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REGULATORY COMPETITION, 
RtGULATORY CAPTURE, AND CORPORATE 
SELF-REGULATION 
WILLI AM W. BRATTONt 
AND 
JosEPH A. McCA HERY77 
In this Article, Professors Bratton and McCahery explore, 
in the larger framework of corporate governance, the positioning 
of legal barriers to shareholder action regarding corporate charters. 
The authors first trace the problems inherent in the management-
shareholder agency relationship and clarify the arguments 
supporting and criticizing the two prevailing "deterrent" strategies 
for regulating corporate management-fiduciary control and 
market control. The authors adopt the view that a third 
strategy-enforced self-regulation through institutional shareholder 
participation-can be more effective, but stress economic 
limitations on the class of situations in which shareholder initiative 
can be expected to yield concrete governance benefits. The Article 
contends that, given these limitations, the present allocation of state 
and federal authority over corporate governance should be 
adjusted in order fully to realize the potential benefits of 
institutional shareholder participation. In the authors' view, 
regulatory competition among the states causes state law unduly to 
constrain the field of action for shareholder initiative in much the 
same way that it already impairs the operation of the fiduciary and 
market deterrents. To support this view, the Article offers a 
public-choice analysis of the charter competition system. Under 
this, the system operates to embed the capture of state political 
decisionmakers by corporate managers and only intermittently 
promotes innovation and assures legal responsiveness to the 
preferences of investors. This analysis leads the authors to 
propose a federally mandated privilege of shareholder access to 
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state corporate charters to approve amendments on matters of 
process and structure. They argue that this proposal is well-suited 
to the background of incentives that determine the level and 
character of institutional shareholder participation, and that its 
enactment would not impede the operation of charter competition 
systems in its beneficial aspect. 
I NTROD UCTION 
Corporate law currently faces the problem of effectuating 
contractual governance in an agency system that insulates agents from 
market constraints. 1 This governance discussion focuses on pos-
sibilities for strengthening the shareholders' role in the ongoing 
negotiation of incomplete corporate contracts. Proponents of 
institutional shareholder participation have taken the lead by mapping 
out shareholder-driven strategies for monitoring and compensation 
systems that will more effectively control the costs of management 
influence activities within the firm. 2 These strategies force 
proponents to confront long-standing economic and legal barriers to 
shareholder action. 
In this Article, we carry this legal confrontation to subject matter 
so far largely exempted from the discussion-state corporate law and 
the system of incentives that forms it. More particularly, we 
recommend partial federal preemption of state law's allocation to 
management of agenda control over corporate charter amendments. 
We argue that this intervention will ameliorate some of the cost and 
incentive barriers that impede shareholder action. 
This recommendation requires us to confront the theory of 
regulatory competition that legitimates the state system. We base our 
challenge to this theory on a reinspection-conducted without the use 
of a general equilibrium lens3-of the internal negotiating structure 
that forms corporate law. This reinspection reveals that charter 
competition results in state laws that inhibit the negotiation of 
contract terms that could both alleviate problems of informational 
1. Cf Jason Scott Johnston , The Influence of TH E NATURE OF THE FIRM on the 
Th eory of Co rporate Law, 18 J. CORP. L. 213,241-44 (1993) (noting that contractarian firm 
theories that rely on market constraints provide no account of the mechanisms that will 
lead to long-run efficiencies) (citing PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOM ICS, OR-
GANI ZATI ON AND MANAGEMENT 192-94, 277-79 (1992)). 
2. See Paul Milgram & John Roberts , An Economic Approach to Influence Activities 
in Organization, 94 AM. J. Soc. S154, S156 (Supp. 1988). 
3. Th at is, we do not assume that competition among the states in the production of 
corporate law, taken alone, over time wi ll assure th e evolution of an optimal lega l regime. 
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asymmetry between managers and monitors and help to realign 
incentives to reduce the costs of management influence.~ 1l1is Article 
depicts a self-regulatory system, composed of firms and state 
lawmaking institutions, in which competition among the states ensures 
the system's capture by corporate management influence. It then 
draws on political theory to provide a guide for deai ing with the 
problem. This learning from the field of public regulation highlights 
the formative role that process and structure rules pl ay in capture's 
amelioration. We adapt it to the private corporate governance 
situation and conclude that removing some of the states' mandatory 
process rules would create opportunities for shareholder participation 
in contract negotiation and for shareholder influence on the formation 
of state law. 
Part I provides an overview of our proposal for agenda access for 
shareholder-proposed amendments to the firm's contract. This 
discussion examines the objectives and strategies of the shareholder 
participation movement in the context of corporate law's historic 
debates over governance strategies and state lawmaking systems. 
Part II critically reviews the market-based justification of the 
charter competition system and the historic alternative of fiduciary-
based blanket federal preemption. It asserts that the market 
perspective is infirm in two respects. First, it understates the effects 
of regulatory capture because it fails to recognize that the system does 
not provide shareholders with either an effective exit route, or, in the 
alternative, an adequate opportunity to register political demands. 
4. c;: Paul Milgram & John Roberts, Bargaining Cos1s, In flu ence Cos/5, and rhe 
Organizalion of Economic Activily, in P ERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
57, 82 (James A. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990) (noting the role of distorted 
information in the decision-making process of central authorities). Under Milgram and 
Roberts's "influence cost" model of the firm, th e firm must confront problems of 
informational asymmetry if it is to make and support efficient choices. The problem is that 
decision-makers must obtain and rely upon information generated by others. Employees 
and other players, by virtue of their place within th e organization, possess information that 
could have a significant impact on decisions mad e by principals. Absent suffici ent 
incentives to release these information rents, the agents will use this information to 
influence the decisions of those above them in the hi e rarchy. According to Milgram and 
Roberts, the problem for an actor higher in the hierarchy attempting to monitor these 
agents is this asymmetric information-the asymmetry ·'prevents easy determination of 
whether a particular observed action or outcome corresponds to desirable behavior and 
thus renders the problem nontrivial." Milgram & Roberts, supra note 2, at 156. 
Shareholder participation strategies seek to alleviate the asymmetric information 
problem in the public corporation with devices such as process reforms (which take the 
initiative in the design of internal incentive schemes away from management) and direct 
placement of independent monitors in the boardroom. See infra notes 148-241 and 
accompanying text. 
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Second, the market perspective offers an overly simplistic picture of 
the incentives that determine the behavior in Delaware, the leading 
chartering state. In the capture model presented here, state-federal 
political instability emerges as a positive fo rce that occasionally forces 
D elaware to confront conflicting demands of managers and 
sb.areholders and effect a somewhat rr1cre even-handed mediation 
between the two groups. The mo 1cl aho suggests caution in the 
selection of a legal correc: tive to the capture problem: D iscre te 
federa l intervention to facili ta te shareholder participation in corporate 
contracting emerges as preferable to blanket preemption. In our 
view, federal preemption that instit.u tionalizes an opportunity to 
register conflicting demands on state lawmakers would not sacrifice 
the relational advantages that flow from corporate law production in 
a small, market-sensitive jurisdiction. 
Part III examines the theories, accomplishments, and open 
agenda items of the institutional shareholder movement. The 
discussion describes and evaluates three participatory modes: discrete 
issue-based voting contests, coalition-based voting for board seats, and 
relational investment in large share blocks. Only the first mode 
clearly passes the tests of cost-benefit feasibility and insusceptibility 
to management capture. In practice, discrete voting contests have 
occurred because they require low out-of-pocket costs and serve as 
vehicles for reputational gain by a narrow segment of institutional 
agents. These agents' reputational interests make them unlikely 
candidates for capture. A t the same time, reputational interests 
render managers vulnerable to the institutions' dialogic activities and, 
therefore, prone to make concessions. Contractual modifications have 
resulted. The second participatory mode, coalition-based board 
voting, holds out the promise of high-intensity monitoring with little 
chance of capture due to absence of capital investment by, and 
reputational profiles of, the hypothesized monitors. H owever, federal 
regulation impedes experimentation , and there are substantial cost 
and incentive barriers. Toe third mode, relational investing, solves 
the problems of coalition-building by making the volunteer monitor 
a substantial equity investor. In theory, this volunteer recoups its 
costs as its equity block increases in va lue due to its input into the 
firm 's governance. Also in theory, this volunteer 's public-regarding5 
profile renders it impervious to the free ride taken by the rest of the 
shareholders. Practical feasibility presents no problem in the sense 
5. T hat is, activated by the inte res ts of the shareholders as a group. 
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that large block investments and attendant governance engagements 
have long occurred in practice. However, a practical problem does 
follow from the magnitude of the actor's investment. Large financial 
stakes make sustained public-regarding relational engagements 
unstable. Both capture by management in exchange for separately 
nego tiated rents and defection into the camp of a host ile offeror 
rema in structural possibilities. 
Pa rt IV asserts that practical barriers to exper imentation \'>' ith the 
second and third modes of shareholder participation make it 
worthwhile to recommend federal intervention against state-mandated 
agenda control. This discussion details the restrictive effects of state 
law's agenda mandate, describes the central role of charter com-
petition in the mandate 's evolution , and proposes limited fe deral 
intervention to ensure a shareholder privilege to initiate charter 
amendments. We recognize that shareholder initiative could lead to 
rent-seeking and the emergence of voting cycles. To ameliorate the 
rent-seeking problem, the proposal limits access to matters of process 
and structure. To cut off the cycling activity, the proposal includes a 
set of ancillary process rules. 
I. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL GOVERNANCE STRATEGIES AND 
STATE CORPORATION LAW 
A. Deterrent Governance Strategies and State Charter Competition 
An unsatisfactory organizational incentive scheme hampers the 
performance of large corporations. Opportunistic managers often 
exert excessive influence over their governance mechanisms, 
exploiting a collective action barrier to effective monitoring by 
dispersed equity owners. Solving this management-shareholder 
agency problem is corporate law's long-standing, unperformed 
assignment. Historically, debate over the appropriate solution has 
centered on two competing deterrent strategies. The first, the 
"fiduciary" strategy, is the corporate version of command and control 
regulation. It follows from assertions by Berte and Means that 
shareholders lack any effective means to monitor the firm themselves, 
that no adjustment of shareholder incentives will cure the problem, 
and that therefore the state must intervene to pick up the slack by 
imposing mandatory rules.6 Under the strict regime envisioned, 
6. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINE R C. M EANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPE RTY 219-21 , 241-52 (Harcourt, Brace & World , Inc. 1968) (1932). 
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process rules that provide entrepreneurial lawyers with financial 
incentives to enforce fiduciary norms address the shareholders ' 
collective action problem. The competing approach, the "market" 
strategy, seeks to deter management shirking by clearing the field for 
the operation of markets for products, management employment, and 
co rpora te control. According to this view, economic actors in fre e 
m<1rke ts can be relied upon to protect themselves, and ov.::r time 
col lect ive ac tion problems solve themselves as fit competitors survive 
in ::1 compe titive environment. Here a different sort ot entrepreneur, 
the hostile tender offeror or proxy contestant, plays the critical 
enforcement role. 7 
lv1ost observers agree that an effective legal model must draw on 
both modes of deterrence, but proponents of the two strategies 
dispute the appropriate weighting of the legal mix. Proponents of 
fiduciary control question the market 's effectiveness in protecting 
shareholders from management opportunism and see mandatory 
fairness norms as necessary supports for systemic confidence. Market 
proponents see fiduciary regulation as a barrier to the market's 
operation in some cases, and otherwise as an unnecessary deadweight 
cost, except where intervention proves necessary to facilitate the 
operation of free transfers of corporate control. 
This debate repeats itself when attention turns to the po litical 
structure of corporate lawmaking. The federal system8 leaves matters 
of corporate organizational structure and fiduciary standards to th e 
states; corporations remain free to choose their states of incor-
poration.9 Since corporate charters produce rents for the states, the 
states compete to attract charters. Proponents of fiduciary regulation 
see this regulatory competition as a "race to th e bottom": Since the 
managers have captured the governance mechanisms of the states' 
corporate customers, competition for charters by the states devolves 
on the provision of special benefits to managers, weakening the 
7. Compa re Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control 
Transacrions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 passim (1982) (applying market stra tegy to sales of control) 
with Victor Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corpora1e Distribwions and 
Reorganization, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1072 passim (1983) (applying fiduciary strategy to sa les 
of control). 
8. American corporate Jaw has evolved with the national government assuming 
responsibility only for regulation of information flow in the secur ities markets; it imposes 
a mandatory disclosure regime on public corporations with a combination of administrative 
and entrepreneurial enforcement techniques. 
9. American conflict of laws rules respect the law of a corporation's nominal 
domicile. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF L AWS§ 302 (1971). 
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fiduciary regime. Tnerefore, a preemptive, fiduciary-based federal 
corporate law regime is the recommended remedy. 10 Market 
proponents counter that market controls ensure that efficient 
governance structures result as the states respond to the managers' 
demands. Tnis "race to the top" obviates any need for federal 
intervention. 11 
B. Insriwtional lnvesrur Parriciparion and a Strategy of Enforced Self-
Regulation 
These debates over deter rent strategies and charter com petition 
have been complicated in practice by two developments. one negative 
and the other positive. First, the negative: During the 1980s, state 
lawmakers took an active role in impairing the mark et deterrent, 
contributing to the collapse of takeover activity. This prompted 
reappraisal of the race to the top and race to the bottom views of 
charter competition and the emergence of an intermediate view 
recognizing that competition has both positive and negative effects. 
Next , the positive development: The collapse of the takeover market 
coincided with the advent of active institutional investor participation 
in corporate governance. 12 This prompted the articulation of a third 
strategy for dealing with the agency problem: enforced self-
regulation.13 Under this third strategy, shareholders can avoid the 
10. The most prominent advocate of this view was William Cary. See William L. Cary. 
Federalism and Corporare Law: Reflecriorzs Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663. 696-705 
(1974). 
11. The mos t prominent advocate of this view is Ralph Winter. See Ralph W. Winter. 
Scare Lmv, Shareholder Protecriorz, and rhe Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 
251 passim (1 977). 
12. These events had profo und implications for corporate legal theory. lt became 
apparent that the theoretical resources of neoclassical economic analysis of Jaw could not 
adequately describe the events taking place . The result was a renewed interes t in both the 
politics of domestic corporate law and the comparison of foreign institutions. For 
discussion of the break and the shortcomings of the comparative inquiry. see Richard M. 
Buxbaum. Compararive A spects of Institutional Investment and Corpora1e Governance, in 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTO RS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 3 passim (Theodor Baums 
et al. eds., 1994). 
13. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TR ANSCEN DING 
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 101-04 (1992). Ayres and Braithwaite distinguish between 
"enforced self-regulation" and "coregulation" in administrative law. !d. at 102. Under the 
former, the state and the regulated firm negotiate over standards tailored to the firm . The 
latter, which prevails in the U.S. securities industry , involves self-regulation by an industry 
association with some oversight or ratification by the government. Ayres and Braithwaite 
explore possib ilities for enforced self-regulation on the theory that th e subcontracting of 
the regulatory function to private actors under ultimate government supervision could lead 
to greater fl ex ibility in the formulation of the terms of regulation and effectiveness of 
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need to rely on legal and market deterrents to the extent that they 
effectively negotiate the corporate contract themselves and monitor 
its performance. 
Self- regulatory strategies are not new to corporate governance. 
Indeed, self-regulation by means of a legally mandated shareholder 
vote for the board of directors is the system's historic base point. 
Commentators have debated plans to improve this se lf-regulatory 
structure 's performance for decades. '"owever, since those ear lier 
proposals all followed from the Berle and i\11eans assumptions, no one 
expected that independent internal monitors could be imposed on 
management by unilateral shareholder directive. Instead, the 
proponents sought voluntary acceptance by management of oversight 
by independent directors and pursued a dialogic implementation 
strategy. The proponents advocated a norm of majority independent 
board membership and attempted to have such a requirement inserted 
into the canon of proper business practices. 14 Success was achieved 
in form but not in substance: The norm found its way into the canon 
only to be subverted in practice by management influence. By the 
enforcement. !d. at 102-32. 
We think the concept usefully describes the mode of corporate governance envisioned 
by proponents of participation by institutional investors. The context is different , of 
course. Here the enforcing actor is not a government agency but the firm's shareholders; 
no immediate ly available sove reign mandate skews bargaining positions when the parties 
negotiate over governance tenns. Thus we do not empl oy the se lf-regulation concept to 
import a "pub lic" coloration into a "pri vate " contractual matter. However, we do take the 
position th at state mandates are already inex tricab ly bound up in the dete rmin ation of the 
potential scope of enfo rced se lf-regu lation by shareholders and that their readjustment is 
an app ropr iate subject matter for corporate Jaw refonn . 
14. Manda tory independent board structure was proposed in the first draft of the 
American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project, but was cut back to precatory 
status in late r versions a t the insistence of management representatives. Compare 
PRINCrPALS OF CORPORATE GOVE RNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS§ 3.03 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1982) (proposing mandatory majority 
of indepen de nt directors) with 1 PRINCIPALS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYS IS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3A.01 (1994) (recommending majority of independent 
directors as practice suggestion) ; see also MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF 
THE CORPORATION: A LEGA L ANALYSIS 170-85 (1976) (recommending mandate). For 
a review of the politics of the AU Corporate Governance Project proceedings, see 
Jonathan R. Macey, The Transformarion of che American Law Institute, 61 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1212 passim (1993). 
Proponents of both fiduciary and market deterrence strategies took a dim view of 
mandatory independent boa rds. Compare Victor Brudney, The Independent Direc-
tor-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 609-12 (1 982) (em-
phasizing that the directors' duty of vigilance would be constrained by their need to 
interact with other directors) with Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governan ce 
Movemenr, 35 V AND. L. REV. 1259, 1280-86 (1982) (arguing that use of independent 
directors is detrimental to profit max imiza tion ). 
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end of the 1980s, almost three-quarters of A merican directors were 
outsiders; management nevertheless retained control of the selection 
process, and sixty- three percent of the outside directors selected were 
chief executive offi cers of othe r public companies. 15 
Ins titutional investor participation changes this picture, holding 
out a prospect of se lf-r::: g.ulation enforced by the sha :-e i-: olders 
themseives. rf11e theorv nos its that concen trated institu tional eauity 
,.1 .I _l. 
. ' li l . . • 1 l . . f" . 17 ~ o\vnershr p ' m;.L<:es JOm t srn .re.1.0 Ci er actio n cost e,rec::tlve. - i: 'rac-
• ' 1-.. J" . ' 1-- ' d " . . . . I Lee nns uegun to va 1ctate tne Lr eory s pre _.tiCtion. as !TISt1t1Jtlona! 
shareholders have used the ir voting power to get results. Successful 
publicity and issue-based proxy campaigns against underpe rforming 
companies have prompted management concessions on governance 
provisions, and in the most dramatic cases, boardroom shakeups.1s 
rTheorists, however, ask for more thoroughgoing engagements than 
these discrete and relatively inexpensive exercises can provide. They 
have mapped strategies for sustained rela tionships between managers 
and institutional monitors, looking to the use of institutional votes to 
nominate and elect expert outside monitors, and the placement of 
substantial blocks of shares with public-regarding institutional owners. 
These more ambitious and costly proposals have not yet been tes ted 
in practice. 
Shareholder participation strategies are an attractive altern ative 
to the two deterrent strategies. The payoff for costly action by 
shareholder volunteers comes from improved inves tment policy and 
day-to-day management. This expands on th e payoff of the fi duciary 
deterrent and promises governance beneflts formerly in the market's 
exclusive preserve. Corpora te law's duty of loyalty focuses on a 
limited class of moral hazard 1'J problems; its duty of care avoids 
·------·----- - ---
15. JAY W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER , PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE 
REA LITY OF AMER ICA'S CORPO RATE BOARDS 17-18 (1989). 
16. This proportion passed 50% du ring the 1980s. See CENTER FOR LAW & ECON. 
STUD IES, fnsrirwi onal Investors and Cap ital Markers: 1991 Upda te , COLUi'vt. 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR PROJEcr, at Table 19 (1991 ). 
17. See infra notes 154-58 and accompanying tex t. For an exce ll ent review of the 
proposa ls on the table, see Aleta G. Estre icher, Beyond Agency Costs: !Vlanaging the 
Corporation for th e L ong Term, 45 RUTG ERS L. REV. 513. 593-612 (1993). 
18. See infra notes 162-80 and accompanying tex t. 
19. Milgrom and Roberts defin e moral hazard in tenns of "postcomraclllal 
opportunism that arises when act ions required or desired under the con tract are not fr ee ly 
observable ." See MILG ROM & ROBERTS, supra note I, at 167; see also Ian Ayres & Peter 
Cramton, Relational In vesting an d Agency Theory, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1033, 1044 (1994) 
(suggesting tha t moral hazard "stems fr om the agent's 'hidden action'"). T his framework 
can be used to describe corporate law's garden varie ty conflict of interest transaction: A 
board with insufficient in fo rma tion respect ing incentives is more li ke ly to approve on e-
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mqmry into the adverse selection20 problems that lead to unsuc-
cessful business plans. This limited scope follows from limited 
enforcement resources: Judges intervening ex post can untangle 
conflict-of-interest transactions and structure remedies, but infor-
mation al complexities put investments and operations outside their 
com p<:: tence.21 The takeover, in con trast , addresses all of these 
age problerns and, at least in theory, creates value for shareholders 
through their elimination. However. it s widespread employment 
cl urin z the 1980s gave rise to a perceived problem of perverse effects. 
It ap peared that prospects for short-term gain could induce the 
takeover of a well-managed firm, thereby chilling productive long-
term investment. It also appeared that readily available debt 
financing could lead to speculative overbidding and subsequent 
bankruptcy costs. 
Shareholder participation strategies promise to avoid these 
prob lems. They seek a competency payoff by placing effective 
monitors inside the firm. There, with access to the full set of 
information, the monitors will effect necessary changes through 
sided deals; rationally apathetic shareholders will take no action in response. 
20. Mi!grom and Roberts define adverse selection in terms of the 
kind of pos/contracwal opportunism that arises when one party to a bargain has 
private information about something that affects the other 's net benefit from the 
contract and when only those whose private information implies that the contract 
will be especially disadvantageous for the other party to agree to the contract. 
l\:!ILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 595. In this context, adverse selection stems from 
the agent's hidden infom1ation. A board with inad equate information cannot fully 
evaluate the agent's capabilities and performance, making it difficult to ensure the 
selecti on of the most able agents. See Ayres & Cramton. supra note 19, at 1044. 
iV!ore generally, fiduciary law is ill-suited to the control of managers' influence 
activiti es th a t have negative consequences for the firm. In the Milgrom and Roberts 
model, influence activity is the time and effort spent by rational, self-interested actors in 
firms to influence decisions. Some of this activity may benefit the firm, but it also results 
in questionable pay increases, unnecessarily large budgets, acceptance of suboptimal 
projects and proposals , and rejection of worthwhile proposals. See Milgrom & Roberts, 
supra note 2, at S155-56. 
21. This limitation of scope, embodied in the business judgment rule, stems from a 
recognition of informational constraints on the process of judicial enforcement. The risk-
return calculations prevailing at the time of initial investment cannot be reconstructed ex 
pos1; the fact of failure invites the ascription of incompetence to conduct better described 
as considered risk-taking. Aggressive fiduciary inquiry into investment policy would over-
deter risky investment. The corporate duty of care, accordingly, strikes only at extreme 
cases of incompetence. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885-86 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 
460 U.S. 1051 (1983); Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 , 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1 924). The Delaware 
Supreme Court has created an exception by strictly scrutinizing the process employed in 
the boa rdroom of the acquired firm in a friendly merger. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 
Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 368 (Del. 1993); Smith v. Van Gorkom. 488 A.2d 858,893 (Del. 1985). 
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cooperation and persuasion. The deterrent strategies, in contrast , lead 
to punishment payoffs. The more widespread their use, the more a 
management subculture of resistance to outside regulation becomes 
entrenched.22 
This picture of productive relational engagement by shareholders 
is still largely aspirationa l. So far, institutional victories in discrete 
engagements have followed from the efforts of agents of public 
pension funds. These actors take the role of political en treprene urs 
and act from motivations more reputational than financi al. A lth ough 
agents of private pension funds, mutual funds, banks, and insurance 
companies control the overwhelming portion of institutional equity 
holdings, they have not emerged as leading players in the game. 23 
It remains unclear wheth er concrete cash payoffs can be rea lized from 
the loose cost-benefit projections that support the relational strategies. 
A number of sticking points impede testing of the relational 
models. First, no one has devised an incentive scheme that integrates 
investment in governance participation with the range of agency 
arrangements that obtain in the different investment institutions.24 
Second, substantial legal impediments to shareholder collective action 
remain on the books. Early pressure for reform has resulted in some 
significant changes-paternalistic barriers to coordinated institutional 
action in issue contests have been removed from the federal proxy 
rules, but full-scale testing of relational models of shareholder 
participation awaits the implementation of a broader program to 
curtail the scope of the federal securities laws.25 1l1ird, a nascent 
incentive problem lies unresolved in the interplay between self-
22. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 13, at 19-20. The part ici pat ion strategy 
also looks reasonable in a loose comparative cost survey. The instituti ona l volunteers do, 
of course, incur the up-front costs of campaigning, coalition building, or direct investment. 
That inves tment does not occur, however, absent the prospect of a greater performance 
payoff, and that payoff ultimately benefits the shareholders as a group. Meanwhile, 
significant costs attending the deterrent strategies are avoided. Fiduciary law carries the 
deadwe ight cost of corporate subsidy of hostile, labor-intensive judicial processes even in 
the meritorious case , and additional costs from nonmeritorious cases stemming from the 
unso lved problem of process incentives to plaintiffs' lawyers to hold up firms for quick 
se ttlements. Takeovers, although said to create shareholder value overall, see, e.g., 
Roberta Romano, A Guide 10 Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regularion , 9 YALE J. 
ON REG . 119, 152-54 (1992) , do not necessarily benefit the sharehold ers of the acquiring 
firm, see, e.g., BernardS. Black, Bidder Overpaymenr in Takeovers , 41 STAN. L. REV. 597, 
614-15 (1989); Richard Roll , The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporare Takeovers, 59 J. Bus. 197 
passim (1 986) , and entail enormous transaction costs. 
23. See infra notes 198-208 and accompanying text. 
24. See infra notes 229-40 and accompanying text. 
25. See infra note 244 and accompanying text. 
1872 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
regulation by shareholders and market deterrence by takeover. The 
institutional participation movement has proceeded during a cyclical 
low in merger and acquisition activity. An upturn in the merger cycl e 
and resurgence of hostil e activity26 wou ld reweight the institutions ' 
payoff pattern away from patient engagement in favor of defection 
and short-term gain. That, in turn. would diminish management 's 
incent ive to cooperate.27 
C. A Federally 1\!Jandared Privilege of Shareholder Iniciative 
R ecent commentaries on shareholder participation focus on 
barriers to the realization of the full relational models. This Article, 
in contrast , examines the legal landscape that channels discret e 
institutional interventions and explores possibilities for expanding the 
menu of contractual reforms attainable through shareholder initiative. 
In so doing, it constructs a theoretical case for a reform proposal 
made in passing many times in the past:2R federal preemption of 
state law's allocation to management of an exclusive privilege to 
initiate corporate charter amendments. We revive this proposal with 
two consequences in mind. First, recent institutional accomplishments 
suggest that levelling of the state law playing field could lead to 
26. An upturn in the merger cycle has occurred during the last two years, but hostil e 
takeover activity remains spo radic. See infra note 236. 
27. At the same time, new incentives to defect to the management side would ari se 
in a case in which the sharehold er volunteer holds a substantial block o f stock and state 
fiduci ary law proves incapable of policing a side deal. See infra notes 232-40 and 
accompanying text. 
28. See, e.g .. Bern ard S. Blac k, Is Corporate Lmv Trivial?: A Po litical and Econom ic 
Analysis , 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 542, 582 (1990) (propos ing a fed eral requirem ent for public 
companies that a maj ority of shareholders elect to be governed by changes in state Ja w 
that affect the divi sion of power between man agement and shareholde rs); Cary. supra note 
10, at 701-03: John C. Coffee. Jr .. Th e Fwure of Corporate Federalism: Stale Compelilion 
and the New Trend To ward De FaciO Federal Minimum S1andards , 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 
759. 774-77 (1987) (propos ing shareholder initiative by the use of proxy statement to opt 
out of sta te rules, amend the charter and change the state of incorporation); see also SEC 
Concept Release on Takeovers and Contests for Corporate Control, Exchange Act 
Release No . 34-23486, 51 Fed. Reg. 28,096, 28,100-02 (1986) (suggesting self-governance 
exemptions to specific tender offer rules); SEC Advisory Commiuee Report on Tender 
Offers , Fed . Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) , Special Report No. 1028, at 37-41 (July 8. 1983) 
(recomm ending annual shareholder advisory votes on golden parachutes , standstill 
agreements. and supermajority and disenfranchising charter provisions); cf ROBERTA 
ROMANO, TH E G EN IUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 83-84 (1993) (herein aft er 
ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAw) (proposing change of statutory defaults fr om opt-
out to opt -in at the sta te level) ; Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence 
and Interesl Group Formation: A Case Swdy of th e SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 
909, 944 (1994) (proposing that Congress should preempt state antit akeover sta tutes, 
leaving shareholders to make decisions respecting takeover defenses). 
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patterns of corporate contracting that begin to resemble those 
resulting between actors at arms ' length. Second, the combination of 
institutional leadership and shareholder access to the charter could 
invigorate the charter market. Given a path for the effective 
registration of shareholder demands, states would have an incentive 
to take shareholder preferc::nces into account in the construction of 
coroorate lavv 's mandato rv orovisions. 
1 J 1 
It is possible that rent- :sceki ng by sh<ueholder coalition-builders 
could lead to perverse effects if an access mandate \Vere extended to 
matters of investment and other business decisions. 29 Our goals are 
modest, however, and the ir satisfaction does not require unlimited 
shareholder access. Accordingly, we would limit the subject matter 
scope of mandatory shareholder access to charter terms bearing on 
governance process and structure. To prompt the reorientation of the 
political calculations of state lawmakers, our operative concept of 
permitted amendments wo uld extend to the decision as to state of 
incorporation. 
This proposal also has a theoretical goal. The program to 
restructure corporate law to accommodate the economic possibility of 
shareholder-enforced self-regulation implies the adjustment of 
prevailing notions of corporate federalism. An inconsistency has 
developed in the commentary. On the one hand, no one questions 
that state law's grant of control of the corporate voting agenda to 
management restricts shareholder enforcement opportunities.30 On 
the other hand, the law reform movement tends to press against only 
the federal side of a two-sided system, foregoing consideration of the 
state law (and federalism) implications of shareholder participation 
strategies.31 This imbalance is surprising given the consensus view 
that the competition-driven state system imposed excessive constraints 
on the operation of the ma rket deterrent during the 1980s. 
Two explanations for the imbalance suggest themselves, one 
practical, the other theoretical. First, proponents of shareholder 
participation formulate their agenda with the urgency of activists, 
29. On this point we follow Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice 
and Game Theoreric Approach ro Corporate Law, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 347, 376-81 (1991) 
(hereinafter Gordon, Shareholder fniriative]. 
30. See, e.g, Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agenrs: The Promise of lnstitwionat 
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 825-26 (1992) (hereinafter Black, Agents] . 
31. The exception is Gordon, Shareholder Iniriative, supra note 29, at 357-59, which 
concludes that the system confirms the prediction of the market efficiency story. 
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either selecting immediately attainable improvements32 or confron-
ting unavoidable barriers to full realization . Charter access for 
process and structure amendments fits neither profile. The 
complicated politics of federal intervention give it a lo·w rank on the 
feasibi lity list ,33 and, in any event, access promises incremental rather 
than fu ndamental improvement in th~ agency relationship. Second, 
concept ua l barriers impede reapprais::il of the regulatory allocation 
betwee n national and state governmen ts. The reform agenda reflects 
the view that shareholder-enforced se lf-reg ula tion is perversely 
impeded by federal regulations promulgated long ago by actors under 
the influence of Berle and Means.34 Historically, suggestions for 
federal preemption have followed from th e same, discredited35 set of 
assumptions. More recent arguments for fede ral preemption have 
taken steps to cure this infirmity by bringing to bear both a relational 
contract perspective and the economic presuppositions of the market 
deterrent approach.36 However, the cure is incomplete because these 
new calls for preemption continue to include the Berle and Means 
remedy of a state-mandated fiduciary deterrent. 37 Still unaddressed 
is the central federalism concern that fede ral intervention imports a 
risk of blanket preemption that destroys the responsive benefits of 
jurisdictional competition?8 As a result, the market competition 
32. See John C. Coffee, Jr.. Th e SEC and the In stirutional lnvesror: A Half- Time 
Report , IS CARDOZO L. REV. 837,900-02 ( 1994) (hereinafter Coffee, Half-Tim e Repon] 
(sugges ting implementation by SEC rulemaking); Ronal d J. Gilson & Reinier K raakm an, 
R.eirzve111ing !he O utside Direelor: An Agenda fo r fnstirurional Invesrors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 
863. 865 , 883-84 (1991) (here inafter Gilson & Kraakman , !nstinuional Agenda] (proposing 
inst itutional board monitors by means of shareholder se lf-help); Joseph A. Grund fest, Jus! 
Vote No: A Min imalist Strategy f or Dealing ~vith Barbarians Inside th e Cates . 45 STAN. L. 
REV. 857, 903-08 (1993) (recommending purely dialogic strategy). 
33. See ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 50, 75-84. 
34. Or, more generally, it follows from earl y twentieth century populism. See, e.g., 
Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 
32-45 (1991). 
35. Here we speak from the point of view of others. In our view, the Berle and 
Means description may or may not carry force in the future, depending on the success of 
the shareholder participation movement. 
36. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and th e Corpora/ion: The Desirable Limits 
on Slate Competition in Corporate Law, lOS H ARV. L. REv. 1435, 1458-67 (1992); David 
Charny, Competition Among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Law Rules: An 
American Perspective on the "Race to !he Bouom" in !h e Eu ropean Communities , 32 HARV. 
INT'L L.J. 423 , 442-53 (1991). 
37. See Bebchuk, supra note 36, at 1500-07. 
38. ROiv!ANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE L AW , supra note 28, at 82-83. 
1995] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1875 
model of state la-w still carries sufficient validating force to discourage 
consideration of structural adjustments.39 
The federalism discussion should be disaggregated and the 
benefits and burdens evaluated in light of the regulatory stra tegy that 
informs a specific proposal for intervention. That step accomplished, 
a powerful case emerges for minimal intervention to inc re ase the 
menu of subjects fo r shareholder initiative. The recent, 
unpreceden ted success of the shareholder activis ts invites 
reexamination of legai restrictions on shareholder voice fo r The first 
time since the restrictions appeared in state law a century ago_-+o The 
charter compe tition system prevents states from undertaking this 
review because it effects the capture of state lawmakers by 
management interests. There is, of course, nothing intrinsically 
unacceptable about a captured sovereign, as the political theory 
undergirding the market justification of the system teaches. Never-
theless, nothing in that theory also dictates the conclusion that this 
particular situation of capture enhances economic welfare. Previously, 
that conclusion was reached only on two assumptions: market 
constraints in any event cure the capture's negative effects; and state-
mandated agenda control is irrelevant because collective-action 
constraints prevent shareholders from availing themselves of an 
opportunity to voice preferences internally. Neither assumption is 
safe today; state lawmakers undercut the first during the 1980s, and 
institutional shareholders thereafter rendered the second obsolete. 
Thus, the legal terms that perpetuate the one-sided capture of 
state law need no longer be accepted as the best available, provided 
that the proposed adjustment makes both the captured sovereign and 
the regul ated firm more responsive to the excluded shareholder 
interest. H owever, any proposed federal adjustment also must leave 
unimpaired such benefits of responsiveness to the preferences of 
actors in economic organizations as the state system does provide. 
The minimal intervention suggested here meets that burden.4 1 
39. Fo r a manifesta ti on of thi s thinking in a fed e ral lawmaking context, see S. REP. 
No. 265, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1987) (observing that state corporate laws work well 
and th at Congress has a lways decided against fed e ralization) . 
40. See infra notes 275-83 and accompanying text. 
41. T o kee p the discussion manageable, we avoid mentioning th e problem of 
constituency pa rticipation. We acknowledge, however, that this corporate governance 
problem is close ly re lated to th a t of shareholder access and ultimate ly must be confronted 
as corpora te law evo lves to accommoda te institutiona l investor initiatives. Accordingly, 
our focus on th e shareholder interest should not be taken to presuppose adherence to the 
share holde r primacy norm implicit in much of the governance litera ture . Richard M. 
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More broadly, a strictly market-based theory of regulatory 
competition provides an inadequate framework for appraising the 
law's role in facilitating effective organiza tional incentive schemes.42 
The market-based model understates the distortions that result from 
the interplay of mul ti ple sovereigns and interest groups in the 
reso lutio n of corporate commitmen t. information, and en forcem·~n t 
problern:\. 
sovereiQn n13ndate bv one contra::ting grou·o and in Dart fr om the 
._! ..1 ._... ,_,. 1 l_ 
absence of a contrac tua l avenue for rea lignment of the sovereign 's 
incentives by the competing group. Tnis mixed problem of economics 
and politics calls for a mixed political and economic solution. Iclealiy, 
the political solution should be shaped to leave the ultimate resolution 
of the corporate agency problems to the economic actors themselves, 
and leave sovereign actors with incentives to make balanced responses 
when their oreferences conflict. Federal intervention would facilitate 
l 
that result if it refrained from displacing the states' role in corporate 
law creation and instead realigned the positions of the three parties 
to the corporate contract-management, shareholders, and state 
government-to allocate shareholders a seat at the bargaining table. 
II. C ORPORATE CHARTER COMPETITION AND THE PROBLEMS OF 
REGULATORY CAPTURE AND REGULATORY RESPONSIVEN ESS 
This part of the A rticle reconsiders the debate between critics 
and proponents of charter competition and proposes a modified 
description of th e system. From the critics' perspective, the charter 
market fa cilitates managerial capture of state iawmakers and prevents 
the evolution of an effective fiduciary deterrent. The proponen ts, in 
contrast, applaud market impediments to the development of fi duciary 
controls and describe a mechanism that assures state responsiveness 
to the preferences of economic actors. We assert that neither position 
remains viable in the present environment. The critics tend to 
overstate the problem: Capture, taken alone, does not de legitimate 
Buxbaum , ins1inaional Owners and Corporale Managers: A Comparative Perspec!ive, 57 
BROOK. L. REV. 1, 41 (1991 ), notes that institutionalized labor-management cooperation 
along European lines need not be a zero-sum gam e, and we agree. We also think that 
Buxbaum, id. at 42-45, plausibly looks to governance innovations stemming from 
institutionai initiatives as a potential beginning point in the evolution of American 
analogues to codetermination. 
42. Such schemes allow opportunistic actors to overcome collective action problems 
in pursuit of the gains of trade, promoting mutual compliance ex post and allowing for 
credible commitments ex anre. See Terry M. Moe, Polilics and !he Theory of Organizmion, 
7 J.L. ECON. & ORGS. 106, 122 (Special Issue 1991). 
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a regulatory regime. They also tend to overplay the solution: By 
displacing Delaware courts from their position as corporate law's 
leading center of dispute resolution, mandatory federal fiduciary 
standards would impair and possibly terminate the operation of a 
useful repository of information and expertise. The proponents tend 
to understate the problem: They describe a relational contract 
witho ut fully exploring its pol iti ca l and process characteristics. ll1is 
relational contract contains not only norm ative mandates, but also 
process mandates that govern the alteration of default terms. 
Furthermore, the capture of the mandating sovereign by one of the 
parties has orevented the evo lution of both ootimal mandates and 
• ' L 
effective ground rules for opting out. The proponents also tend to 
avoid sustained consideration of solutions: The federal mandate can 
be directed to the process side, not only to level the playing field for 
corporate contracting, but also to destabilize a structure that affords 
the states the comfort of having to respond to the demands of only 
one affected interest group. 
A. The Corrupt Sovereign Versus the Responsive Sovereign 
The original case for federal intervention against state charter 
competition combined a public interest theory of regulation with a 
fiduciary strategy for improving corporate law. Professor William L. 
Cary's leading article denounced Delaware, the leading corporate 
domicile,43 as a corrupt sovereign. He undertook a general review 
of its courts' pronouncements and concluded that there appeared to 
be "no public policy left in Delaware corporate law other than the 
objective of raising revenue."~4 To Cary, the "public policy" at stake 
was the integrity of corporate managers, and the revenue objective 
had led a single state to "grant management unilateral control 
untrammeled by other interests,"~5 thereby sacrificing the national 
interest. He looked to federal intervention to eliminate the firms ' 
incentives to incorporate in Delaware.46 
43. Delaware is home to one-ha lf of the largest American corporations, and is the new 
domicile of 80% of reincorporating firms. Roberta Romano, Law as a Produce: Some 
Pieces of the lncorp oracion Pun/e. l J.L. ECON. & ORGS. 225, 244 (1985) [hereinafter 
Romano, Law as Produo]. 
44. Cary, supra note 10, a t 684. 
45. !d. at 698. 
46. !d. at 702. His proposal included not only federal fiduciary standards, but 
shareholder access to the cha rt er and by-laws, the abolition of nonvoting shares, and 
mandatory indemnification rules. !d. 
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Cary assumed that regulation could and should pursue a notion 
of the general good. By the time he published his thesis in 1974, 
however, that theory of regulation had already fall en from favor in 
the social sciences~7 and was replaced by capture theories of 
regulation ... 8 Capture theories described regulation as an arena in 
which special interes ts compete to use government power for 
advantage. They also debunked the pu blic interest sto ry of regulatory 
motivation-now regulators should be expected l O behave no 
differently than actors in private economic relations . ..\9 This shift in 
political theory, coupled with the emerging market deterrent view of 
corporate law, permitted Cary's race to the bottom to be reversed 
into a race to the top.50 
The "race to the top" story drew on the centrai assertion of 
regulatory competition theory-that jurisdictional competition 
ameliorates the distortions that result as interest groups compete for , 
and win, political favors. Under this theory, competition for 
domiciliaries leads to the matching of government policies wi th 
diverse citizen preferences, and thus fosters innovation.51 Citizens 
signal their preferences respecting legal goods and services when they 
migrate from regime to regime. Their ability to exit disempowers 
government actors, whose welfare diminishes as citizens depart, taking 
with them votes and revenues.52 Given competition, law production 
goes forward without losing time on the task of reconciling competing 
preferences. The theory also implies a preference fo r state over 
national lawmaking. Since the revenue enhancement constraint on 
the national government is less intense,53 the national lawmaking 
47. See ~,;lich ael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regula tory Cap111 re, Pu blic Interest, 
and 1he Public A genda: Toward a Symhesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORGS. 167, 167 (1990). 
48. Mancur Olson attacked the optimistic public interest orthodoxy of American 
political sc ience as built on a misguid.o::l conception of the log ic of group action. MANCUR 
OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND TH E THEORY OF 
GROUPS 16-22, 117-31 (1965). Olson claimed that the liberal view that groups form ed 
orga niza tions based on common goals ignored free riding by members of the group. !d. 
at 15-1 6. Since most of the gains from group formation could be captured by all , there was 
very little incentive for groups to organize. !d. at 14-16. 
49. Levine & Forrence, supra note 47, at 168-69. 
50. See Winter, supra note 11, at 254-62. 
51. See ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 4-6. 
52. See Ronald J. Dani els, Should Provinces Compere? The Case for a Compet irive 
Corporare Law Marker, 36 MCGILL L.J . 130, 142-43 (1991). 
53. ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 4-6, 48-51. 
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process will be slower, less responsive to productive concerns, and 
more susceptible to the influence of organized interest groups.5• 
Regulatory competition theory applies to corporate law on th e 
assumption that state corporation codes may be viewed as products 
consumed by corporations.55 In the resulting description, com-
petition fo r the legal business of fi rms forces the sta tes to adapt the 
law to th e dvnamic conditions in which the firms operate.51i Stare 
J ' 
lawn1<!K iiH! emerges as a trial and error process suited to the accurate 
~' ~ 
idcntiflca tion of optimal corporate arrangements. 57 
Reincorporating firms are this market's marginal consumers. 
They see k a predictable legal regime that reduces their costs. 
Delaware provides this with comprehensive case law, well-specified 
indem nifica tion rules, and an expert judiciary.58 The firms also seek 
a guaranty that the new state of domicile will maintain the desirability 
of its code, because the reincorporating firm and the target jurisdic-
tion enter into a relational contract that entails a risk of opportunistic 
breach . Even as the firm invests to gain access to the target 's 
favorable legal regime, the target remains free to change its politics 
and transform itself into an unresponsive jurisdiction.59 Tne com-
54. !d. at 5. In a fed eral system, the allocation of lawmaking power to the compet ing 
states a lso protects individuals from the power of the national gove rnm ent: private 
organizations provide an additional check by counterbalancing the powe r of state 
governments. Na tional reg ulation of corporations would impair thi s corpo rate funct ion 
and thus de tract from individual liberty. See Roberta Romano. The Srare Co mperirion 
Debare in Corpora/e Law , 8 CA RDOZO L. REV. 709, 753 n.97 (1 987). 
55 . ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, mpra note 28, at 6. 
56. Delaware, the leading corporate law state, exce ls in thi s process . !d. at 9. 
57. Romano's study of the spread of innova tion in corporation codes found th ;lt 
inn ova ti ons spread rapidly in a pattern resembling the S-sha ped diffusion curve of 
technological innova tions. Romano, Law as Product, supra note 43 , at 234-35. Her study 
of state responsiveness. id. at 237-40, found that the more responsive sta tes ga in more and 
lose fewer incorporations, and that state responsiveness bears a significant posi ti ve 
correlation to the proportion of state revenues derived from franchise taxes. id. 
58. ROM ANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 32-40. Romano has 
backed thi s cost-reduction assertion with a study of public corporation domicile changes 
between 1960 and 1982. See Romano, Law as Product, supra note 43, a t 242. The stud y 
shows th at corporations tend to change domiciles in advance of either a public offe ring. 
an acq uisiti ons program, or the promulgation of antitakeover measures. !d. at 250. They 
incur substantial costs in so doing, including the one-time costs of the move, the possibi lit y 
of app raisa l claims, and , in the case of co rporations moving to Delaware. the present 
nega ti ve va lue of an additional la ye r of high franchi se taxes. RO MANO, G EN IUS OF 
CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 34-35. The benefits mostly stem from the threa t of 
litigation-all three of the identified transactional occasions for changes of domicil e en tail 
litigation risks. 
59. New Jersey did this early in the twentieth century, precipitating a mass movement 
of corporations across the river to Delaware. Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware's 
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petitive jurisdiction has to reduce this possibility by offering a credible 
commitment. Delaware's commitment stems from its dependence on 
franch ise tax revenues.60 These revenues are an "intangible asset" 
that emerges from the combination of a large number of incor-
porations and a sma ll population . Delaware also invests in real assets 
soecific to its in coroora tion busi ness-its case law and its Ji udicial and 
1 l 
administrative e:·:oen ise. These, to gether \vith LJebware's co -~ e . 
l ~ . 
consti tu te repu w tiornl capit2l. Delaware protects this storehouse of 
capital by impo::;ing in ternal process and structure rules th at deter 
poli tical disruption .A1 TI1is store of capital bolsters the state's market 
pos ition. Other states cannot credibly precommit to offer superior 
service, and thus are de terred from incurring the necessary start-up 
costs. A fi rst-mover advantage in Delaware resul ts.li2 
As original ly articulated, this market-based race to the top 
validation of state law bypassed the problem of the shareholders' lack 
of influence over state lawmaking with a reference to the control 
market deterrent. The assertion, in effect, was that the managers' 
General Corporarion Law of 1899, 1 DEL. J . CORP. L. 249, 265-70 (1976). 
60. ROMANO, G ENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, a t 38-39. Franchise taxes 
amoun ted to 17.7% of De laware 's total tax revenues in 1990. !d. at 10. 
61. These includ e its direction of corporate matters to a specia lized chancery court . 
its practice of appointin g rather th an electing its judges and limiting them to 12-yea r terms. 
and its requirement of two-thirds majorities in both houses of its legislature for the 
approval of corporati on code amendmen ts. !d. at 38-42 . 
62. !d. at 40-44. The sto re of capita l also foste rs reciprocal depen dencies between 
Delaware ancl its custllmers. The lawye rs who recommend reincorporation to client 
corporations invest in Delawa re expertise, and th us have incentives to recommend it as a 
destina tion. Th eir clients need to economize on lega l cos ts, and thus tend to stay in place. 
For competing exp lanations. see RICHARD A. POSNER & KENNETH E. SCOTT, E CONOMICS 
OF CO RPORATI ON LAW AND SECUR ITI ES REG ULATION 11 1 (1980) (finding that large finn s 
go to Delaware) ; Barry D. Baysinge r & Henry N. Butler, The Role of Corporare Law in 
rhe Theory of rhe l--inn. 28 J.L. & ECON. 179, 190 (1985) (finding that firms wi th 
concentrated owners hip do no t go to De laware) . 
The basic model of the "first-mover advan tage'' is that of Michae l Spence. See 
Michael A. Spence. Enrry, Capaciry, lnvesrmenr and Oligopolisric Pricing, 8 BELL J. ECON. 
534, 534-44 (1977). Under it , an oligopolist mus t commit resources to a certain level of 
production ; a potential entrant can observe this, and must decide whether to enter and 
produce a t a certa in leve l. !d. at 534. Spence's entry deterrence model ass umes a two-
stage game in which one firm may enjoy a first-mover advantage if it can choose its 
quanti ty first: Because firm one uses its excess capacity to de ter firm two's ent ry , quantity 
has a commitmen t value. !d.; see also J EAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL OR-
GANIZATION 317-22 (1988) (rev iewing the Spence-Dixit model and interpreting it as a 
double capaci ty ga me, with produc tion as the first capaci ty constraint and sel ling capacity 
as the second); Avinash Dixit, A Model of Duopoly Suggesling a Theory of Enuy Barriers, 
10 BELL J. ECON. 20, 20-32 (1979) (finding that "a great absolute advantage in demand 
(or cost) for established firms makes entry harder. but lower cross-price effect s with 
potential en tran ts' products make en try easier"). 
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option of exit adequately disciplined the states, while the possibility 
of shareholder exit by tender to a hostile offeror adequately dis-
ciplined the managers. This story lost its persuasiveness as managers 
and state politicians collaborated63 to hamper the market deterrent 
with the antitakeover legislation of the 1980s. 64 This manifest case 
of charter market failure65 reinforced the opponents' assertion that 
management capture of the states leads to suboptimal lawmaking. 
Following the lead of Roberta Rom :mo ,nfi the market de terren t 
school moved to a middle ground position on charter competition.01 
From that perspective, they defend the state system, except to the 
extent that it inhibits the control market. 
Others, principally Lucian Bebchuk, returned to the attack. 63 
63. Although this is interest group legislation, it did not result from the efforts of a 
centrally-organized management lobbying effort. Romano's case study of the state 
legislative process here suggested that the statutes are initiated by threatened managers 
of local corporations and their assistants in the local corporate bar rather than by broad 
coalitions of business, labor , and community leade rs. See Roberta Romano, The Fwure 
of Hostile Takeovers: Legisla1ion and Public Opinion, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 457, 461 n.ll 
(1988). 
64. The statutes evolved in succeeding generations. The first generation submitted 
tender offers to substantive review by state securities administrators; those statutes were 
held unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 
640 (1982). The second generation limited the subject matter scope to regula tion of 
internal corporate affairs. These statutes tend either to condition the voting right of 
bidders on the approval of the shareholders as a whole, impose freeze periods on 
combinations between bidders and targets, or require that an equal price be paid in the 
second stage of a two-tier acquisition. Some statutes combine these elements. These 
statutes survived constitutional challenge in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 
U.S. 69. 94 (1987). Another variety confirms the legitimacy of board consideration of the 
cons tituents' interests other than shareholders in takeover defense situations. For a 
summary, see ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 53-57. 
65. A large body of empirical work confirms that the antitakeover statutes had a 
harmful effect on shareholder value. This empirical result emerges from a complex picture 
that encompasses the negative price effects of contractual antitakeover provisions such as 
poison pills. For a summary of this work, see ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, 
supra note 28, at 60-75. 
66. See Romano, Law as Product, supra note 43, at 281. 
67. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 222 (1991) (concluding that the race to the top stands 
as refuted, but the proposition that competition creates a "powerful tendency" to enact 
shareholder beneficial laws remains vital); Ralph K. Winter, The "Race for the Top " 
Revisited: A Commen£ on Eisenberg, 89 COLUtvl. L. REV. 1526, 1528 (1989) (expressing 
more confidence in the view that Cary was wrong than in the view that state competition 
results in a race to the top) . 
68. Bebchuk, supra note 36, at 1458-75; see also Charny, supra note 36, at 456 
(promoting "hannonization," the promulgation of corporate rules by a central authority); 
Roberta S. Karmel, Is It Time for a Federal Corporation Law?, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 55,91-
96 (1991) (endorsing the promulgation of unifonn federal corporate law): Joel Seligman, 
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Bebchuk argued that the middle ground69 result stems from a 
structural defect in the competitive system that disables the produc-
t ion of a maximizing legal regime. The market leads the competing 
states to focus on the variables that influence reincorporation 
decisions.70 There follows from this a concern for management 
prefe rences rather than shareholder value itself. A,ccord ingly, nothing 
deters the states from pursuing policies of management accom-
m odation \Vith regard to the fiduci ary and rn.arke t dete rren ts. 71 
Bebchuk concluded that because of this oversight , fede ral fiduciary 
standards should preempt most state takeover regulation. 72 
The renewed debate on the desirability of federal intervention 
continues among those occupying different middl e-ground views of 
charter competition. At the found ation of this debate lies the 
allocation of the theoretical burden of proof for or against interven-
tion , the assumption being that the side bearing the burden loses the 
game. Sevral points are sharply controverted. Opponents of 
interven tion point to a body of event studies showing that reincor-
poration in Delaware does not reduce shareholder value; proponents 
argue that convergence among the states on the basic points of 
corporate law denudes the results of persuasiveness.73 Opponents 
The Case for /vlininwm Corporate Law Standards, 49 Mo. L. REV. 947, 971-74 (1990) 
(same): Joel Seligman, The New Corporare Law, 59 BROOK. L. RF.v. l, 60-63 (1993) 
[h e r·~inafter Seli gman, New Corporare Law] (sam e). 
69. Bebchuk, supra note 36, at 1440-41. Bebchuk began hi s analysis of the problem 
by sta ting his assumption that , absent reasons to the contrary, sta te compet ition is more 
likely to prod uce an efficient rule than federal regulation. !d. 
70. !d. at 1452-54. 
71. Bebchuk ident ified a category of "insignificantly redi str ibutive," management-
favorab le rules that a lways escape the market constraint. !d. at 1462. Bebchuk 
hypo thesized a transaction undertaken by a $1 billion firm that reduces share holder value 
by $1 million for the purpose of returning $200,000 to management. /d. at 1463. The 
transac tion is too sma ll to excite a takeover, but as long as state law opens the door , 
management has every incentive to undertake it. Jd. In addition, com petition can cause 
the states to use their lawmaking power to impair the strength of market disciplin e even 
furth er, as the proliferation of antitakeover statutes demonstrates. !d. a t 1467-68; see also 
Coffee, supra note 28, at 770-72 (discussing the impac t of state anti takeove r legislat ion) ; 
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller , Toward an !meres£ Croup Theory of Delaware 
Corpor111e Law, 65 T EX. L. REV. 469, 471 (1987) (same). 
72. Bebchuk, supra note 36, at 1494-95. 
73. Roberta Romano conducted the leading event st udy showing that reincorporating 
firms experience an increase in value or no significant stock price decl ines. See Romano, 
Law as Produc£, supra note 43, at 279-80. Proponen ts of inte rvention respond with a 
number of standard questions about the shareholder vote on which reincorporation is 
conditioned. Even though Delaware has value-d ecreas ing rules. the shareholders may 
approve a move for several reasons: because the move on the whole increases shareholder 
value, the shareholders have inad equate information, or management has ti ed the move 
- - - ---·---- -··-·· ·------------ - - ----- - --
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draw on a contractual theory of the firm and point out that new 
federally mandated fiduciary deterrents would retard the evolution of 
contractual corporate arrangements;74 proponents respond that the 
consensus view on contracting out continues to favor fiduciary 
mandates in view of the rational apathy that impedes shareho ld er 
choi ces of governance terms. 75 Opponents argue th at the fe deral 
political landsc2.pe remains as hostiie as that of the states, mal'-ing 
De r v<:: rs c effects a likelv result of a fed era l law-reform movement; 76 . "' 
prop onents respond that the federal venue is marginally more 
hospit able and that centralized politics facilitate shareholder collective 
action .7; 
to another corporate action they desire . Bebchuk, supra note 36, at 1471. These problems 
limit the normative force of the eve nt studies: The stock prices may rcf!t:ct the market's 
reaction to the deve lopments signa ll ed by the reincorporation rather than the reincor-
poration itse lf. and managers may systematically choose to reincorporat e at moments when 
such information exists. !d. at 1449-50; see also Coffee, supra note 28, at 767-68 (offering 
a critique of Romano's analysis) ; Macey & Miller. supra note 71, at 482 (same); Romano, 
Law as Producr, supra note 43, a t 267 (discussing the implications of rei ncorporat ion) . 
Romano, who recognizes the former possibi lit y, responds that it is improbable that 
inform ation ti ed to the move could swamp an otherwise nega tive stock price effect ; rather, 
if management were manipul ating the process, price-negative rather than price-neutral 
results should obtain for firms reincorporating for management-favo rable purposes. 
ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 18. Bebchuk, fo llowing others , 
anticipates thi s point: Given convergence among the state codes , the absence of negative 
returns may onl y mean that th e lega l rules of the original and destinati on sta te are eq ually 
h:nmful. Bebchuk, supra note 36, at 1449; see also Coffee, supra note 28. at 767-68 
(d iscussing the logical inferences to be derived from "s tati st ical noise"'); Me lvin A. 
Eise nberg. Tlze Srru crure of Corporarion Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1508 ( 1989): 
Macey & Mi ller. supra note 71, at 482-83 (discussing the market signals produced by 
relocation to Delaware). Furthermore, the fac t that reincorporation does not decrease 
va lue overall docs not prove that competition produces desirable results on all co rporate 
issues. Bcbchuk , supra note 36, at 1450. 
Bcbchuk, in sum, argues that the event studies must be see n in temporal perspective. 
!d. at 1448-51. They do contradict Cary's picture of an ever-lowering race to the bottom 
with Delawa re in th e lea d. Howeve r, once we accept that point and join Romano on the 
middle ground , the probative force of the studies diminish es. The race, in effect , bottomed 
o ut before the studies were undertaken. !d. The prospective question is whether 
intervention can cause the numbers to improve. /d. at 1509-10. 
ln Romano's view, acknowledging disproof of the race to the bottom decides the 
debate over intervention. Given agreement on the beneficial effects of competition, she 
sa id, the burden is on advocates of intervention to demonstrate "emp irica ll y which 
particular code provisions harm shareholders and why national legislation wo uld be more 
likely to alleviate the problem. " ROMA NO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28. 
at 19. 
74. ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 90-91. 
75. Bebchuk, supra note 36, at 1496-99. 
76. ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 50, 75 -84. 
77. William W. Bratton, Corporare Law's Race 10 Nowhere in Parricular, 44 U. 
TORONTO L. J. 401, 432 (1994). 
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B. Charter Competition as Regulatory Capture 
This middle ground discussion of federal intervention takes on 
the binary quality of the old race to the top/race to the bottom 
discussion as its participants iterate positions from the historic debate 
over market and fiduciary deterrent strategies. However, as the 
replay continues, each side has recognized possibilities for both 
market succe:~s and market fai lure. This more open-ended theoretical 
framework allows nwre flexibility in the diagnosis of the problem, and 
the stronger assertions of regulatory competition theory have dropped 
out of the picture for the most part. The 1980s antitakeover alliance 
between the states and the managers has dispelled the notion that 
identification of a market phenomenon at a significant stage in the 
lawmaking process, taken alone, assures the ideal result of legislation 
based solely on the exogenous preferences of individuals. It has 
become clear that imbalanced interest group influence in this market-
driven lawmaking process prevents that result, divesting regulatory 
competition theory of a legitimating effect. 
· Regulatory competition matches individual preferences and legal 
results because actors have the opportunity to exit cheaply from an 
unsatisfactory jurisdiction. The charter system, of course, does allow 
for exit from an unsatisfactory jurisdiction, but, because the exit 
privilege applies to firms rather than to shareholders, it does nothing 
to ameliorate the agency problem. Corporate law has evolved under 
charter competition to block shareholder access to the determination 
of reincorporation decisions. 78 Existing market disciplines offer no 
way around that barrier because they create no incentives to 
encourage the development of a shareholder-favorable jurisdiction.79 
Successful control contests, whether by takeover or proxy fight , 
displace one group of managers with another. The new management, 
unless it has taken the firm private, remains in an agency relationship 
with the firm 's shareholders and thus has no reason to look for a 
jurisdiction favorable to the shareholder interest.80 In addition, due 
78. See infra notes 275-83 and accompanying text. 
79. Cf Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-
to-the-Bottom" Rarionale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 
1249 (1992) (arguing that the charter competition process is not defective in itself, but that 
the unresolved principal-agent problem respecting the selection of the state of incor-
poration makes locational decisions defective). 
80. The displacing group that plans to make further acquisitions with the target has 
an interest in the removal of state law antitakeover barriers. However, reincorporation 
to a hypothetical shareholder-favorable jurisdiction would not help with this problem, since 
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to the peculiarities of A merica 's constitutional structure, the com-
peting jurisdictions- which lack a balancing incentive-have national 
lawmaking power over the sha reholders of domiciliary corporations. 
In this variant of regulatory competition, then, exit from one 
jurisdiction provides no remedy for th e dissatisfactions of the 
disadvantaged in terest group. 
1. Caoture Th eories of R e£ulation ' ~ 
Tr)P I"''!l·vo rl lr,....,n'e'-V'"•'"l' l."' "l· te c <) ·~ c t e lli no of tl,e r 'n ::JrtP C"' -~ -...., 1 n .\..r - !Ct 1 • Vl "- l l.,. \.....,V u. .l ~ ;. l l J. b 1_ .&. v (! _ ,_..._, [ _ ,l._; ffi ·-
petition story in terms of both the economic and governmental politics 
of interest groups and organiza tions. In this story, charter com-
petition becomes the mainspring of a uniquely stable arrangement of 
regul atory capture. 
Under capture theories of regulation, interest groups and political 
decisionmakers enter into jointly maximizing relationsh ips. The 
simple demand model of capture asserts that lawmaking follows the 
lawmakers ' responses to demand patterns.R1 Particular responses 
depend on interactions be tween the lawmakers' risk profiles and the 
proj ected benefits of legisla tive action.82 The lawmaker, being risk 
averse, tries to avoid conflicts- given no demand for legislation , 
nothing is done; given organized demand, the lawmaker attempts to 
satisfy the interest group making the demand with beneficial legis-
lation.83 In addition, inte rest groups desiring to influence legislation 
encounter collective action problems.8"' Different groups have 
the law of the ta rge t jurisd icti on applies in a take over. The onl y solution to the acquiring 
firm·s problem. then, is interes r grou p pressure to work agains t antitakeove r legisla tion 
nationwide . Yet, at thi s point , conflicting interests among acquiring firms enter into the 
picture. Today"s acquirer may be tomorrow·s ta rge t: the manage rs of large acquirers can 
afford to be pat ient and work arou nd state barriers in making host il e acquisitions, 
meanwhile enj oying th e prerogat ives of the state law regim e. 
81. See Robert D. Tollison. Public Choice and Legisiation, 74 VA. L. RE V. 339, 343-44 
( 1988) ; see also Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and rlz e Reading of Statutes and 
rh e Cons ri twion, 49 U. CHr. L. REV . 263, 265-68 (1 982) (d iscussing the interest-group 
theory). 
82. Sam Peltzman , Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 
211 ,214 (1 976) . Benefits can come in the form of resources or fa vo rab le consequences 
for reelec ti on. George J. Stigler. Th e Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 
& ~v!GMT . SCI. 3, 10-13 (1971). With corporate law, the benefit tends to be rents from 
corporate bus iness . 
83. See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups fo r Political 
Influence , 1983 Q.J . ECON. 371, 394-96 (discussing the impact on the political redistrib ution 
of income resu lting from compet ition among politica l pressure groups vyi ng for political 
favors). 
84. O lson's fundam ental ins ight is that in a large, heterogeneous communi ty, 
individuals will prefer not to pay the full cost of the provision of nonexclud abl e public 
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different abilities to overcome them-the smaller the group and the 
higher the per capita stake of its members, the greater the likelihood 
that the members will work out a collective arrangement and enjoy 
the benefits of governmental inftuence.85 This activity results, 
according to the theorists of the Virginia School, in a social loss from 
rent-seeking.~6 Legislators create rents for the benefit of successful 
interest groups, distributing them based on a self-seeking vote 
caic ul us.s7 
An additional body of capture theory supplcmcn ts this demand 
model with a supply-side story. Exclusively demand-based models of 
law production tend to treat the political process as a black box and, 
as a result, do not attempt to describe how legislative trades are 
accomplished and enforced.88 This is a problem, since legislative 
goods and that, as a result, they will be undersupplied . A free-rider problem must be 
overcome if public goods are to be supplied, and voluntary compliance can be secured only 
by introd ucing se lective incentives (such as fees) or sanctions. OLSON, supra note 48, at 
50-51, 133-34. The result is that rational individuals are motivated to join interest groups 
based on individualized selective incentives . !d. at 60-65. Given the free-rider problem, 
large groups will have difficulty achieving their goals. !d. at 35-36. 
85 . It seems to follow that, in a case in which more than one interest group manages 
to compete to achieve influence, the risk-averse legislator will delegate ultimate regulatory 
authority to an agency. Once that occurs, the agency becomes the venue of interest group 
activities. See JAMES WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 388-89 (1980). 
86. The Virginia School concentrates on the economic theory of legislation. The id ea 
is simple: Government creates rent that is captured by interest groups. Politicians pass 
legislat ion that benefits the interest groups that are better organized, and rents are 
distributee! based on the welfare maximization of the political decisionmakers. The cost 
of supplying rents to well-organized groups is passed on to poorly organized groups. 
The upshot is a waste of consumer surplus. Governments create rents and can 
appropriate them , and th ey are likely to squander the rents they capture; as a result, 
eve ryone is worse off. Under this view, the political process is justified only if lawmakers 
produce legislation obtained without influence. The task of politics, then, is to crea te 
legislation based on the exogenous preferences of individuals. See RichardS. Higgins et 
a!., Free Emry and Efficiem Rem-Seeking, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF R ENT-SEEKING 
127, 128 (Charles K. Rowley et al. eds., 1988); Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Cosls of 
Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, in TOWARD A RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 39, 46-47 (James 
Buchanan et al. eds. , 1980). 
87. Policies are evaluated in terms of the distribution of costs and benefits based on 
the assumption of a level of votes for each dollar expended. See William C. Mitchell , 
!nteresr Gro ups: Economic Perspectives and Conrribwiorzs, 2 J. THEORETICAL POL. 85, 98-
99 (1990); Tollison, supra note 81, at 339-50; Barry R. Weingast, The Congressional 
Buremtcratic Sysrem: A Principal-Agem Perspecrive (Wirh Applications 10 rhe SEC) , 44 
PUB. CHOICE 147, 147-48 (1984). 
88. Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Irzdusrrial Organization of Congress; 
or, Why Legislarures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markers, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132, 
133 (1988); see also Tollison , supra note 81, at 347-66 (summarizing supply-side research). 
Such models also leave unexplained such phenomena as simultaneous provision of policy 
benefits to multiple diverse interests . See Daniel A. Farber, Polirics and Procedure in 
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trades, unlike well-drafted private contracts, can be undone at the 
subsequent behest of a competing group. For example, an interest 
group deal, ob tain ed in the legislature through logrolling and other 
trad ing mechanisms and then embodied in a legislative directive, can 
be undercut later by an administrative agency responding to a 
cornpetmg inte rest group. In the alternative, represe ntatives can 
amend or repeal a piece of legis lation la te r at the request of a 
compt.:ting group. Supply-side explanations of interest-group 
dealmaking confron t th is problem of political insecurity by drmving on 
organiza tional economics to show that inst itutional arrangements have 
an impact on outcomes. This body of work disaggregates the 
governmen t into a complex of principal-agent re lations hips. ~9 In 
these stories, legis latures develop process and structure machinery to 
control the opportunistic conduct of both career bureaucrats and 
legislators.90 These devices include the legislative committee system, 
which helps to overcome problems of asymmetric information 
between legislative principals and bureaucratic agents through ex post 
m onitoring, and process requirements for rulemaking, which provide 
advance notice of noncomplying conduct.91 The processes of the 
Environmenra/ Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORGS. 59. 65 (1992) (concluding that the speci al 
in te rest model fail s to explain environmental legislation). 
89. Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Adminis1ra1ive Procedures as fn suumems of Polilical 
Contro l. 3 J.L. ECON. & ORGS. 243, 243-44 (1987); Weingast. supra note 87, at 148. 
90. Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Po litics and Policy: Ad-
minislralive Arrangem ents and !he Polilical Comrol of Agencies. 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 441 
(1989). A related, and more abstract, line of discourse considers the effects of given 
modes of vot ing process on the ordering of preferences among elected representatives, 
refuting the chaos scholars predicted under eari y soci al choice theory. See, e.g., PETE R C. 
0RDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITI CAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTI ON 266-30 1 
(1986) (d iscuss ing agenda control and outcome); David P. Baron & John A. Ferejohn, 
Bargaining in Legislaw res , 83 AM. POL. SCI. RE V. 1181, 1189-98 (J 989) (consider ing closed 
and open rules of legislative amendment) ; Jules Coleman & John Ferejohn, Democracy 
and Social Choice, 97 ETHI CS 6, 8-9 (1986) (finding that the pa rti cu lar content and contour 
of institutions determines the ex tent to which electora l ou tcomes retlect popular 
prefe rences). 
91. For a formal agency model of infonnation asymmetries and capture re lat ionships 
between legislatures and agencies, and between prod ucer groups and public interest 
groups, see JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A TH EO RY OF INCENTIVES IN 
PROCUREMENT AND REGULATION 480-500 (1993). SUI cf Andre i Sh leifer & Robert W. 
Vishny. Poli1icians and Firms (1994) (Harvard Institute of Economic Resea rch Discussion 
Paper No. 1686) (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors) (cl ai ming that approach 
turning on a comple te infonnation model is not plausible in cases where the problem of 
inefficiency is essential to the politicians' perfonnance, such as in sta te-run enterprises; 
therefore, corruption is central to the operation of the firm). 
For an app lica tion of this approach keyed to lega l policymaking, see Jonathan R. 
Macey, Organiza1ional Design and 1he Poli1ical Comrol of Adminislrative Agencies, 8 J.L. 
1888 NOR TH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
legislature also contribute to transactional stability: Legislative 
procedures and committee jurisdictions give the congressional 
gatekeeper the ability to resist short-term internal pressuresY2 
2. Charter Competition as a Form of Capture 
These capture th eories of legislation and administration provide 
a useful basis for explaining the success of the charter competit ion 
system ;:md the rree rninence of D elaware. Ex it through reincor-
poration provides a po tent ex post enforcement device to the 
managers who purchase legisla tion from the target state, particularly 
a small state de pendent on charter revenues. Ex ante, the code the 
managers purchase provides them with control of the enforcing exit 
decision by blocking shareholder access to the charte r. "} The state's 
incentive to co llect rents from new incorporations ass ures that the 
process legisl a tion securing the exit route will not be amended in the 
future to make exit more difficult. Thus the state's rent incentive 
joins the deterren t of possible reincorporation to assure the managers 
that the deal will stick. The combination does more than that , 
however. It a lso mitigates any collective action problems the 
managers might encounter in getting the future legislation. Should 
desired legislation not be obtained, exit can be effected unilaterally, 
and there will remain up to for ty-nine states from which to choose. 
Furthermore, the chartering state 's rent flow includes fees to 
practicing lawyers in addition to franchise taxes. This assures an 
identity of interests between management and key actors on the 
sup ply side. In this scheme, the organized bar in the chartering sta te 
can be expected to act as an effective advocate for the management 
interest, without forc ing management to organize a trade association 
to enter into a fo rmal lobbying relationship. Delaware practice 
confirms this predict ion .l)-1 Delaware delegates to its bar association 
ECON. & ORGS. 93. 99-103 (1992). Macey contends that legislators are able to cap ture 
highe r rents only if they can sum10unt the agency problem. !d. at 100. In Macey's view, 
ex posr monitoring and punishments may not be sufficient to solve th e agency prob lem. 
Ex anre structuring or "hard-wiring" of the agency works better, and the inte res t groups 
that pay fo r the legis lation can be expected to at tempt to secure it. !d. at 100-03. 
92. Ke nneth A. Sheps le. Congress is a "They, " Not an "It ": Legislarive lnrent as 
Oxymoron, 12 INT' L REv. L. & ECON. 239, 245 (1992). Moe, supra note 42, a t 122-23. 
criticizes this litera ture for its adherence to a model of motivation grounded in strateg ic 
rationalit y, asserting that a thick description of the moti va tions of different types of actors 
provides knowledge about a uthority that the principal-agent mode ls do not offe r. 
93. See infra notes 259-74 and accompanying tex t. 
94. It should be noted that the interests of the bar and management di verge on the 
matte r of litigat ion incentives. For discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 126-37. 
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both agenda control and drafting responsibility for any amendments 
to its corporate code. The bar and legislature have a long-standing 
"understanding"-amendments to the corporations code must first be 
drafted and approved by the bar association 's corporate law section 
and the bar association itself.95 
Capture by cha rter competiti on exacerbates the shareholders ' 
collect ive ac tion problem even as it re duces that of management. 
Sta te law not only blocks shareholde r access to the charter, it provides 
only management with routine compensat ion for expenses incurred in 
voting contests. 90 Meanwhile, the bar emerges as the only interest 
grou p within the chartering state with an incentive to advance th e 
shareholders ' interest in lawmaking processes. Litigating lawyers 
promote shareholder welfare as an incident to making a living as 
enforcers of the fiduciary deterrent. Unfortunately, this confluence 
of interests results in a strictly limited set of shareholder benefits. 
The lawyers have an incentive to promote lawmaking that strengthens 
the market deterrent only if the change would lead to additional 
litigable dispu tes. The same applies to lawmaking that enhances the 
possibilities for shareholder-enforced self-regulation. Such incentives 
seem unlikely to arise in practice. Fiduciary breaches that bring rents 
to lawyers stem from excess management influence; any market or 
self-regulatory governance strategy that has a cognizable chance of 
working well in practice ultimately threatens to diminish those rents 
by reducing the num.bers of unproductive influence activities. In 
addition, the bar's interest diverges from the shareholders' even 
within the sphere of fiduciary enforcement, with the bar favoring a 
95. See Andrew G.T. Moore !1, Slate Competilion: Pan el Response, 8 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 779, 780-81 ( 1987). A ctive drafting and discussion is limited large ly to the corporate 
law section. See Curtis Alva , Delaware and rhe Market for Corporate Charters: History 
and Agency, 15 D EL. J. CORP. L. 885. 888-92 (1990). The section itself performs the 
legislative function of sifting the comments of inte rested parties. Each of the three largest 
corporate servicing firms have representatives to the section. !d. at 888-92, 910. 
The legislature rubber stamps the bar's recommendations; the executive branch's role 
is limited to representation a t bar association mee tings on invitation. !d. at 888-92; see also 
David S. Schaffer, Jr., Delaware 's Limir on Direcror Liabiliry: How the Market for Incor-
p orarion Shapes Corporare Law, 10 HARV. J .L. & P UB. POL'Y 665, 682-84 (1987) 
(discussing th e 1967 revision of Delaware corporate law). 
96. It compensates only shareholder winners in board control contests and provid es 
no compensation at all to shareholders who oppose management positions in issue 
contests. See Rosenfeld v Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 
1955). For discussion, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for 
Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Comesrs , 78 CAL. L. REV. 1071 passim (1990). 
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system that trades substantial money judgments to shareholders for 
substantial attorneys' fees.97 
In short, no interest group in the chartering state has a rent 
incentive linked to the shareholders' interest in minimizing influence 
costs within the finn. The shareholders, then, must se lf-organize98 
to advance an agenda in state lawmaking processes. Unfortunately, 
th e charter competition svstem structu ra lly limits orospec ts for pavoffs 
-' -' l -' 
that wo uld justify the costs of organization. Fur thermore, any 
sustained shareholder effort would have to be pursued in multiple 
jurisdictions. By default, then , federal law emerges as the preferred 
venue for organized shareholder efforts to alter legal structures to 
make firms operate more effectively.99 Federal lawmakers, unlike 
their counterparts in the states, have no t been captured by the 
management side pursuant to a deal with sticking power. ]nis is, of 
course, only a negative qualification that by no means implies 
probable success for a shareholder influence campaign. Process costs 
still loom large at the federal level, and management retains both 
organizational advantages and well-worn paths of influence. But the 
turf at least is open. There are no rent incentives tied to chartering 
decisions, and a large number of players, each making complex and 
political calculations in a dynamic environment, makes it easier to 
contest management influence. 100 
C. Conflicting Demands on the Captured State 
\Ve draw no race to the bottom conclusions from this capture 
model of corporate lawmaking. Rather, th e model serves to explicate 
the theore tical implications of the middle ground framework, putting 
a different gloss on the same practices purveyed as productive 
relational contracting in the race to the top story. Since many areas 
97 . For discussion of the role that the lawyers' interest plays in shap ing De laware law, 
see infra text accompanying notes 131-37. 
98. Shareholders also may rely on independe nt allies such as academics. 
99. This conclusion obtains eve n though Delaware's compact and re latively informal 
lawmaking processes , see supra note 95 and accom pa nyin g text , hold out significan t process 
cost advantages. For a discussion of the relati ve advantages and disadvantages of the 
fed eral venue, compare ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW , supra note 28, at 75-81, 
with Bratton, supra note 77, at 430-33. 
100. The SEC embodies this possibility: Historicall y, its acto rs tend to sa ti sfy the 
demands of neither the shareholder nor the management side. In addition, th ey bring an 
inherited, albeit limited ideology of shareholder protec tion to their ongoing mediative 
actiVIties. Recent amendments to the proxy rules promulga ted at the instance of 
institution al shareholder activists, see infra note 180, con cretely demonst rate this agency's 
continuing receptiveness to shareholder agenda items. 
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of sta te corporate law find shareholder and management interests in 
alignment , it complica tes, but does not displace, the relational contract 
reading. 
The capture model does suggest exp loration of stra tegies of 
federa l intervention designed to diminish sta te law's imbalanced 
supply-side incentives and imbalanced opport unities to make 
demands. Hmvever, it does not therebv imol v tha t fed e ra l fid uciary 
J l • 
st ;:,n cl ;m ls ~L·e the mos t des irable mode of intervention . Federal 
tl. duciary standards would amelio ra te bo th the supply and demand-
side problems by imposing shareholder-favorable norms. They also 
would entail a difficult trade off, because process infi rmities could 
follow fr om the appointment of the fed era l judicial sys tem to the 
sha reholder guardian role. The infirmities lie in the possibility that 
a preemptive change in the venue of corporate common lawmaking 
from the Delaware courts to the federal courts would so materially 
alter the composition of the product sold in the charter market as to 
denude D elaware of significant relational capital. The loss of the 
first-mover role in common lawmaking would leave D elaware 
marketing a product of diminished value and weaken its relational tie 
with fi rms. The ren ts that support Delaware as a center of infor-
m ation on corporate governance disputes could dissipate, possibly 
leading to corpora te lawmaking on a level of diminished sophis-
tication. 
~l11us, one assertion of regulatory competition theory--that 
nationa l lawmaking procedures carry process infirmities that are 
avoided when the subject matter is left to the competing 
sta tes-continues to bear on the deba te. Th e captured state system 
can enhance economic welfare to the exten t that its competitive 
elemen t causes the lawmaker to weigh th e regu lations ' benefit and 
harm to the firm as a whole. 101 Argu a bly, then , the preferred 
solution to the corporate agency problem leaves the subject matter 
with the states but finds a means to interpose the shareholder interest 
101. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 13, at 63-66 (providing a prisoners ' 
di lemma model of agency capture). 
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into state lawmakers' demand picture. 102 This would render the 
capture benign. 103 
Past practice provides a base point from which to begin this 
reordering of incentives. Shareholder demands have, in fact , figured 
into the existing competitive regime in a secondary posture, influen-
cing the shape of Delaware's fiduciary case law. This result appears 
surprising if we view state law under the pure product competition 
model. To account for it, the model must be expanded to encompass 
the political instability that results from the national attention that 
Delaware lawmaking attracts because of its dominant market position. 
1. Delaware Lawmaking and the Threat of Federal Intervention 
The deal struck between the chartering state and management 
can never be entirely secure because the possibility of removal of 
corporate lawmaking to the federal level inheres in the constitutional 
structure of the United States. Delaware, as the entity most 
dependent on corporate law revenues, is the contracting state most 
prone to view that possibility as a threat. This structural constant 
suggests that Delaware lawmakers may have secondary incentives to 
respond to shareholder in terests. 104 
It can be plausibly hypothesized that Delaware actors remain 
averse to possible destructive exercises of federal preemptive power 
and have incentives to avoid exciting its application. 105 Federal law 
102. This point can be expanded by ana logy to the lit erat ure on legislative control o f 
agencies, under which the question of political contro l has been addressed in terms of the 
economic principal -agent problem. See generally, e.g., McCubbins et a!., supra note 89. 
A fede rally imposed fiduciary regime would restrict opportunities for this beneficial 
engagement because it would remove the lawmake r from an imm ed iate agency rel a tionship 
with the firm. 
103. Restating this point , the charter compe tition problem stems from the same 
incentive problems and barri ers to collective ac ti on that create th e corporate agency 
problem in the first place. 
104. A number of commentators have recogni zed this possibility. See Bebchuk, supra 
note 36, at 1455; Cary, supra note 10, at 688; Eisenberg, supra note 73, at 1512. 
105. This dual demand mode l's plausibility depends on three ass umptions. First, actors 
in Delaware must perceive that their activities have the potentia l to excite political action 
at the national level. Second, Delaware actors must perceive that the shareholder interest 
finds a voice among the actors and groups that influ ence fed eral law. Third, th e projected 
fed era l political action must have a negative im pact either on the charter competition 
system as a whole or on the rela ti ve place of Delaware in the system to reduce Delawa re 's 
rent flow. 
As to the first assumption, periodic calls for fede ral inte rvention have, ove r the years, 
given D elaware reasons for concern. Although federal intervention has not been a present 
prospect since the late 1970s, see infra note 114, the subj ect has remained a staple of 
corporate law discourse. Anecdotal evidence shows that Delaware lawmakers keep it in 
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reform discussions of the past two decades have given Delaware 
actors cause for concern because the often-proposed remedy of 
federal fiduciary standards would have an adverse impact on their 
interests. This vulnerability stems from the competitive evolution of 
corporate statutory law. Competition has caused state corporate 
codes to converge in their broad outlines. As a result, Delaware's 
case law, judges, and speedy process figure prominently in its line of 
legal products. 106 Federal intervention might deprive Delaware of 
mind when they take po litically sensitive steps. The Delaware bar's concern abo ut fede ra l 
responses is confirmed in accounts of its de libera tions on new legislation. When the bar 
first considered (and rejected) an antitakeover statute, it received comment letters from 
Martin Lipton and Joseph Flom warning that enactment might excite federal interve ntion. 
Such worries were expressed at the committee mee ting on th e proposal. See Alva , supra 
note 95, at 906-08. 
The second assumption has been the subject of debate. Professor Romano argues that 
management replicates its dominant influence in the sta tes a t the federal level. She 
inspected the federal corporate law reform politics of the 1980s to show that management 
voices were heard th e most often. Romano surveyed th e content of both federal takeover 
legis lat ion proposed during the pe riod 1969-87 and of interest group representation in the 
accompanying legis lative processes. She found that th e overwhelming majority of bills had 
a n antibidder aspect and that m anagement voices appeared much more frequently than 
shareholder or labor voices. ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 
76-81. Romano also showed, however , that bureaucratic, po litical , and academ ic voices 
were heard in quantity during the 1980s. !d. at 77. In any event , to the ex tent that large 
stakes in th e status quo make Delaware's lawmakers risk averse, any act ive federal politics 
with possible adverse consequences might prompt them to make a preemptive response. 
Regarding the third ass umption , the gravity of a federal threat will vary with the 
pa rticular form of federal intervention proposed. A discrete provision might impair 
Delaware 's position only incidentally, blocking a particular management accommoda tion , 
but applying the block to a liSO states. As examples, consider (1) the all holders rule , Rule 
14cl-10 under section 14( d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C. F. R. 240.14d-10 
(1994), providing that any tender offer must be open to all holders of th e subject class of 
secu riti es, preempting the defensive tactic sustained in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum 
Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); and (2) the special tax on greenma il profits, l.R.C. § 5881 
(1991), enacted in 1987, which imposes a 50% excise tax on profit realized in a greenmail 
transact ion. In e ither case, Delaware no longer can take a competitive lead on the subject 
matter regulated , but neither can any other state. The overall field of subject matter for 
compe tition shrinks slightly , but not enough cognizab ly to impair Delaware's position. 
Furthermore , a fed e ral provision might even result in a short-term enhancemen t of 
Delaware 's position. Consider, as an example, the proposals for national antitakeover 
legislation made during the mid-1980s. At that time , worries about federal responses 
con tributed to Delaware's hesitancy to initiate takeover defense legislation. Federa l 
intervention on either side would have settled the matter , removing a threat of competition 
from o ther states. 
106. In addition to a large collection of past decisions, Delaware se lls a unique , 
technically qualified judiciary and speedy determination of new disputes. Bayless Manning 
identified Delaware's judiciary as its prime attraction, comparing D elaware to the medieva l 
law merchant. Bayless Manning, State Competition: Panel Response, 8 CARDOZO L. R EV. 
779. 784-85 (1987). For confirmation of this point from a game theory perspective, see Ian 
Ayres , Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and Fischel, 59 
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the principal justification for its premium price, resulL1g in an 
outbreak of price competition in the market and the erosion of 
Delaware's position as an informational center. Recognition of a 
perceived federal threat implies a model in which Delaware faces 
conflicting demands, each threatening potential negative consequen-
ces. First, the management interest must be satisfied to prevent 
corporate migration out of the state and entry into competition by 
competing states. Second, federal actors, as proxies for the 
shareholders, must be satisfied to avoid destructive intervention. The 
conflicting demands complicate the business of response: Professor 
Eisenberg has suggested that the conflict leaves Delaware with an 
incentive to avoid taking the lead in adopting rules favoring managers 
at the shareholders' expense. Other states have a different incentive. 
If they offer innovative management-side payments, they may siphon 
business from Delaware; if the federal government intervenes to stop 
them, they lose little. So long as a given state has a small market 
share, its actions attract little attention. Delaware, in contrast, cannot 
take any significant steps without close scrutiny nationwide. 107 It 
remains under pressure to follow new developments elsewhere, but 
emerges in a mediative role. 
A question arises as to how Delaware, alone in this competing 
demand situation, can structure a mediative response without losing 
business, given a market still keyed to management preferences. 108 
Two factors make this picture plausible. First, no full-service 
alternative domicile exists, and only a handful of other jurisdictions 
have strong incentives to incur the start-up costs to market a full-
service operation. But a potential competitor has no assurance that 
a third jurisdiction will not duplicate its efforts, 109 and given the low 
U. CHL L. REV. 1391 , 1414-15 (1992) (reviewing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. 
FISCHEL, THE ECONOM IC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991)). 
107. Eisenberg, supra note 73, at 1512-13; see also Bebchuk, supra note 36. at 1455 
(pointing out that th ere remains a range within which states can maneuver without fear 
of federal interventi on). 
108. Delaware's med iative output can be explained in terms of the interests of 
managers as a group. Well-timed interventions to protect shareholders se rve to defuse the 
federal threat and to make Delaware a buffer state that protects corporations from federal 
intervention. However, the benefits of a mediative jurisprudence are more questionable 
from the point of vi ew of individual managers seeking an optimal environment. They have 
an apparent incentive to cause their firms to migrate to states adopting less equivocal 
antitakeover polici es, free riding on the firms that stay. Of course, if a large number of 
firms su rmounted this collective action barrier and successfully shopped for a more 
responsive jurisdiction, federal intervention would become more likely. The same might 
occur if a large number of firms left Delaware, starting a new race to the bottom. 
109. See Daniels, supra note 52, at 182. 
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cost of reincorporation, 110 no assurance that its new customers will 
remain. Second, the shareholders' newly discovered capability of self-
protective collective action may effectively deter management 
reincorporation proposals. Beginning in the late 1980s, incidents of 
shareholder resistance caused managers to drop the assumption of 
automatic shareholder approval of antitakeover proposals requiring 
charter amendment. 11 1 Thus, departure from Delaware may not be 
the open option it used to be. 
Evidence of the dual demand model 's robustness can be found 
in the recent pattern of Delaware lawmaking. Given statutory 
convergence among the states and the dominance of the management 
interest, the problems of conflicting demand rarely show up in 
corporate legislative process. Antitakeover legislation is the principal 
recent instance, and Delaware's corporate bar moved late and with 
caution in putting an antitakeover statute before its legislature. 11 2 
The conflict becomes more apparent in the adjudication of fiduciary 
cases, particularly those dealing with corporate control transfers.11 3 
Here the shareholder interest has found Delaware intermittentlY 
.I 
responsive. The Delaware judiciary abruptly changed a long-standing 
habit of monolithic fidelity to management interests in 1977, 114 and 
110. See Black, supra note 28, at 551, 574, 586-90. 
111. See infra notes 162·80 a nd accompanying text. Romano contributed some evidence 
of this phenomenon with a report on th e behavior of public corporations subj ect to the 
1990 Pennsylvania ta ke over stat ute . The Pennsylvan ia s tatute , like most takeover statut es. 
included a default rul e that applied th e statut e to a ll corporations that fa il ed to take 
affirmative action to opt out. See PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2571-75 (1994). Despite this. 
press ure from institutiona l investors resulted in opting out by the boards of 127 firms; only 
72 firms stayed in. ROMANO, GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 68-69. 
Pres umably, opportunistic re incorporation proposals would excite similar share hold er 
attention. 
112. See Alva, supra note 95, at 906-08. 
113. This is analogous to the allocation of responsibility between legislatu re s and 
agencies. Legislato rs faced with a conflicting demand problem can avoid confrontation 
with the competing interest groups and resort to the expedient of delegating lawmaking 
authority to an age ncy; with state corporate law, the judiciary tends to assume thi s 
function. Delaware, as it responded to sensitive developments in the corporate control 
market of the 1980s, kept open its options by employing equivocal judicia l rules in 
preference to clear cut legislation. 
114. See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 976-80 (Del. 1977) (imposing st rict 
fiduciary standards on parent firms in cash-out mergers). The Singer rule was in turn 
rejected for a looser, process-based approach in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. , 457 A.2d 701, 
704, 715 (Del. 1983). Oddly , Singer was decid ed after the immediate threat of federa l 
preemption of state fiduciary rules under the antifraud rules of the securities laws had 
been removed by the Supreme Court in Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 , 479-80 
(1977). The story told at th e time was that the brush with preemption at the hands of the 
federal judiciary and th e wider critical atmosphere provoked by Cary and others had 
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Cary's 1975 article has been accorded a role in the break. 115 The 
federal threat, thus crystallized, impressed upon the Delaware courts 
the practical importance of solicitude to shareholder interests. 11 6 
This post-Cary behavior pattern has persisted and still yie lds headlines 
as highly publicized cases articulate surprising new shareholder-
protective applications of basic fi duciary rules.117 Tne pattern has 
been volatile, 11 ~ however, and shareholder protective intervention 
has not been a constant theme. The De laware courts ' indulgence in 
this back-and-forth at apparent cost to a reputation for certainty, 
predictability, and management responsiveness confirms the presence 
of competing demands. 
Two caveats must be noted. First, the federal threat does not 
play an exclusive causative role in this conflicting demand model. 
Courts and judges sell reputations for speed, dependability, and 
predictability, but they also stake reputational capital in their working 
prompted the De laware Supreme Court to reve rse its direction and become more 
accommodating to the inte rests of investors to d iminish the threat of intervention. 
115. The federal threat, and Cary's association with it, appears in accou nts of these 
events. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 28, at 764-66; Eisenberg, supra note 73, at 1511-13. 
116. Prior to Santa Fe Indus. v. Green , 430 U.S. 462 (1977), there was a cognizable 
chance that much conduct covered by state fiduciary law would be found to be 
"manip ul ative" or "fraudulent" conduct violative of section lO(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and rule IOb-5 there und er. The an timanagcrial political climate of 
th e time also resulted in the introduction of preemptive legislation in Congress . See S. 
2567. 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). 
117. See Paramount Comms., Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A .2d 34, 46-48 (De l. 1993) 
(holding that management has an ob ligati on to achieve the best value reasonably available 
for shareholders) ; Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A .2d 345, 366-7 1 (Del. 1993) 
(applying a heightened duty of care scrutiny of boa rdroom merger decision and sugges ting 
an expanded remedial concep t inclusive of post-merger gain); Revlon, lnc. v. MacAndrews 
& Forbes Holdings, Inc. , 506 A.2d 173 , 182 (Del 1986) (inventing a duty of management 
that changed from defending against a tende r offer to a uctioning the company in limited 
circumstances); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985) 
(applying an expanded review of tender offer defensive tactics under a proportionality 
test); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873-81 (D el. 1985) (suddenly expanding the 
duty of care to cover board approval of arm's length merger). 
118. Equally famous cases often appear to restrict the applica tion of the new rules. See 
Paramount Comms., Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150-54 (Del. 1989) (limiting 
application of Unocal and Rev/on) ; Moran v. Household lnt ' l, Inc. , 500 A.2d 1346, 1356-57 
(Del. 1985) (sustaining "poison pill defense" under Unocaf); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 
A.2d 701, 703-04 (Del. 1983) (overruling Singer in favor of a less restrictive process 
scrutiny of cash-out mergers). 
The legis lature , prompted by the corporate committee of the Delaware sta te bar, 
entered in on management's side in one famous instance. Aft e r Smilh v. Van Gorkom's 
application of the duty of care caused nervousness in boardrooms and a substantial 
increase in insurance premiums, the legislature amended the code to permit firms to op t 
out of the duty of care by charter amendmen t. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) 
(1991) (permitting opting out of personal liabilit y of directors for duty of care violations). 
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roles. This gives the judges an independent incentive to protect the 
legitimacy of the system119 by balancing the satisfaction of interest 
group demands with public-regarding results. Delaware judges, 
responding to Cary's well-publicized allegations of corruption, 120 
have declared a commitment to this role integrity. 121 They describe 
themselves as mediators betw een managem e n t and 
shareholders-protectors of market risk-taking who nevertheless 
impose eth ical constraints.122 
Second, the identification of competing demands should not be 
taken to predict a pattern of even-handed mediation. Although the 
federal threat holds out the potential of substantial injury, it remains 
an unlikely event. Potential impairment of competitive position and 
loss of incorporations is a more immediate problem for Delaware, and 
also amounts to a competing reputational concern for Delaware 
judges, given limitations on their tenure. 123 If we look at the pattern 
the Delaware courts took during the 1980s in charting a course 
between competing demands on sensitive corporate control matters, 
we can infer that the Delaware courts took advantage of an infor-
mational slack 124 to develop a body of case law that gave an ap-
119. See Eric Rasmusen , Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game, 10 J.L. ECON. & 
ORGS. 63, 72-74, 78-80 (1994) (offering a repeat-game model of judicial moti va tion with 
infinite time horizons). As occurs with re peat games, the model res ults in a multiplicity 
of equilibria in which the outcome depends on the players' expectations. !d. a t 74. In 
Rasmussen's model , judges follow precedent if there is a se lf-enforcing system based less 
o n compulsion th an on the need to uphold systemic legi timacy . !d. at 72-74. In th e case 
of Delaware, of course, systemic legitimacy has pointed in th e opposite direction. See also 
Thomas J. Miceli & Metin M. Cosge l, Repwation and Judicial Decision -making, 23 J. 
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 31,42-49 (1994) (modelling the preferences of judges on a utility 
func tion th a t includes both a private and a reputa ti ona l component, with th e decision as 
to whether to follow precedent turning on a trade -off between th e two components, and 
th e equilibrium rate of adherence to precedent depending on th e distribution of 
preferences across the population). 
120. Cary, supra note 10, at 684 , 696-98. 
121. See Coffee, supra note 28, at 764-65. 
122. See Moore, supra note 95, at 779-800 (wri tt en while Moore was a D e laware 
Supreme Court Justice). They also have acknowledged th e federal threat. See William 
T. Quillen, The Federal-State Corporace Law Relalionship-A Response ro Professor 
Seligman 's Call for Federal Preemplion of Swre Corporwe Fiduciary Law, 59 B ROOK. L. 
REv. 107, 129 (1993) (author is former Delaware Chancellor and Supreme Court Justice). 
123. The recent refusal of Delaware's judicia l nominations committee to recommend 
the reappointment of Justice Andrew Moore, a judge with a reputation for solicitude for 
th e shareholder interest, arguably confirms this point. See Richard B. Schmitt , Delaware 
Judge Is Seen as Investors' Friend , WALL ST. 1. , July 7, 1994, at B2. 
124. Slack results from monitoring costs that prevent interested parties from observing 
a ll actions taken by a regulator . To the extent slack is present, a regulato r is more like ly 
to be captured by an interest group; a self-interested regulawr pursues public regard ing 
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pearance of greater weight to shareholder interests than was justified 
by the actual payoffs. In highly publicized cases, the Delaware courts 
announced vague standards that held out the prospec t of enhancing 
shareholder value. But in the less well-publicized cases that fo llowed, 
they took the opportunity held out by complex facts to refrain fro m 
applyin g the standards in management-constraining '," Ztys.125 The 
fu ll se:: of res ults ta llied by the lawyers who make re incorporation 
decisions signall ed considerably more room for rnanagement 
maneuver than did the public profile signalled by the leading cases. 
2. The Litigation Anomaly 
F ull description of the complex of incentives that shape Delaware 
law requires further consideration of conflicting interests on the 
supply side. 'vVe have already suggested that managers implicitly rely 
on the Delaware bar to represent their interests in the sta te. 
However, the bar's interests are far from perfectly aligned with 
management's, since litigation against managers also provides a source 
of income. Delaware has a unique collection of process rules that 
advance this local interest. These encourage derivative litigation,126 
making sure that the local bar gets a share of the action by requiring 
Delaware lawyers to make appearances and filings. m Competing 
demands also result in some systemic concessions to managers, 128 
bu t the concessions hardly counter Delaware's reputation as a fee -
generating ce nter fo r corporate lawyers. The litigation rules thus 
stand as the great anomaly in the charter competition discussion, 
poli ci es only when littl e or no sl ack is presen t. See Levine & Forrence, supra note 47, at 
183. 
125. For a reading of the post- Unocal cases along these lines, see ViCTOR BRUDNE Y 
& WiLLIAM W. BRAfTON, BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN'S CA5ES AND iVL\TER!ALS ON 
CORPORATE FINANCE 1087-95 , 1129-30 (4th ed. 1993). 
126. Delaware differs from many jurisdictions in not requiring plaintiffs in shareho lder 
derivat ive actions to pos t security for expenses. See DEL. CT. C.P.R. 23.1. De laware 
facilit ates servi ce of process on nonresident directors with a broad consent to service 
statute. See DEL. CODE ANN. ti t. 10, § 3114 (1993). It also is li beral in its fee awards to 
deri va ti ve plain tiffs ' lawye rs: Under its nonpecuniary settl ement pract ice , defending 
manage rs can trade a high fee for a small overall recove ry. Coffee, supra note 28, at 763. 
127. See DEL. SUP. CT. R. 12(a) (1); DEL. CH. CT. R. 170. 
128. Delaware ameliorates the litiga tion rules' immediate im pact on managers by 
a llowing for liberal indem nifica ti on. Its courts also have been inventi ve in recent yea rs in 
placing procedural barriers in the way of a trial on the merits of derivative claims. See 
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 ,813-14 (Del. 1984); Zapata Corp. v. Mal donad o, 430 A.2d 
779, 78 1-86 (De l. 1981). For criticism of these and subsequent cases, see Sel igm an, New 
Corporare Law, supra no te 68, at 23-26. These defendant-friendly proced ures do dis-
courage litiga tion. 
l 
I 
l 
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synchronizing with neither the race to the top 129 nor the race to the 
bottom.130 
Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Milier have explained the 
litigation rules with a supply-side account that highlights the impact 
of internal interest group politics on the production of Delaware 
law. 131 ln their account, all groups within the state have a common 
interest in producing a marke table legal regime, but the groups differ 
on the re la tive proporti ons of costs imp osed and revenu es earned. 
The taxpayers have an interest in higher direct costs (franchise tax 
revenues) and lower indirect costs (legal fees). The lawyers ' in terest 
in fees would be served by lower direct costs leading to a grea ter 
number o f incorporations, and by higher indirect legal costs even 
sacrificing some incorporations when the legal fees paid exceed those 
lost. M acey and Miller assert that, unlike Delaware, a state acting as 
a pure profit maximizer would limit indirect costs to maximize direct 
costs. 132 Delaware fails to conform to the product model's predictions 
because the bar acts as a small, cohesive interest group that extracts 
special concessions from the legislature at the expense of the general 
public. 133 
Macey and Miller rightly emphasize the organized bar's political 
power. Yet two factors that align the interests of the bar with those 
of the rest of the state need to be added to their description. First , 
the fede ral threat may temper the incentive of Delaware's lawyers to 
lobby for a reduction in direct charges to customers. Increasing 
D elaware 's market share substantially above the level of one-half of 
public incorporations 1 3 ~ would make Delaware even more of a 
"national" lawmaking center, enhancing its visibility and vulnerability 
-------------------------------- -· 
129. Cary , who favored stric t fiduciary-law control of management conduct. e xplai ned 
th e rul es as a spec ia l exception keyed to the interests of the D e laware bar. Ca ry, supra 
note 10, at 687. 
130. Since th e rul es expand the zone of legal control of corporate actors for the bene fit 
of lawyers. the y arguabl y derogat e from shareholder interests, viewed from the mark et 
deterrent point of vi ew. See Macey & Miller, mpra note 71, at 510-11. 
131. !d. a t 472. 
132. !d. at 498, 502-04. 
133. !d. at 506-09. Macey and Miller add an asymme tric information compon ent to this 
ma rket imperfection story. They draw on Romano 's finding that lawyers (and to a lesse r 
extent investment bankers) pl ay key rol es in re incorporation decisions and favor De laware . 
!d. at 486-87 (citing Romano, Law as Produ ct, supra note 43, at 273, 275 n.72) . They no te 
that information problems on the cli ents' part may present a barrier to compe tition am o ng 
the lawye rs. !d. If the cli ents have an information problem, then we can account for 
D e laware' s litigation rul es as a shrewd marketing move-a boon to those responsible for 
making reincorporati on decisions. !d. at 487. 
134. See supra no te 43. 
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to challenge at the national level. Given a state with a monopoly 
position, traditional federalism objections to intervention carry less 
weight. Second, rules that encourage litigation in Delaware play a 
secondary role in production. Delaware's case law and judges figure 
prominently in its substantive law product line. 135 Its code's ad-
vantages are iess dist inct than those of its cases, given statutory 
convergence among the states, but Delaware does not complete ly 
control the production of case law. The first option on the choice of 
the forum for new disputes tends to lie with the plaintiff, and in many 
instances Delaware law questions can be litigated in other states or in 
federal courts. This gives Delaware a reason to offer incentives to 
plaintiffs. Their cooperation gives Delaware the opportunity to apply 
its own law, preserving the first-mover advantage and generating a 
flow of cases. These, in turn, are products sold in the charter market. 
The need to satisfy the demands of the national plaintiff's bar 
reinforces the internal bargaining position of Delaware 's bar, further 
explaining the state's delegation to the bar of the corporate legislative 
function. 136 However, the delegation to the bar also helps to 
stabilize the capture arrangement with management. 137 
D. From Threatened Federal Intervention to Shareholder 
Intervention-The Strategy of Countervailing Interest Empower-
m ent 
The foregoing survey of the charter competition system 
highlights three points. First, although the system can be described 
as one of voluntary exchanges, that description does not by itself 
justify the system because these exchanges entail the capture of public 
authority. The states here effectively sell the coercive exercise of 
their authority on behalf of a purchasing group. 138 The system 
thereby lacks not only the exit possibilities presupposed by regulatory 
competition theory, but also the exit possibilities present when actors 
freely make contracts. Although the system affords relational 
benefits, it also channels distributions within the firms that enter into 
contracts with the states, making losers of the principals and winners 
of the agents. Second, the relative stability of the charter market 
cannot be completely accounted for with a relational contract model 
135. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
136. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
137. Thus, it may be that the conflict between Delaware's taxpayers and attorneys is 
eit her more nascent than actua l or more se ttled than active. 
138. See Moe, supra note 42 , at 123. 
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that recognizes only one possible route of defection by the 
state-defection to anticorporate interests opposed to the interests of 
both shareholders and managers. Contracts in the charter market are 
also structured to guard agains t state defection to the shareholder 
interest. In addition , in a federal system, state public authority, once 
captured, can be recaptured by 2 competing interest that manages to 
invoke federal author i ty. 1~" Potential federal intervention ma kes 
this recapture a constant po:~s ibil i ty in corporate law. Third, federal-
state po litical instability can have weal th-en hancing properties. Under 
the conflicting demand model of Delaware law, the federal threat 
reinforces the shareholder voice, moving D elaware in the direction of 
shareholder value enhancement . The stronger the threat, the more 
pronounced the move. 
Taken alone, however, the federal threat does not provide a 
workable basis for solving the corporate agency problem. Substantial 
political barriers to shareholder capture of federal authority keep the 
threat distant and make it possible for Delaware to . defuse it with 
minimal concessions to the shareholders, while providing management 
with maximum feasible protection of its own prerogatives. Nor does 
this threat lend itself to institutionalization as a component of a 
federal intervention strategy designed to intensify the conflicting 
demands on the states. Institutionalization implies the congressional 
mandate of a prospective and graduated scheme that ripens into 
preemptive mandates only to the extent that some background 
normative standard remains unsatisfied. 140 Such a carrot-and-stick 
approach also implies a ful ly articulated federal corporate law policy. 
lt is hard to imagine how such <1 scheme, once implemented on a 
national basis, would amount to anything short of blanket preemption 
that sacrifices the relational benefits of the state system. 
Federal intervention nonetheless could help to place a stronger 
quantum of shareholder dema nd before state lawmakers. In 
regulatory theory, one expedient for the problem of agency capture 
by a producer group is consumer empowerment through the grant of 
standing in regulatory processes to public interest groups.141 This 
139. See id. at 124. 
140. Under this "big stick " th eory of regulation, the regulatory authorit y makes self-
regulation generally available, but holds out a graduated threat of command and control 
regulation and punishment for uncooperative parties, thereby building in an incentive to 
comply. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE. supra note 13 , at 39-40 (discussing the theory in the 
administrative law context). 
141. In Ayres and Braithwaite 's model of •·tripartitism," the public interest group 
receives the same information as th e regulator, a seat at the negotiating table, and equal 
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tripartite 142 strategy follows from the insight that the structuring of 
conflicts be tween agents, including third parties, can assist in the 
collection of information and the reordering of incentives in a desired 
di rection. 1-u E mpowerment brings the representatives of the 
counte rvai ling interest inside the system. Once inside, they assis t 
iegisla ti ve pri ncipals in overcoming the problem of asymmetric 
information in agency control. The countervailing interest generates 
information about the agency, supplementing the costly process of 
direct supervision. 144 Empowerment also reorders the incentives of 
the agents of the countervailing interest. ~Their inside position holds 
out an incentive to abandon obstructionist strategies and develop 
cooperative relationships with both regulators and producers. Ideally, 
they assist the evolution of win-win outcomes in the ongoing 
regulatory bargaining game.145 Finally, since these public interest 
figures attain their status as agents in the world of grassroots politics, 
they are relatively unsusceptible to capture. Since their guardianship 
positions are contestable, reputational incentives make defection to 
competing interests unlikely. 146 
The strategy of countervailing interest empowerment shares 
objectives with the strategy of regulatory competition. Both seek 
regulatory flexibility and balanced control of regulatory structures that 
de ter the capture of regulators. 147 The choice between the two may 
depend in part on the situation. Regulatory competition theory 
assumes that competition provoked by exit frees the regulator from 
interest group control. Interest group empowerment addresses the 
capture problem where competition either has been blocked by 
regulatory coordination, or, as has occurred in the case of corporate 
law, has served as a mechanism to enforce the capture arrangement. 
standing. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 13 , at 57-58. 
142. "Tripa rtite'" is used id. at 57-60. 
143. LAFFONT & TIROLE, supra note 91, at 611. 
144. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Sch wartz, Police Pa1rols v. Fire Alarms, 28 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1 984 ), distinguished between "police patrol " oversight, direct 
monitoring of the age nt by .the principal, and "fire ala rm"' protection, a passive fonn of 
o ve rsight in which third parti es bear the bulk of th e cost of providing information. This 
mode l was ex tended in Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Learn ing from Oversigh1.· 
Fire Alarms and Police Patrols Reconstructed, 10 J.L. ECO N. & ORGS. 96, 105 (1 994) , with 
a model of a multistage, single-shot two-person game invo lving a principal and an agent, 
showing how the principal learns fr om fire-alarm oversight. 
145. AYRES & BRA ITHWAITE, supra note 13, at 71-73. 
146. !d. at 73. 
147 . See id. at 59, 71. 
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Tne often-suggested corporate law reform that we rev1Ve 
here-shareholder initiative to amend the charter and effect reincor-
poration-is the corporate law equivalent of an interest group 
empowerment strategy. The avenue of shareholder initia tive makes 
it possible for the shareholders to make competing demands on the 
states themse lves, and thereby gain a seat at the table when sta t£-:: L;v;s 
are formulated. The problem wi th this strategy, of course, is the 
problem of shareholder collective action. However, as th e next DZ\rt 
• l 
shows, the gravity of that problem has diminished. 
II I. STRATEGIES FO R EN FO RCED S ELF-REG ULATION THROUG H 
SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION 
Concentrated in stitutional ownership holds out the poss ibil ity th at 
shareholders can surmount collective action barriers keeping them 
from governance participation. Shareholder participation, in turn , 
holds out the possibility of a transition from voluntary to enforced 
self-regulation as shareholders use their votes to revise the process 
terms of corporate contracts or to place capable and independent 
monitors on the board. Enforced self-regulation, in turn , holds out 
the possibility of cooperative gain through relational engagement. 
The short-term, arm's length engagement of the shareholder under a 
deterrent regime evolves into the long-term, patient commitment of 
an equity partner.t48 In theory, this resolves governance conflicts of 
the 1980s: Effective monitoring reduces the gap between market and 
intrinsic value that triggers hostile intervention by market means.t49 
T his relational model's realization depends in part on the 
alignment between governance benefits and th e incentives of 
institutional agents. This part describes these incentive problems and 
identifies the strategies for their solution. In theory, financia l benefits 
themselves provide sufficient incentives, given the removal of legal 
barriers to group action. In practice, shareholder intervention has 
been effected by a group of political entrepreneurs, the agents of 
public pension funds, who appear to be pursuing reputationai gain. 
148. See Ayres & Cramton, supra note 19, at 1038; Jeffre y N. Gordon, insliilllions as 
Re!alional Inves10rs: A New Look a£ Cumulative Voting, 94 COLUM. L. R EV. 124, 129 
(1994) [hereinafter Gordon, Cumulative Voting]. 
149. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Inveslment Companies as Guardian 
Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC in the Corporate Governance Debate, 45 STAN. L. 
R Ev. 985, 1006-09 (1993) [hereinafter Gi lson & Kraakman, lnvestmen £ Compan ies]. 
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A. The Collective Action Problem, the Cost-Benefit Solution, and the 
Counter Story 
Historica lly, shareholders of public companies are an Olsonian 
latent group.150 That is, a collective good-active monitoring of 
managemen t- v;ould make them better off given proport iona te 
distribution of its costs. but the law provides no cost-sharing 
mechanism, ~mel th e free--rider problem prevents the emergence of a 
volunteer or group of volunteers with an incentive to provide the 
good.151 Given dispersed shareholdings, the nontrivial costs of 
active monitoring, and the alternative of exit through sale, the 
benefits obtainable wi thout investment in monitoring exceed the 
benefits obtainable from investment. 152 In addition, rational apathy 
prevails when the system mandates that matters be presented for 
shareholder approva l. The rational small shareholder does not inves t 
in information about governance matters, given the likelihood that the 
collective action problem inhibits an effective group response. 153 
Collective action theory allows for the possibility that a subgroup 
of a latent group will organize and provide the public good if the 
benefits from action to each member of the subgroup exceed the costs 
incurred. 154 The increased concentration of shareholdings in 
institutional hands makes it conceivable that institutional subgroups 
might find investment in monitoring cost beneficial. 155 Con-
centration of shares also promises to mitigate the rational apathy 
problem. The shareholders' decision of whether to seek information 
about the governance issue depends on the costs and expected 
benefits of the effort and the initiative's probabilities of success. The 
cost is independent of the number of shares held. \Vith individual 
shareholders holding larger proportionate stakes in the firm , the 
150. See Edward B. Rock , Th e Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional 
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. LJ. 445, 455-59 ( 1991) [here inafter Rock , Shareholder 
Activism] (working th e mode ls o f Olson and Hardin through the corporate fact pattern). 
151. Each mem be r of the group rati o nally prefers that o thers in the group incur the 
costs of providing the pu b lic goocl. 
152. Rock, Sh areho lder Acrivism. supra no te 150, at 455-56. 
153. See Grundfes t, supra no te 32, at 910. 
154. Rock, Sh areho lder A ctivism, supra no te 150, at 457-59 (citing RUSS ELL HAR DIN , 
COLLECfiVE ACT ION 4 1 (1982)) -
155. !d. at 459. As Bl ack argues, shareholder passivity m ay be historically continge nt , 
the res ult of a com bina tio n of lega l obstacles and past dispersed ownership patte rns. See 
Bernard S. Black, Shareh older Passivity Reexamin ed, 89 MICH. L REV. 520, 525 (1990) 
[he re inafte r Black, Shareholder Passivity ]. 
' i 
...h 
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expected returns from a given information investment go up, as does 
the proponent's chance of success. 151i 
Subgroup formation depends on the size of the group, the cost of 
action, and the magni tude of the benefit the subgroup seeks. 
Proponents of law reform designed to facilitate shareholder par-
ticipation direct most of their attention to the firs t two factors. Since 
the number of members needed to form a subgroup declines as 
ownership concentration goes up , the proponents argue for a 
relaxation of the regulatory barriers that impede the accumulation of 
large holdings in given firms by single investors or organized groups 
of investors. 157 The proponents also circulate blueprints for cheap 
strategies, since, as the costs of a given initiative go down, subgroup 
formation can go forward with a lower level of concentration and a 
lower projected probability of success. 158 
In sum, the proponents assert that, given certain legal ad-
justments, prospects for fin ancial gain by themselves will induce 
governance initiatives by institutional investors. Yet there is a 
counter story. This asserts that , even with legal adjustments, 
governance initiatives realizing the full promise of cooperative gain 
through enforced self-regulation cannot be expected. Two points are 
emphasized. First, agency relationships within investment institutions 
create disincentives that prevent subgroup formation, even assuming 
a projection of a positive return to the subgroup from an investment 
in governance. Since the individual manager's performance is 
measured against the performance of the market as a whole and 
subgroup investment benefits the market as a whole, successful 
governance investments do not necessarily improve the individual 
manager's performance profile. 15Y Second, the benefits of cost-
intensive relational investment remain underspecified. In theory, 
156. According to Black, the incent ive to become informed increases as th e ho lde r 's 
share ownership level is squared. !d. at 585-89. 
157. !d. at 578. 
158. See Grundfest, supra note 32, a t 908-13 (exa mining the minimum cost s tra tegy of 
the "just vote no" campaign). Proponen ts of refo rm also stress that scale economies li e 
in the application of a single govern ance dev ice to multiple companies, Black, Shareholder 
Passivity, supra note 155, at 584, and a rgue for rules that transfer th e cost of shareholder 
initi at ives to the firm , see id. a t 579-80. 
159. Rock, Shareholder ACiivism. supra note 150, a t 473-74; see also Jill E. Fisch, 
Relationship Investing: Will it Happen? Will it Work?, 55 OHIO ST. L.J . 1009, 1020-25 
(1994) (arguing that competitive pressures on instituti ona l performance must be accounted 
for in cost-benefit models of institutional monitoring); H e len G arten, Institutional In vestors 
and the New Financial Order, 44 RUTGERS L. REV. 585, 630-32 (1 992) (arguing th a t it is 
difficult to incre ase inst itutional activism). 
1906 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
these lie in informational access and ongoing constructive criticism by 
the institutional monitor. 160 In practice, underperforming companies 
are publicly identified in the ordinary course, and standard remedies 
respecting investment policies, incentive schemes, and governance 
structures are part of the conventional wisdom. To the extent that 
insti tutio ns can cheaply tie the communication of these points to 
credibie threats against target managers, they can ::.ecure the available 
set of governance benefits through a discrete engagement, Incentives 
for more substantial investments in ongoing 1-elationships remain 
speculative, absent a special technical capability on the part of the 
particular monitor. As a result, risks of perverse incentives and 
commitment problems come to the forefront of the relational picture. 
A strategically placed institutional holder could opt for side payments 
from management in preference to public-regarding informational 
development, or, given a hostile tender offer, the institutions in the 
subgroup could defect from an implicit undertaking by management 
to be patient 161 
The practice has tended to fulfill the counter story's predictions. 
Relational engagements have been discrete, cheap, and focused on the 
short term. In contrast to the proponents ' prediction that financial 
incentives by themselves will induce subgroup formation, the selective 
incentive of reputation seems to drive the practice. This implies that 
contractual renegotiation of governance terms will dominate over 
direct monitoring of investment decision-making as the means to 
enhance value through shareholder participation. 
B. Selective Incentives and the Pauern of Shareholder Participation 
L The Pattern of Discrete Intervention 
Institutional investor activism is the successful grassroots political 
movement of American big business. It bega~ during the late 1980s 
vvhen institutions became dissatisfied with expanding legal constraints 
on takeover activity. Tne access route was the precatory shareholder 
160. See infra note 217. It comes as no surprise that the results of empirical st udies of 
returns on monitoring activities are inconclusive. See Fisch, supra note 159, at 1035 (citing 
L ILLI A. GORDON AND JOHN POUND, ACTIVE INVESTING IN THE U.S. EQUITY MARKET: 
PAST PERFORJ'v!ANCE AND FUTURE PROSPECTS, REPORT FOR THE CALIFORNIA PUB LI C 
EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM 44 (Jan. 11. 1993)) . 
161. For exploration of these problems, see Ayres & Cramton. supra note 19, at 1036-
39: Edward B. Rock, Comrolling th e Dark Side of Relarionallnvesting, 15 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 987 , 989-99 (1994) (hereinafter Rock, Dark Side]. 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1907 
proposal, 162 a medium for nonbinding, shareholder-initiated voting 
proposals made availab le by preemptive mandate v.nder rhe fede r?,l 
proxy rules. 163 The first generation of proposals concerned poison 
pilts, and urged management to exercise its priviiege of redeeming 
ti1ern or to submit them to shareholder approval. 164 ~t~'1e first 
sus tai.ned assault on the pills came in 1987, wh en a group of ;:n tbli ': 
T -::::. pc 1 r ~ -i .Cl In ,--i .;:- -i ~ ..... cu-·vp reo' tl·l e e•'onorr•y nf C' ('<:) Lc. r n ~ r.:', l }- rf"l ~ -;- ·r p. r ) ~)c . u".!L .lcl.;< ... o <~ .• :3 ·-~ ·~ • • ,1. -'·"' "·-- c.L.u ._, ,_,, ), .. ,.,_., ... , 
c :·oocszds a t fortv firm s. The oroDosals received more than r\'i<>: ,t -~ "' ... l . .. . . -
C l . 'fi . \.. ' . . percetlt 01 t_·le votes cast-s1gn1 cant returns g1ven tue nistc;.ric r) :::, ·:-~e r 'l. 
of overwhelming votes against shareholder proposals. 165 
--------------------------------··----
162. Management must includ e in the annual proxy statem•: nt preca tory shareholJer 
proposa ls that meet Rule 14a-8 process and su itability guidelines. Proxy Soli ci tation Rules, 
17 CF.R. s 240. 14a-8 (1994). 
The process guidelines , se t out in Rule 14a-8(a)(2) to (4), arc st rict-the propone nt 
is allowed only one proposal , submiss ion must occur months before the mee ting. and the 
supporting statement is limited to 500 words. 17 C.F.R. § 240. 14(a)-8(a)2 to 3 (1993). The 
suitability guidelin es are stricter. They were drafted at a time when shareholder proposa ls 
were envisioned as a medium for exp ress ion of concern on social issues rela ted to 
corporations, and exclude many business topics of prime concern to governance activists . 
To wit, unde r Rule 14a-8(c) , matters of "ordinary business operations ," "election[s] to 
offi ce," proposa ls counter to management proposals, and "spec ific amounts of cas h . .. 
dividen ds" are unsuitable; at the same time, a social proposa l "not signi fican tl y 
related" to the business also is unsuitable. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)5 , 7-9 & 13 (1 994). 
The SEC alters its interpretations of these rules from time to time , opening the door 
to issues concerning the operation of the business if it determines that the particular topic 
has taken on substantial po licy import. The Commiss ion has not been notab ly consiste nt 
in these determi nations. Compare Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, lnc. , SEC I\lo-
Action Letter, [1992-1 993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'fi 76,418. at 77.284-87 
(Oc t. 13 , 1992) (finding unsuitable a proposa l recomm ending policy of nondisc riminat ion 
respecting sex ual preference in hiring), with Eli Lilly & Co .. SE C No-Ac ti on Le tt er [1 993 
Trans fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) ~ 76,629, at 77,682 (Feb. 25 , 1993) (fin ding 
:; uit able a proposal recomme nding adoption of price restraint policy by drug company 
:, uitabie) and AT&T, 1990 SEC No-Act LEX IS 20, *2-3 (J an. 5, 1990) (findin g proposal 
for elimination of affinnative action programs suitable). This sort of nonsense has gotten 
the agency into difficulties with certain courts. See New York City Employees ' Retirement 
Sys. v. SEC, 843 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (enjoining the agency from act ing 
inconsisten tly with its own stated po li cy in respec t to the Cracker Barrel proposal), rev'd, 
Fed. Sec . L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 98,493 (2d Ci r. Jan. 3, 1995). 
Observers tend to see these suitability rules as manifestly unsa ti sfactory. See, e.g., 
Blac k. Shareholder Passivity, supra note 155, at 541 ; Jill E. Fisch , From Legitimacy ro 
Logic: .Reconstrucring Proxy Regulation , 46 YAND. L. REV. 1129, 1155-62 (1993) . 
163. Under Rule 14a-8, the proponent bears th e expense of mak ing the proposa l, 
including legal expenses in the event of a management cha ll enge to its suitab ility, but the 
corporation bears the expense of including the proposal in th e proxy statement. Proxy 
Solicitat ion Rules, 17 C.F. R. § 240.14a-8 (1994). 
\64. Gilson & Kraakman, lnstilutional Agenda, supra note 32, at 867-68. 
165. Rock, supra note 150, a t 402. The players we re the College Retirement Equit ie5 
f und . the Ca li fornia Public Employe es Retirement System, and the Wisconsin Investment 
Board, loosely organized through the Council of Institution al Investors. Jayne W. 
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The activists thereafter broadened the range of their proposals to 
cover other takeover defenses 166 and, with proposals for confidential 
voting, the voting process itself. 167 By 1990, the voting pattern had 
changed. In that year, 160 shareholder proposals received more than 
twenty percent of the votes, and nineteen received more than fif ty 
percent 1f>s_the iargest number of successful proposals in the enti:< ·~ 
history of the device.169 'Ir.e voting pattern respecting man2gement 
proposals also had changed. 170 Although the overv,helming majority 
management submitted in 1990 were approved, ten were defeated and 
two were withdrawn to avoid defeat. 171 Antitakeover charter 
amendments, overwhelmingly approved in the early 1980s, now passed 
with only fifty to sixty percent of the votes. 172 
Institutional activists had arrived, led by agents of the California 
Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) and other public 
pension funds. After 1990, the subject matter of their proposals 
broadened again, to include process and structure proposals designed 
to make boards more effective in monitoring and designing incentive 
Barnard, fnslirwional Investors and rhe New Corporate Governance, 69 N.C. L. R EV. 1135 , 
1153 (1991). 
M ark R. Wingerson & C hristopher H. Dorn, lnsritwionallrzvestors in the U.S. and th e 
Repeal of Poison Pills: A Pracririoner 's Perspective, in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND 
CORPORATE GO VER NANCE, supra note 11 , at 201-02 , makes a co unter suggestion. Given 
the present control marke t in which takeovers tend to be strategic moves made by larger 
players in a gi ven industry, th ey argue th a t th e shareho lde rs' interest li es in lea vi ng the 
pills in place to facilit a te lowe r-cost fri endly transactions. !d. at 212. They thus ascribe 
institutional pressure for pill redemption entirely to sel ective incentives. !d. a t 211-22. 
166. The proposals suggested prohibition (or requirement of shareholder approval) of 
greenmail payme nts, opting out of antitakeover statutes, and requiring shareholder 
approva l of place ments of large blocks of stock with managem ent-friendl y ho lders. See 
Gilson & Kraa kman, lnstirwional Agenda , supra note 32, at 868. 
167. See Black , A gews, supra note 30, at 825-26. Confidential voting assi sts shareholder 
participation in two ways. First , confidentiality prevents management from punishing 
private in ves tm en t institutions that vote against it in the product market. !d. Second , 
under the usual procedures, management's proxy solicitors are free to count the proxies 
as the y come in , identify no-voting shareholders, and resolicit their votes . If the vote 
seems des tined to go against management , management can withdraw its proposal. 
Shareholde r proponents do not have this privilege. !d. 
168. Rock, Shareholder Activism , supra note 150, at 483. 
169. Barnard, supra note 165 , at 1156. Poison pill proposals received an average vote 
of 42 % . Black , Agenrs , supra note 30, at 828. 
170. Management must submit charter amendments and fundamental corporate 
changes, including liquidation, substantial asset sales, and some mergers for a shareholder 
vote. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 242, 251, 271 , 275 (1994). Executive compensation 
plans must be submitted to the shareholders pursuant to exchange listing rul es. 
171. R ock, Shareholder Acrivism , supra note 150, at 484. 
172. Black. Shareholder Passivity, supra note 155, at 571. 
1995) CORPORA TE GOVERNANCE 1909 
IT M . 1 arrangements. -· ore tmportant y, success caused the se t of cheap 
strategies to expand. It turned out that managers, once confronted 
with majority or near majority votes for the institutions' nonbinding 
proposals, or confronted wi th even the prospect of such a vote, 
proved willing to open negoti ations and make concessions,174 either 
by voluntarily adopting responsive measures or by accepting ot her 
policy changes in exchange for the withdrawal of a proposal. 17-' 
Proponents took this advantage and gained negotiating access by 
generating bad publicity without making specific proposals. They 
publicized lists of underperforming companies176 with the suggestion 
that shareholders "just vote no '· in that year 's board ele::tion .177 
173. Suggested improvements included th e separation of th e functions of board 
chairman and chie f executive office r and outside director membership for the compen-
sation committee . Proposa ls respec ting executive pay also appeared , after th e SEC 
reversed a position in 1992 and decla red th e subject matter to be prope r under its rul e . 
See Staff Advises Shareholder Proposals on Pay Includible in Proxy Materials , 24 SEC. 
REG. & L. REP. (BNA), No. 8, at 250 (Feb. 21, 1992). Shareholder inte rventi on has 
resulted in changes in compensation practices a t liT, IBM, Cincinnati Bell, and A von. 
Grundfest, supra note 32, at 931. 
Institutional shareholder proposals continue to increase in number. See 9 CORP. 
COUNS. WKLY (BNA), No. 22, at 4 (June 22, 1994) (reporting a slight increase in 1993 and 
1994). In the 1994 annua l m eeting season (according to Georgeson & Co.), institution:; 
sponsored 69 proposals, up from 65 in 1993. !d. Of the 1994 proposals, 11 sought to 
repeal classified boards, 10 conce rn ed executive compensation, 7 sought poison pill 
redemption, and 14 ad vocated confidential voting. '93-'94 Proxy Seasons Said 10 Show 
Slight Increase in Shareholder A ctivism . 9 CO RP. COUNS. WKLY (BNA) , No. 24, at 4 (June 
22 , 1994) (he reinaft e r '93- '94 Proxy Seasons]. The re has been a change in the sponsorshi p 
pattern. however. La bor unions have appea red as sponsors. backing 32 proposals in 1994 
versus 9 in 1993. john C. Wilcox , chaim1an of Georgeson & Co., cha racte ri zes the unions 
as "gadflies, " because they repeat th eir proposals and do not seek to negoti a te with 
management before submitting them. !d. In another recent deve lopment , Ca iPE RS , ci ting 
an independent consultant's stock price study, has indica ted an interes t in e nco uraging 
manageme nt to adopt " high pe rformance" workpl ace strategies that accord wo rk e rs mo re 
rights and feedback. See id. at 1. 
174. See Rock, Shareholder Activism, supra note 150, at 483. For example , K-Ma rt 
accepted two proposals in 1990 and se ven firms instituted confidential voting in exchange 
for withdrawal of proposals . /d. 
175. Grundfest , supra note 32, at 932 (stating that in 1992 , 31 firms confronted with 
shareholder proposals negotiated their withdrawal). Institutional successes al so have had 
a noticeable dete rrent e ffect on management proposals for self-protective charte r 
amendments. See Black, Agents , supra note 30, at 828-29. 
176. See Ca/PERS Lists 12 Companies in Effort to Focus Atrention on Corpora te 
Reform, 24 SEC. R EG. & L. REP. (BNA), No. 13, at 420 (Mar. 27 , 1992). 
177. Grundfest, supra note 32, at 933. The New York State Common Retirem ent Fund , 
the Public Employees R e tirement Fund of Colorado, the New York State Loca l 
Retirement Funds, th e New York City Retirement Systems, and CRE F ha ve joined 
CalPERS in these campaigns. !d. at 867 & n.37. 
Grundfest notes the cost advantages of these dialogic campaigns. T he anal ys ts collect 
the basic information on performance and the costs of drafting and compliance costs of 
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Proponents then would meet with management to voice their 
criticisms and concerns. Results follmved m - chief executives were 
terminated at two of CalPERS ' 1992 targets, IBM and Westinghouse; 
another target, Sears, took the institutions' advice about concentrating 
on the core business and dismembered itself. 179 A change in the 
SEC proxy rules, promulgated in 1992 as a resu lt of institutional 
pressures, facilit ated the new approach by pr.:.:rrnitting shareholders to 
pubiish their views in the media without prior agency approval. 180 
2. Explaining and Evaluating the Pattern 
The institutional shareholders' record, thus outlined, confirms 
that concentrated shareholders are not passive and can coordinate 
votes to achieve results. Specifically, the ra tional apathy problem has 
diminished substantially, reputational threats against managers have 
14a-8 proposals are avoided. CaiPERS es timates that a 14a-8 proposal can cost up to 
$500,000, where a "just vote no" campaign costs $100,000. !d. at 911-12. Howeve r, the 
device is not necessa rily more effective than the a lternat ive of a precatory shareholder 
proposa l directed to a matter of process and structure; the latter gained stronger support 
than the former at th e 1995 annual mee ting of Philip Morris, a current institutional target. 
See infra note 296. 
178. !d. at 933. Heads also ha ve rolled at Good year, Allied Signal, Tenneco, Shearson, 
and Kodak. !d. at 882-94. 
179. This sort of institutional pressure continu ed to be exerted through 1994, with 
different results in diffe rent finm. K-Mart and Philip Morris were two leading institutional 
targets. A t K-Mart, institutions press uring for the separation o f non-core re tailing 
divisions ca used the defeat of a company proposal (presented for approval at the annual 
mee ting) deemed no t to go far enough. Months later, the board removed the embattled 
C.E.O. from the chairmanship, but it retained him as pres ident. See Joann S. Lublin & 
Christina Duff, Managemenr: Ho w Do You Fire a CEO? Very, Very Slowly, WALL. ST. 
J., Jan. 20. 1995, at B1. Philip Morris expe rienced simil a r institutional pressure for division 
of the company, but the internal politics worked differently. See infra note 296. 
180. See Proxy Solicita tion Rul es, 17 C.F. R. ~ 240.14a-2(b)(l) (1994). The ea rlier rules 
prohibited solicitation of more than 10 o the r share ho ld e rs wi thout adva nce clearance. The 
revised rul es also cut back on manageme nt agenda control in the proxy solicitation itself 
by (1) permitting share holders to vote in board elections for a combination of management 
nominees and outside challengers, and (2) allowing shareholders to oppose a single 
managemen t proposa l without being req uired to vote for or against an entire slate of 
proposa ls. 17 C.F,R. § 240.14(a)-4(b) (1994). The former change facilitates the possibility 
of campaigns for se lect numbers o f institutionally nominated directors. See Ronald J. 
Gilson et a!., How the Proxy Rules Discourage Consrructive Engagemenr: Regu latory 
Barriers 10 £leering a Minoriry of Direcrors, 17 J. CORP. L. 29, 33-42 (1991). The latter 
change prevents th e bundling of a proposai to which shareholders might object with an 
advantageous proposa l. It does not, howeve r, prevent management from conditioning the 
approval of a proposal on the approval of one or more other proposa ls . See Fisch , supra 
note 162, a t 1169-70. 
The revised rul es have had some effect on the pattern of proxy contests. Institutions 
now so licit proxies from one another when opposing mergers or corporate restructurings. 
See '93-'94 Proxy Seasons, supra note 173, at 2. 
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proved effective, and capture of institutional proponents has not been 
a problem. Diverse incentives among the institutions, however, make 
the wider attack on the collective action barrier a tentative one. 
a. The Rational Apathy Problem 
The rational apathy caiculation broke during the 1980s when 
newly concentrated holders encountered takeover-related voting issues 
with substantial fin ancial implications.18 1 Ins ti tutions thereafter 
made at least minimal investments in information on governance 
issues and showed some discrimination in their voting. 182 The 
network of activist institutions also became a point of information 
exchange. Their public suggestions that votes in selected firms be tied 
to performance entail the sorting of financial information for 
rechannelling into the voting arena. This ameliorates a problem of 
informational slack183 in addition to securing leverage for 
negotiations. Finally, the activists' success at extracting governance 
concessions provided the wider institutional community with ongoing 
incentives to stay informed, even as takeover-related incentives 
declined in importance after 1989. 
b. The Reputational Threat 
The record also suggests a revision of the standard list of 
corporate governance deterrents. As yet, most shareholder initiatives 
have not employed threats of direct intervention in the form of 
mandatory proposals 184 or opposing slates of directors. 185 Instead, 
181. On this point, then, Black's "critical mass" has been reached. See Black, 
Shareholder Passivicy, supra note 155, at 588-89. 
182. The institutions articula te voting policies in advance by type of proposal. See 
Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund A ctivism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered , 
93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 831-39 (1993) [hereinafte r Romano, Pension Fund A ctivism J 
(comparing public and private fund voting policies). Bw cf Louis Lowenstein, Why 
Managements Should (And Should Nor) Have Respecc for Their Shareholders , 17 J. CORP. 
L. 1, 19-20 (1991) (surveying the guidelines of one bank and finding that they crudely fail 
to discriminate between well and badly run companies to avoid an appearance of 
favoritism to bank customers). 
183. See Levine & Forrence, supra note 47, at 185-91. CalPERS's list of underperfor-
ming finns amounts to a " fire al ann'" mode of oversight that supplements the "police 
patrolling" of the independent directors. See McCubbins et al. , supra note 89, at 273-74. 
The fire alarm realigns the outside directors' incentives to make them more inclined to 
challenge the managers. !d. 
184. These are prohibitively costly under state law, and the extent to which the proxy 
rules allow for them under Rule 14a-8 is unclear. See infra note 274 and accompanying 
text. 
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action is communicative. The shareholders as a group are invited to 
join in a nonbinding request and their cooperation indicates dissatis-
faction with performance. 186 In the alternative, the proponent 
announces performance dissatisfaction directly and invites others to 
concur. None of these initiatives entails a takeove r threa t in the 
present cl imate. Nevertheless, they resul t in preemptive negot iations 
;:md concessions by managers,1s7 and . in some cases, prom pt the 
U'TT11 ina tion of the chief exec utive by the outside directors. 
These shareholder threats appear credible because they impact 
on the reputational interests of chief executives and independent 
board members. The campaign declares that the target executives 
possess undesirable characteristics, 18~ detracting from their standing 
in the business community189 and , in some cases, from their 
marketability. It can be expected that managers will be extraor-
dinarily risk-averse to such reputational impairment if, as seems 
reasonable, we can assume that employment contracts are incomplete 
and do not fully compensate for tenure insecurity and the costs of 
changing jobs. 190 Preemption by negotiation serves the managers ' 
interest by defusing the threat and providing them with some control 
over the settlement process. 191 
More broadly, the appearance of a vocal shareholder interest 
group changes the manager's institutional environment. The 
institutions articulate a normative challenge to the manager's conduct 
of the business. 192 Their challenge has a more destabilizing effect 
185. Diss ident in ves tors have successful ly conducted proxy contests for board scats in 
a handful of cases. See John Pound , The Rise of rh e Polirica / Model of Corporare 
Governance and Corporare Comrol, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1047-50 (1993) . 
186. It is not cle ar how discriminating the institutional voters are in this regard . 
Confidential voting, once placed as a yes vote in a guideli ne presum abl y results in yes 
votes in both well and badly managed compani es. See Lowenstein , supra note 182, at 19-
20. T he va lue of the signal depends on the discriminat ion or the ac ti vist gatekeeper. A t 
least one writer has assured managers that shareholder initiatives can be avoided through 
good fin ancial performance over the long run and direct explanation of any short-term 
problems to the institutions. Robert C. Pozen , lnsrirurional lnvesrors: The Relucranr 
Acrivisis , H A RV. Bus. REV. 141, 147-49 (J an.-Feb. 1994) . 
187 . Pound, supra note 185, at 1057-61. 
188. G rundfest , supra note 32, at 927-28. 
189. See James G. March & Zur Shapira, Managerial Perspecrives on Risk and Risk 
Taking, 33 MGMT. SCI. 1404, 1413 (1987) (stating that managers are concerned about their 
re putati ons for risk-taking and are eager to discuss the deficienci es of others). 
190. See fvlilgrom & Roberts, supra note 2, at 158-62. 
191. See Gilson et a!. , supra note 180, at 45 . 
192. Firms are, from a sociological perspective , normative environments. Institutional 
norms are rationalized prescriptions that identify soci al purposes as technical ones and 
specify rul e-like means to pursue these technical rati onalities. John W. Meyer & Brian 
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than ordinary external criticism, due to their equity investments, long 
term presence, and ability to marshal votes respecting both present 
and future matters for shareholder action. They represent an unstable 
sector in the larger domain of institutional relationships with which 
the manager deals. 193 By negotiating, the ris k-ave rse manager194 
seeks to stabilize and influence the relationshio. 
' The shareholder threat can also destabilize tile re lat ionsh ips of 
i.ns ide manage rs and outside directors by reorienting the c utsiders' 
incentives. Ordinarily. the outside directors, being corporate players 
themselves, 195 see that their interests lie in cooperation with 
management. However, shareholder intervemion gives rise to a 
public question about the outsiders' effectiveness, creating a dual 
demand that has an impact on different components of the same 
reputation. If the conflict becomes severe, the outsiders resolve it by 
forming a coalition and exercising their board voting power to oust 
the chief executive. Thus, publicity and reputational interests 
combine to effect a transfer of control. 
The occurrence of a number of such transfers in practice bolsters 
the activists' credibility. These cases also represent an important 
achievement: Since managers become psychologically invested in 
their past strategies, chief executive turnover plays a crucial role in 
prompting disinvestment m those strategies. 196 Furthermore, 
Rowan, !n stinuional Organization: Formal Struclllre as M_wh and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. 
soc. 340, 343-44 (1977). 
193. See WALTER W. POWELL & PAUL J. DIMAGGIO. THE NEW INSTITUTI ONA LISM 
IN ORG ANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 30 (1991) (looking to ext ra-institutional sources of 
institutional change as a complement to the internal interes t group story of the firm). 
194. See March & Shapira, supra note 189, at 1410-14 (suggesting that extreme risk 
aversion can be expected). March and Shapira survey empirical studi es on attitudes to risk 
and conclude (1) that the managers do not see uncertainty about positive outcomes as an 
important part of risk, and rather understand risk in terms of negative outcomes; and (2) 
that managers do not understand risk as a probability concept, instead understanding risk 
in te m1s of how much they might lose rather than the probability of loss. !d. at 1407. See 
generally KE NN ETH R. MACCRIMMON & DONALD A. WEHRUNG, TAKING RISKS: THE 
MANAGEME NT OF UNCERTAINTY 77-274 (1986) (reporting on a comprehensive survey of 
senior business executives and studying their willingness to take risks). 
195. See supra text accompanying note 15. 
196. See Theresa K. Lant et al., The Role of Managerial Learning and Interpretation in 
Strategic Persisten ce and Reorienlation: An Empirical Exploration , l3 STRATEGIC MGMT. 
J. 585, 588, 603 (1992) (stressing that heterogeneity of top management induces strategic 
change and that managers in environments with constant change are more lik ely to change 
than others in less complex circumstances); see also Paul C. Nystrom & William H. 
Starbuck , To A void Organizational Crises; Unlearn, ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAM ICS, Spring 
1984. at 53-60 (explaining that faulty cognitive structures developed by top managers 
contribute to an organization's inability to deal with crisis , often requiring an infusion of 
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organizational tenure has been accorded a principal role in explaining 
the informational diversity, risk , and status quo preferenc~::::; of the 
teams of managers that run corporations. Long-term executives tend 
to employ unchanging strategies and rely on customary informa.tion 
sources. Teams with short tenures are more inclined to adoot diverse 
! 
stra tegi es, look for new sources of information, and deveicp nevi 
plans. 1n 
c. Financial and Selective Incentives 
Shareholder engagements have fo llowed a drscrete, sins l e ·· s ho ~: 
pattern. Agen ts of public and not-for-profit funds take the initiative, 
select targets, and make investments in communication and legal 
compliance. Private sector agents of mutual funds, private pensior; 
funds, management firms, banks and insurance companies follow the 
leaders,19H taking a selective, cost-sensitive approach. Larger private 
players join in the dialogue when prominent underperforming 
companies become successful targets. Otherwise, they discrimin<J.te 
among specific issues according to projected short-term financial 
consequences. A proposition with significant bearing on short-term 
returns, such as a management proposal for a merger with a low 
payout, might prompt an initiative. Other issues will not, with the 
extent of participation in the initiatives diminishing with the payoff: 
Poison pills rank above compensa tion plans, which in turn rank above 
more general process and structure improvements. 19Y 
This division of functions between public and private institutions 
foilows from differences in the agen ts ' financial incentives 8 !1d the 
institutions ' product market vulnerabilities. Public pension funds tend 
to be internally managed by civil servants who have relative irnrn unity 
to threats by managers. These agents ' bureaucratic positions a lso lead 
them to pursue risk averse financial strategies, since the public sector 
------------------·-------· -------
new ideas in the form of new managers). 
197. See Sydney Finkelst ein & Donald C. Hambrick, Top Managemenl· Team Tenure 
and Organizarional Owcomes: The Moderating Role of Managerial Discretion, 35 ADi'vl i N . 
SCI. Q. 484, 486-88 (1990); see also Jeffrey Pfeffer , Organizational Demography . in 5 
RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 299, 320-26 (L.L. Cummings & Barry M. 
Staw eds., 1983) (examining the effects of organizational demography on innovat ion. 
adaptation and performance). Bw see Andrew M. Pettigrew, On Sw dying tHanagerial 
£/ires, 13 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 163 passim (1992) (providing a methodological cri tique of 
this literature). 
198. In 1990 public pension funds owned 8.3% of the equity market ; priva te pension 
funds owned 19.9 %; mutual funds owned 7.2%. All of these percentages had inc reased by 
1992. See Coffee , Half-Tim e Reporr, supra note 32, at 848-49. 
199. Pozen sets out this pa tt ern of response. Pozen, supra note 186, at 145-<!6. 
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provides no special rewards for exceptional financial performance, 
while financia l fa ilure can lead to punishment.200 These funds, as a 
result, are heavily indexed .201 Private sector agents, in contrast, run 
the risk of management punishment for uncooperative conduct. 202 
They also have stronger incentives to pursue upside gain , which leads 
them to trade more act ive ly and worry about liquidity.203 Some also 
work under tight cost constraints that stem from fee arrangements 
structured on th e assumption of governance passivity. 2D-1 
T he different be havior pa tterns of public and private institutions 
reverse the assertion of the fi nancia l incentive theory of shareholder 
participation . In theory financial gain provides the incentive, while in 
practice the less intense the financial pressures on the agent , the 
greater the likelihood that the agent will take the governance 
initiative.205 Tnis odd result dovetails with the more general point 
that inevitable sharing of governance gains with free riders makes 
governance investment irrational in a world in which the agent's 
individual performance evaluation proceeds against the performance 
of the market as a whole. 206 Together these points confirm the 
prediction that share holder initiative will follow from selective 
incentives. Public sector actors, as civil servants, are unimpeded by 
the private actors' cost, product market, and reputational disincen-
200. See Lowe nste in. SllfHa no te 182, at 17-18. 
201. See Coffee. Half- Time Report, supra note 32, at 860. 
202 . See, e.g, Grundfest. supra note 32. a t 9 13-24. Corporations, parti cu larl y corpora te 
pension fund s, are a s ign ific::m t sou rce of busin ess fo r private manage rs . A we ll-publicize d 
confrontation with one manage ment grou p can chill a bus iness re lation ship with a simila rl y 
situated group. !d . 
203. Private pension fund s te nd to be ·'defined bene fit '' plans, giv ing the corpora te 
sponso r a n incenti ve to max imize plan re turn to minimize th e need for corpora te 
contributions. P ublic p lans some tim es follow a "defined contribution" pattern, with no 
connection be tween perform an ce and contri bution. Coffe e, Half- Time Report, supra no te 
32, at 859. Roman o suggests th a t possi bilities fo r ex tern a l political pressures on public 
pension fund agents wo ui d diminish if a ll took th e defin ed contribution form . Romano , 
Pension Fund Activism, supra no te 182, at 844-51. 
204. Pozen cit es 70 basis points per yea r plus a maximum perform ance fee of 10 to 20 
basis points fo r externa l manage rs, and notes that all costs of dealing with the proxy 
process come out of thi s com pensa ti on poo l. Pozen , supra note 186, a t 144. 
205. There is a counter sto ry to th e effect th a t the indexed investor must invest in 
sys temic governance improvements du e to th e absence of the a lte rnative of exit throu gh 
sale. See Barnard. supra note 165 , at 1151-52; Gil son & Kraakman, lnstinaional A genda, 
supra note 32, at 866-67. T he pro blem with this incentive sto ry is that it neither accounts 
for the behavior different ial between the public and private secto rs nor recognizes tha t 
inacti vity might neverth e less be a more rat ional a lte rnative from th e point of view o f a 
particular private secto r age nt. 
206. See supra text accom panying notes 151-52. 
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tives. At the same time, governance activity seems to suit them as a 
mode of reputation enhancement. Given this phenomenon of reward 
for power exercised over business actors rather than for financial 
performance,207 they are political entrepreneurs in both the tradition-
al and O!sonian senses.208 
d. Credibility and Poss ibilities for Capture 
A number of factors make public pension fund agents suitable for 
this "public-regarding" entrepreneurship. The credibil ity of a 
shareholder who proposes a cooperative engagement with 
management is enhanced by a concrete commitment to a long-term 
investment in the firm. The public agents' indexed portfolios give 
them a long-term posture as a structural proposition. Their interven-
tions, accordingly, hold out no possibility of a hidden defection 
strategy keyed to exploiting the management vulnerability that follows 
from public targeting.M Nor, given indexing and the multiplicity of 
institutional holders, is it likely that a proponent or group of 
proponents could use voting power or the opportunity of access to 
management to defect from the wider shareholder interest in 
exchange for rents from the target. A particular pension fund agent 
has reputational concerns that limit such a possibility to an end 
period.210 The agent's ability to exercise a reputational threat 
207. lf the caree r patte rns of the most prominent actors are any guide, job shifts over 
to the private sector also seem to be a possible reward. 
208. A second type of po litica l en tre preneur also has appeared. This is a professional 
inte rm ed iary who makes th e good governance case to management from an inside 
position. The intermediary a rgues that voluntary acceptance of a program of internal 
monitoring procedures minimizes th e possibility of becom ing an institutional target. Two 
prominent lawyers, Martin Lipton and Ira Milstein, take the prominent roles in this 
capacity. See Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch , A 1\l!odest Proposal for Improved Corporate 
Governance, 48 Bus. LAW. 59, 67-75 (1992) (recommending the separation of the chief 
executive and board chairman functions, longer and more frequent board meetings, smaller 
boards , use of outside consult ant s, periodic evalua tion of the C.E.O. 's performance , and 
an annual meet ing with the company's largest shareholders); see also Jay W. Lorsch, 
Empowering the Board, H ARV. Bus. REV. 107 (Jan.-Feb . 1995) (describing activist board 
strategies). 
The General Motors Board adop ted a se t of "guidelines" in 1994, drafted by Milstein. 
These provide for annual evaluation of the C.E.O. but little else. See The GM Board 
Guidelines, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Summer 1994, at 5. 
209. Conflicts ove r short term gain and long term strategy are entailed in th ese 
engagements. These contlicts are discussed publicly, particularly where the issue is the 
unbundling of a conglomerate . 
210. That is, when termination of a particular relationship is co ntemplated. 
Presumably, an end period res ults only when a given agent has decided to leave th e fi e ld 
of money management. Cf Black, Agents, supra note 30, at 851 (observing that 
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against management depends ultimately on the agent's ability to rally 
vo tes from the wider institutional community.2li Since votes against 
management remain the exception rather than the rule, the proponent 
must husband its reputation to continue to play, selecting targets 
carefully and representing th e interests of the entire group of 
shareholders in the engagement with management. Informational 
slack seems unlikely to open up any room for self-seeking manev;e c-s. 
Tne institutions operate in an informal ne twork, and the man agers 
themselves re main ready to p ublicize any misconduct.212 In short, 
guardianship here is easily contes ted. 
Competing demands on, and the possible capture of, agents of 
public pension funds can more plausibly be hypothesized from a 
different direction. The bureaucratic positions of public pension fun d 
agents make them vulnerable to pressure from constituency interests 
frequently opposed to shareholder interests. Management is one of 
those constituencies. These actors are, after all, agents of the same 
governments that managers already have captured, at least within the 
production of corporate law. Accordingly, political contestability 
makes it imprudent to predict that this form of entrepreneurship will 
remain vital indefinitely. 
Roberta Romano has suggested that state-based concerns, such 
as political pressure to support local firms and engage in other forms 
of locally directed social investing, could limit the freedom of action 
of pension fund agents. 213 Certainly a close tie between a state and 
a particular firm would crea te a conflict for that fund agent. As 
Romano also suggested, however, these conflicting demand situations 
are geographically specific rather than systemic. They therefore differ 
from the more general threat of management pressure that still 
controls private actors. G iven a multiplicity of players, the confl icts 
can be worked out within the network: The agent disabled by the 
dual demand employs the professional 's device of recusal , and the 
other agents go forward. Romano points to a more systemic threat 
to the leadership of the public pension funds when she recounts pro-
management politicai maneuvers to place pension fund control in the 
shareho lde r engagem ent is a repeated game, re taliation against chea ters can be ex pected, 
and money managers will ra re ly be in an end period with respect to one another) . 
211. Rom ano conducted a compara ti ve survey of the voting policies of pub li c and 
private funds and found no sta ti stica ll y significant differences in voting pa tterns on process 
and structure issues, and a common patte rn on most socia l issues . Romano, Pension Fund 
Acrivism, supra note 182, at 83 1-39. 
212. See Black , Agenrs, supra note 30, at 817. 
213. Romano, Pension Fund ACiivism, supra note 182, at 814-20. 
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governors' offices in New York and California. 214 These maneuvers 
did not succeed, but they underscore the important point that 
managers know how to organize themselves and make state 
governments responsive to their wider agenda. Increased fund 
activism, predicts Romano, will cause a concomitant increase in 
political pressure on the fund s' governance decis ions.215 
It is hard to gauge the likelihood and prospects of a management 
Dolitical initiative to break the oattern of oublic fund leadership. 
1 • 1 
Such a campaign would face several barriers. Here, unlike charter 
competition, the employee beneficiaries provide a countervailing 
interest. In addition, the funds with the most active postures come 
from states, such as California, New York, and ·wisconsin, with long-
standing antimanagerial political traditions. 216 Finally, an initiative 
would have to succeed on a multistate basis. On the other hand, since 
the number of key states is small, it would be possible to knock out 
the core players that provide essential resources to the network with 
an initiative pointed to the leading jurisdictions. The likelihood of 
such an attack would increase if takeovers returned as an issue in a 
political posture replicating that of the 1980s. 
C. Relational Modes of Shareholder Participation 
1. Institutional Coalitions and Board Membership 
Discrete engagements led by public pension funds only begin to 
realize the benefits projected by th e proponents of shareholder 
participation. More significant res ults would follow if the institutions 
formed coalitions and engaged with management to influence the 
selection of board candidates, or, if necessary, proposed and elected 
their own minority slates. TI1is strategy's objective is not the 
acquisition of board control, but the placement of clusters of monitors 
whose reputational interests are tied to meeting the demands of the 
shareholder interest. These inside shareholder representatives would 
work to include performance incentives in compensation schemes, 
develop additional sources of information and analysis, bring 
214. !d. The governors presumably also had an inte res t in controlling the funds to be 
able to draw on them in closing budget deficits. See Garten, supra note 159, at 639. 
215. Romano, Pension Fund Acrivism, supra note 182, at 852. She concludes that 
pension fund activities cannot replace an active control market as a disciplining force. !d. 
216. Ca!PERS enlisted the press in fightin g off the attack against it, charging that the 
state was attempting to silence the funds' attacks on management. See Garten, supra note 
159, at 639. 
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heterogeneity of opinion to board deliberations, watch the managers 
closely, and, in cases of persistent failure, build boardroom coalitions 
to replace the managers. 217 
TI1is strategy could be implemented in either of two ways. First, 
the institutions could voluntarily subscribe to a clearing house that 
would seiect candidates and solicit proxies fo r th em.~iK Second, the 
concentration of instituti onal holdings could increase to a leve l tha t 
\Voul d make the formation of informal institutional votin g coalitions 
more feasib le.219 Unfortunately, no movement toward the 
realization of either strategy seems to exist in practice. No volunteers 
have come forward to organize a governance associa tion, nor have the 
proportionate holdings of individual institutions risen to a point that 
smail subgroups have a stronger voting influence.220 The present 
disposition of institutional incentives heralds no change. A ll the cost 
217. See Gordon, Cumulative Voting, supra note 148, at 133-42. Gordon does not think 
that these institutional monitors should be se lected with a vie w to competing with 
managem ent in the crea tion of investment and management policy. The hypothesized 
monitors do not possess company specific expertise: aggress ive intervention fo r structural 
changes like downsizing could lead to adverse political consequences. !d. at 134-42; see 
also Barnard , supra note 165, at 1165-68 (explaining that insti tu tional in vestors and 
sha re holders lack necessary expertise to play an effective role in corporate governance); 
Gilson & Kraakman , !nstilll tional Agenda, supra note 32 , at 880 (argu ing that since 
institutional investors lack the expertise for monitoring manageme nt , they must delegate 
this functi on to outside directors). 
218. Gi lson and Kraa kman propose an institutional clea ringhouse that would deve lop 
21 pool of candidates. See Gilson & Kraakman. lnsrirwional Agenda. supra note 32. at 883-
88. T he amendm ent of the proxy rules pe rmitting shareho lders to split the ir votes be tween 
the ma nagemen t slate and an opposing slate. see supra note 180, fa cilitates thi s strategy by 
making it poss ible to run a sla te for a small number of seats. 
219. An intermediate strategy, the perman ent sharehold er advisory comm ittee. has not 
me t with enthusiasm from either the commentators. see Barnard . supra note 165, at 11 65-
68; G ilson & Kraakman, !nstitwional Agenda , supra note 32, at 87 1-72. or th e shareholders 
themse lves. A proposa l for an advisory committee made by Mr. Ro bert Monks at Exxon 
rece ived on ly 8% of the vote. See Charles F. Richards, Jr. & Anne C. Fos ter, Exxon 
Revisited: The SEC Allows Pennzoil to Exclude Both Man datory and Precatory Proposals 
Seeking to Create a Shareholder Advisory Commiuee, 48 Bus. LAW. 1509, 1511 (1993). 
220. T he top 20 instituti ons hold 21 % of American equities. and conce ntra tion falls off 
thereafter. See Coffee, Half- Time Report, supra note 32, at 852. The holders of the 21% 
hold sole voting authority as to only three-quarte rs of their blocks. !d. at 854. 
Furthermore, the num ber of mutual fun ds continues to increase. /d. at 855. 
A helpful contrast may be Britain, where the largest 25 institutions hold an absolute 
majority of the shares. !d. at 854. A somewhat more ac ti ve pattern of sharehold er 
participation follows from the higher level of concentration. In the case of a ser iously 
underperfo rming company, the four or five largest institutional hold ers of British firm s 
consult informally. The largest holder takes the organizing lead and ta kes the group 's 
conce rns to the managers in the case of poor performance. See Be rnard S. Black & John 
C. Coffee, Jr. , Hail Britannia?: instirwional Investor Behavior Under Limiled Regulation , 
92 MICH. L. REV. 1997.2046-53 (1994). 
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and reputational disincentives that leave the public institutions in a 
secondary role in discrete engagements also deter special inves tmen t 
in monitoring. Additional disincentives deter the taking of larger 
pos1t10ns: Institutions continue to value liquidity,221 and perfor-
mance pressures deter risky long-term commitments.222 The same 
financia l concerns deter the extension of public pension fun d 
entrepreneurship to the board membership politics. Given the 
nonspecific. lon g-term fin ancial gains of effective m onitoring, the 
disincen tive~ make it unlikely that institutions will invest in board 
election campaigns in the foreseeable future. 
2. Monitoring by Block Holders 
Recognition of the difficulties with the coalition strategy has led 
proponents of shareholder participation to reconsider the possibilities 
of an historica lly tes ted mode of relational investing, large block 
ownership. 223 The model block owner is the legendary Warren 
Buffett, a fundamental value investor who takes large, underdiver-
sified, long-term positions; monitors carefully; but does not attempt 
to interfere with the formulation or implementation of the business 
plan, except in a crisis.224 This model actor's large equity in-
vestment plainly provides an incentive for active monitoring. It is less 
clear, however, whether there are any incentives that might induce 
existing investment institutions to make these large block investments. 
Re lational investors of this type appear only rarely in American 
capitalism.225 \Vhen they do, they are either individual 
entrepreneurs; specialized, privately held venture capital firms; or 
other large corporations.226 Gilson and Kraakman, drawing on the 
venture capital model and a Swedish precedent, sugges ted a vehicle 
for expanding the set of these players. They proposed that closed-end 
investment compan ies be formed to take ten to thirty-five percent 
positions in a number of salvageable companies. These firms would 
221. Coffee. Ha~f-Time Repon, supra note 32 , at 851. 
222. See id. at 867. 
223. Black cites st udi es showing a positive relationship between Tobin 's Q (the ra tio 
of asse t replacement va lue and marke t value of equity) and the size of owne rshi p blocks 
where the blocks are between 5% and 20%. BernardS. Black, The Value of lnstinaional 
Jnvesror Monitoring: Th e Empirica l Evidence, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 815, 918 (1992). 
224. See Gordon, Cumulative Voting, supra note 148, at 129-30. Note that the 
monitoring st rategy duplicates that envisioned with coalition-based board voting. 
225. See Louis Lowenstein, Opening Remarks, Columbia University !nstitlllional!nvestor 
Project Conference on Relational Investing New York, N.Y., May 6, 1993: "More Like 
Wh om?," 18 J. CORP. L. 697, 704 (1993). 
226. For examples, see Rock, Dark Side, supra note 161, at 990-99. 
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monitor actively and hold for long periods but eventually would turn 
over their positions to cash in on the gains of effective influence. 227 
This proposal arouses standard institutional skepticism about the 
projected financial returns: Absent any firm-specific expertise on Ihe 
part of the investor, competitive ga ins seem unlikely as a systematic 
n·ronosl'tinn 22S £-' .... ' y · ""-'·. 
3 . Credibility and Possibili ties for Capture 
Poss ibil ities of capture and defection raise questions about block 
ownership 's ordinary course suitability as a mode of shareholder 
participation. Coalition-based board voting, in contrast, suggests 
neither problem. 
With coalition-based board voting, as with public pension fund 
activism, the combination of cross-monitoring, reputational interests, 
and con testability of guardianship provides a circumstantial guarantee 
that participants will remain faithful to the shareholder interest.22Y 
Yet circumstantial guarantees of fidelity to the relational ideal of 
patience and cooperation are less clear cut. It seems unlikely that 
members of such coalitions could, or would, bond themselves to long-
term cooperation by committing, implicitly or explicitly, to reject a 
tender offer. Their legal duties and reputational interests lie in value 
maximization for beneficiaries, with no fine distinctions being made 
about short or long-term means to the end. Even with an implicit 
commitment to the firm and institutional internalization of a norm of 
patience, the incentive to defect from the coalition and accept an 
attractive tender offer would be powerful. 230 
This element of short- versus long-term instability does not 
completely undercut the cooperative possibilities of the board voting 
227. See Gilson & Kra a kman , lnvesrmenr Companies, supra note 149, at 995-96. They 
hope for a 50'Yo increase in the stock price over th e holding period. T he close d-end form 
is necessary to secure a long-te m1 commitme nt; th e gain must , of co urse, be ne t o f the 
close d-end discount. !d. at 1005-06. 
228. See Poze n, supra note 186, at 148. 
229. See Black, A genrs, supra note 30, at 817, 851 , 855; Gordon, Cumulative Voring, 
supra note 148, at 171. 
230. Lowenstein reports that during the 1980s majo r British funds res ponded to tender 
offers by holding collegial inquiries into the integrity and effici ency of targe t m anagers, 
and, in fact, rejected a few tender o ffers as a result. American fund manage rs, pressed by 
competition and fiduciary duty, always tend ered. Lowenstein, supra note 182, at 10-11. 
A nother possible route of defection should be mentioned. The holder can threaten 
a tender offe r himself. as Mr. Kirk Kerk orian recently did with Chrysler. See Steven Lipin 
& Dave Kanas, Offer for Chrysler May Signal Rerum of rhe Corporate Raider, WALL ST. 
J., A pril 13, 1995 , at C 1. 
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strategy, however. The coalition, by hypothesis, has the votes to 
insert its monitors whether or not management consents in advance. 
Thereafter, the structural possibility of a hostile attack gives 
management an incentive to cooperate to the extent that doing so 
decreases the likelihood of attack. 
The block-owning monitor has a sirniiar incentive to abandon 
management when faced with a tender offer. but the monitor is also 
more susceptible to capture by management. In this situa t ion, 
management can compete with the offeror by offering the holder a 
side deal , exchanging additional returns on invested capital for a 
binding commitment not to tenderY' The holders' substantial 
equity commitment creates an incentive to defect to the management 
side, and at the same time it undercuts any reputational concerns 
about serving the wider shareholder interest. G iven financial rather 
than political entrepreneurship, the incentives would appear to lie in 
the opposite direction. 
In the proponents' story, the block owner charts a course 
between these alternative defections. It makes an implicit commit-
ment to management to rej ect an offer that lacks a basis in fun-
damental value analysis. 232 Thereafter, it plays a tit-for-tat 
cooperative game, holding to its commitment to the extent 
management performs, but standing ready to defect to an outside 
offeror if management fails to deliver.m Meanwhile, a successful 
cooperative relationship makes a hostile offer unlikely. Since the 
block owner plays this cooperative game vvi th multiple firms as a 
going business, it develops a reputational interest for exercising its 
judgment in a discriminating way when faced with a tender offer. 23~ 
It becomes a gatekeeper for good and bad tender offers. 
The problem with this story lies in the complicated mix of 
elements that figure into economic accounts of the sources of merger 
gain. Tender offer premiums of the 1980s had multiple sources. 
U nder Kraakman's "j oint gains" explanation, the offeror pays a 
231. In the standard deal, the block holder rece ives preferred stock in exchange fo r a 
stand-still , or gives management a call option. Indirect payments can come from 
investm ent banking fees, other product contracts, or access to inside information. Rock, 
Dark Side, supra note 161, at 1004-06. 
232. See Ayres & Cramton , supra note 19, at 1041. 
233. Cf AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 13 , at 26-38 (hypothesizing a tit-for-tat 
cooperative game between government agency and regulated firm ). 
234. Ayres & Cramton, supra not e 19, at 1060-61 ; cf Gilson & Kraakman, !nves£menl 
Companies, supra note 149, at 1005 (concluding th at the block inves tor tha t becomes too 
activist loses friendly access and cannot sustain the business) . 
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premium to make up a discount between the equity's market value 
and the intrinsic value of the going concern. Given a competitive 
market , the offeror must make up the discount. Its profit comes after 
the acquisition , from either (or a combination of) synergistic gains, 
better management, or the resa le of parts of the target in the market 
for going concern assets.235 Let us assume that all tender offers 
correctly are typed as motivated by the pursuit of gains through one 
of the three strategies, and consider the position of the block holding 
ga tekeeper as to each. 
The tender offer motivated by synergistic possibilities does not 
seem well suited to the block holder's business judgment, absent 
particular expertise in the given production function. This leads the 
block holder to a difficult reputational choice: Its relational 
monitoring role, narrowly defined, does not require it to forego a 
share of the synergy-motivated premium. Unfortunately, management 
might view a commitment to patience and cooperation more broadly. 
A side payment in exchange for refusal to tender would provide a 
neat resolution of the holder's conflict, so long as the holders' 
reputational interest lies more with cooperation with managers rather 
than with a public-regarding appearance in the wider institutional 
community.236 
The block holder's gatekeeper role would seem better suited to 
tender offers motivated by gain through better management or resale 
of going concern assets. In this case, the holder's superior infor-
mation about company practices enables it to appraise prospects for 
management improvement; chances for gain through dismemberment 
presumably will have been explored in the course of the relationship. 
Even here, the holder's loyalty to the cooperative strategy will be 
235. See Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounrs Seriously: The fmplicarions of 
"Discounted " Share Prices as an A cquisition Motive, 88 C OLUM. L. REV. 891, 925-30 
(1988). Kraakman followed financi al economic theory in accounting for the discounts, 
attributing them to either management misinvestment of free cash flows or systematic 
imperfections in market pricing. !d. at 907-11. Other commentators abandon the limiting 
assumptions of finance theory and cite downward-sloping demand in stock mark et pricing. 
See Richard A. Booth, Discounts and Oth er Mysteries of Corporate Finance, 79 C AL. L. 
REV. 1053, 1095-97 (1991); Lynn A. Stout. Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiz1ms? 
Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 Y A LE L.J. 1235, 1259-75 (1990). 
236. We note that hopes for synergistic gains and other management-driven objectives 
figure prominently in the recent revival of merger and acquisition activity. A few 
transactions have entailed hostile bids, but most have been fri endly. See Randall Smith 
& Greg Steinmetz, Mergers Surge as Firms Find a Rising Economy and Cheap Financing, 
WALL ST. J. , Mar. 16, 1994, at AI; Mergers in America: Something in th e Waves, THE 
E CONOMIST . Nov. 16, 1993 , at 89. 
1924 !\fORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW rvol. 73 
L 
tested if, as Kraakman asserts, most of the premium comes from the 
making up of the discount.237 If we open up the valuation theory to 
admit a likelihood of overbidding by th e offeror,238 the conflict 
becomes even more severe. The overbidding offeror leaves the block 
holder with a choice between (a) coopera tion and a payoff through 
specu lati;; e governance gains that canno t. in anv event. make uo the 
.._ .......... "' ' f 
discount between intrinsic value and the market price of the stock, 
and (b) a single-shot payoff that not on ly m<<.kes up tl:te discount but, 
given overbidding, clearly offers a grea ter return than that held out 
by patient monitoring. Even given a reputa tional interest in integrity 
in the gate keeper role, the blockholder 's temptation to defect and 
take end period gains would be strong, particularly if a trend of 
stepped-up tender offer activity held out possibilities of short-term 
gain in similar investment positions. This scenario invites a res-
tatement of the two choices above: (1) defect, abandon cooperation, 
and go into an end period;239 or (2) adhere to the cooperative 
commitment and take a side payment.240 
D. Summary 
The foregoing discussion of capture risk respecting block holders 
dovetails with the discussion of capture risk respecting agents of 
public pension funds: The availability or effec tiveness of either mode 
of participation may be limited by historical contingencies, with the 
likelihood of hostile takeover activity being a salien t one. It is hardly 
a coincidence that relational investing models found their way into 
circulation after the lapse of hostile takeover activity in 1989. The 
disappearance of the market deterrent both ensured an absence of 
counterva iling interest group demands tha t might have impaired the 
public pension funds' freedom to take a leadership role in discrete 
participation and made plausible the projections of long-term 
cooperative participation by private institutions. The new cycle of 
---· ---~----
237. Kraa km an, supra note 235, at 925-27. 
238. Kraakman discounts this possibility. !d. a t 893-905 . Others take the opposite vi ew. 
See BernardS . Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L REV. 597, 614-15 
( 1989). 
239. Th e mid-1980s experience of bondholders holding portfolios of covenantl ess paper 
in re li ance o n management's reputational interest in ca pit a l market access provid es a good 
example of this risk. 
240. Ayres & Cramton, supra note 19, at 1059-61. recogn ize these prob lems in 
suggestin g that rela tion a l investing might he lp to fo resta ll bad tende r offe rs. We are less 
sanguine than they about the possibility that the problems can be resolved for the benefit 
of the shareholders as a group. 
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acquisition activity that commenced in 1993 could, but need not, 
materially change this favorable climate.241 Another salient contin-
gency is the relative level of concentration of institutional equity 
holdings. Absent a marked increase of concentration in the industry, 
we may not see the emergence of circumstances conducive to the 
appearance of coalition-based relational participation. 
IV. FEDERALLY MANDATED SHAREHOLDER lNlT!ATJV E 
The law reform agenda surrounding the institutional investor 
movement tends to look in the federal direction. This is part ly 
because the proxy process is heavily federally regula ted . Refo rm 
initiatives already have prompted the SEC to remove barriers to 
shareholder initiative.242 However, the reformers would like to see 
additional changes that would shift more of the costs of shareholder 
initiatives from the proponents to the firms. The primary agenda item 
here is mandatory inclusion of shareholder board nominees in the 
firm 's proxy statement.w 
241. So far, the new cycle is management-driven and friendly in most cases; see sources 
cited supra note 236, indicating no sign ificant change. 
242. See supra note 180. 
243. Without such a reform , the proponent must invest in its own proxy solicitation , a 
prohibitive ly expensive process absent a control acq uisition objective. For a recent 
sugges tion that this reform be undertaken by SEC rulemaking, see Coffee . Half- Time 
Reporr, supra note 32, at 900-02. Coffee argued that multiple slates are un li kely, given the 
instabilit y of institutiona l vot ing coalitions, and noted that a minimum support threshold 
could be im posed to deter ove rutilization . He also suggested that access be opened for 
proposa ls counter to management proposals. !d. 
Access proposals such as this have a long history . See, e.g., Secu riti es and Exchange 
Commission Proxy Rules. Hearings Before House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821 & H.R. 2019, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-19,34-43 (1943) 
(proposal for shareholder nomination in issuer proxy statement); Proposed Tend er Offer 
Reform Act of 1987, H.R. 2172, !OOth Cong., 1st Sess., § 6 (1987) (ho lders of 3% or 
$500,000 worth of eq uity to have right to include own proxy mate ri a ls and board 
candidates): see also E ISENBERG , supra note 14, at 117-21 (proposing that shareholders 
holding 5% have the power to nominate directors in proxy sta teme nt); LOU IS 
LOWENSTEI N, WHAT'S WRONG WITH WALL STREET: SHORT-TERM GAIN AND THE 
ABSENTEE SH AREHOLD ER 209-11 (1988) (proposing th at shareholde rs have right to 
nominate one-fifth to one-fourth of entire board); George W. Dent, Jr. , Toward Unifying 
Own ership and Comrol in th e Public Corporation, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 88 1, 907-08 
(proposing that a committee of 10 or 20 largest holders have exclusive access to proxy 
machinery). 
"Access" implies cos t sh ifting. Cost shifting, however, could be directed without 
access, on the assumption that the su bsidized proponent proceeds with it s own solicitation. 
Bebchuk and Kahan recommend compensation for challengers both in board voting 
contes ts and issue contests, with compensation for both board incumbents and chal lenge rs 
made contingent on receipt of a threshold percentage of votes, and more gene rous 
compensa tion for challengers in issue contests. See Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 96, at 
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A broader federal law reform agenda also follows from the 
financial theory of shareholder participation. This asserts that present 
levels of institutional concentration could give rise to financial 
incentives sufficient to induce subgroup formation if the federal 
government removed ancillary legal constraints that increase the cos ts 
and risks of co llective action. 2-+-' \Ve h:we no basis for controverting 
this prediction , but, looking to the counter story and the practice, we 
note a substanti al possibility that the present economic structure of 
the industry may, by itself, deter the appearance of the requisite 
financial incentives. In the latter event, institutional shareholder 
participation can be expected to persist only in a discrete form , with 
reputational incentives figuring in significantly as inducements. The 
possibility that the future framework for action will be thus limited 
implies expansion for the law reform agenda-to increase the benefits 
attainable through discrete action in addition to reducing the costs of 
relational shareholder participation. Toward this end, we present the 
following case for an incremental levelling of the field that state law 
provides for shareholder initiative. 
We propose a federally mandated privilege of direct shareholder 
access to amend the corporate charter at the annual meeting of 
shareholders, with cost-shifting to be effectuated through access to the 
proxy statement for the making of proposals.245 We would limit this 
1077. 
244. The targets are: (1) disclosure req uirements imposed on hold e rs of more than 5 % 
of a class of securities under section l3(d) of th e Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. ~ 78m(d) (1988); 
(2) liability of controlling persons for securities law violations of controlled persons under 
section 15 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1988), and section 20(a) of th e Exchange 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7S t (1988): (3) short-swing li ab ility for trading profits of 10% holders 
under section 16(b) of th e Exchange Act , 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988); (4) restrictions on 
capital structures and incentive compensation for advisors of investment companies under 
sections 18(d) and 23 of th e Inves tment Company Act, see 15 U.S.C. §s 80a-l8(d) , 80-
23(a)-(b) (1988) ; and (5) portfolio divers ification requirements under ERISA. See Roe, 
supra note 34. at 26-27. 
245. There will be ancillary probl c:ms respecting the proposal's preemptive reach. 
States could nullify a narrow access mandate in numerous ways. For example , a code's 
system of process and structure default rules could be reconstituted as a system of 
mandates. Or a stat e could amend the process provision governing charter amendments 
to differentiate amendments by source and require a supermajority for s har~holde r· 
initiated proposals. We think th at the proposal's inclusion of access for reincorporation 
decisions provides a circumstantial guarantee against the former possibility. As to th e 
latter possibility, two drafting solutions suggest th emselves. The preempting legis la tion 
could either provide that a simple majority always suffices or provide that the required 
percentage for a shareholder initiated proposal be no lower than that provided in respect 
of a management proposal. Th e latter, less intrusive, approach should suffice, on the 
assumption that no state would respond by amending its code to require supcrmajor ities 
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access privilege to matters of process and structure and exclude most 
business m8tters allocated to the board by state codes .n~ The 
boundary dividing process and business would have to be drawn in 
the preempting legislation. 2~7 In drawing it, we would place contract 
terms relating to management 's incentives on the " process" side. 
Thus, whatever the state law sta tus, the federal law would grant access 
fo r poison pili redemp tion and opting out of any state legislation with 
an opt out provision , in addition to traditional process matters such 
as the structure and composition of boa rds an d committees. More 
tentatively, we also propose access fo r substantive proposa ls res-
pecting executive compensation. 248 However, cognizant of Professor 
Jeffrey Gordon 's appraisal of shareholder initiative, we wou ld exclude 
access to formulation of the busin ess plan , in particular matters of 
investment and disinvestment.249 Gordon has warned tha t 
across th e board. 
246. See DEL. COD E A NN. tit. 8, § 14l(a) (1991) (requiring business of corporation to 
be managed by or under direction of board). 
247. State law draws a working but vague su bj ect matter line between board authority 
and sha re holder authority that accords the shareholders a privilege of in iti ative respec ting 
by-laws. to the ex tent consistent with the charter and state law. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
8, § 109 (1991). Given the statutory alloca ti on of power over business dec isions to the 
board , see DEL. COD E ANN. tit. 8. § 141(a) (1991), the scheme implies a dis ti nction 
between business decisions and contract terms respect ing process. However, th e precise 
course of thi s implicit bo undary has neve r been defined. The problem is compoundt:d by 
the state codes' designat ion . see id. , of defa ult status to the allocation of busi ness decision-
making auth or ity to the board-the allocation may be constrained or red irected by charter 
amendment. As a result , an open-end ed mandate of shareholder initiative wo uld hold out 
the possib il ity of shareholder direction of all business mat ters. 
248. Th ese proposals carry a deterren t impact that could give the propon ent useful 
maneuvering room in the right case. See infra note 298. Yet they also crea te speci:li ri sks 
of ab use . The ve ry maneuvering room they could create increases the risk that a 
proponent might exchange the withdrawal of the proposal for private rents. In addition. 
substantive compensati on proposals would be pa rti cularl y attractive to actors with po liticai 
agendas unrelated to shareholder value. Such a hostile , politically motivated proposal , if 
directed to an ex traord inarily we ll -com pensated but effective manager, could destab ili ze 
a valuable working relationship; that deleterious effect need not depend on a high 
probability of passage. 
We put thi s component of our proposal on the table for discussion based on an 
appraisal th at a big st ick, placed in the hands of serious proponents, has a va lue th at 
outweighs th e risks. Shareholders are habi tually suspic ious of both politica ll y motivated 
proposals and intervention against board business judgments; se rious proponents, 
accordingly. would employ thi s big stick on ly in extraordinary situations. 
249. The combinati on of a green light for poison pill redemptions. compensation 
matters . and opting ou t and a red light for other business matters could not be ach ieved 
as a drafting proposition simply by excl uding from access any amendment that removes 
authority delega ted to the board under the state code's general delegation. The pe rmitted 
subjects would have to be specified . One candida te for specific exclusion would be the 
corpora te purpose section of the charter. An amendment of the charter to exclude a line 
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shareholder initiatives could have two perverse effects. First, given 
diverse preferences, shareholder access could lead to economic losses 
due to inconsistent choices ; second, access could be manipulated by 
shareholders pursuing private gain.250 We argue that our proposed 
boundary minimizes these problems.25 1 Any problems of confusion 
(or inconsistency) resu lt ing from multi ple proposals can be avoided 
with simp le process rules an d a share ownership qualification . The 
latter should be low enough to permit a small number of players in 
the act ivist network to quali fy a proposal and high enough to exclude 
the gadfl ies. 
On the technical point as to whether this proposal requires new 
congressional legislation or could be promulgated as a rule by the 
SEC, we look to legislation as a practical matter. The legislative 
history of section 14(a) of the Exchange Act provides a basis for a 
strong argument that the SEC does have the authority to impose 
shareholder initiative on the sta tes by rule.252 That result depends, 
however, on the theory of statutory interpretation the observer brings 
to bear,253 and a recent , nota bly restrictive judicial ruling254 of 
of business presently conducted by a finn would mak e a ll of its contracts ultra vires, 
presumably necessitating the sa le of th e line of business. 
250. See Gordon, Shareholder Inilialive, supra note 29, a t 361. 
251. See infra notes 310-27 and accompanying tex t. 
252. See Fisch, supra note 162. at 11 70-74 (marshalling the legislative history in argu ing 
fo r shareho ld er access by rule): Patrick J. Ryan , Rule /4a-8, lnstitlllional Shareho lder 
Proposals, and Corporate Democracy . 23 GA. L. REV. 97, 146 (1988) (conducting a 
legis lat ive history of § 14 and conclud ing that Congress supported "strong and ac tive 
shareholde r participation in corporate ente rprise within the genera l framework of 
man agement-shareholder re lations es tablished by the genera l common and s t:.~tut ory law") . 
For other expansive interpretations, sec LO UIS LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITI ES 
REGULA TJON 453 (2d ed. 1988); Ro berta S. Karmel, Qualita/ive Swndards for "Qualified 
Securities ": SEC Regulation of Voting Rights, 36 CATI-1. U. L. R EV. 809, 824 (1987). 
253. For a differen t read ing, sec Stephen M. Ba in bridge, Redirecting State Takeover 
Laws at Proxy Contests, 1992 Wrs. L. REV. 1071 , 1112. Ba inbridge read the legislative 
history to limit § 14(a) to matters of disclosure and leave substantive voting rights 
unaffected. See also ROBERT C. CLARK , CO RPORATE LAW 366 (1986) (not ing that§ 14(a) 
concerns disclosure and process and does not preempt or add to state law on existence, 
distribution , or content of voting power). 
254. Compare SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 517-1 8 (3d Cir. 1947) (holdi ng 
that a corporation could not apply a by-law in such a way as to block a shareholder by-law 
amendment proposal and implying a fede rally guaranteed right of access, albeit vaguely), 
cerr. denied, 382 U.S. 847 (1948) wi1h Busin ess Ro undtab le v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406,411-15 
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (invalidating the "one share, one vo te" provision in Rule 19c-4, placing 
a limited reading on § 14(a), and distinguishing be tween procedural and disclosure 
regulations that facilit a te rights to vote gra nted by state law, deemed to be within § 14(a), 
and SEC de terminations as to when a vote is required, deemed to be outside the scope of 
the rule). 
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section 14(a) has left the SEC with cause to be reluctant to ex-
periment with new rules.255 This uncertainty leaves us expecting 
that any significant alteration of the federal-state balance regarding 
shareholder voting will come through legislation.256 
A. lvfanagemerzt Agenda Comrol and State Corporate Codes 
1. Description of th e Sys tem 
Political theory tells us that legislative outcomes in electoral 
democracies depend on the collective choice rule utilized by the 
legislature-different process rules lead to different outcomes given 
the same set of electoral preferences.257 It follows that the actor 
who sets the agenda can control the outcome, and that a particular 
process institution's constraints on agenda formation have systematic 
implications for outcomes.258 
The agenda-setting procedures for shareholder voting in public 
corporations have easily-described outcome implications. Control of 
the proxy machinery gives management working control over the 
mandatory shareholder board vote.259 Shareholder votes also are 
mandated for fundamental changes----charter amendments, dissolution, 
certain mergers, and significant asset sales. Under the process rules 
of most state codes,260 however, these matters may not be put 
255. Cf Coffee, Half- Time Report, supra note 32, at 876 (noting that the SEC vacillates 
on the role of institutional investors). 
256. We note that part of what our proposa l seeks to ach ieve could be achieved by rule 
on a rela tively secure statutory basis. Specifically, the SEC could (and we think should) 
amend rule 14a-8 to include by-law amendments. 
In any event, we would recommend that any bill be drafted with specificity to reduce 
the chance of ex post nullification in administrative proceedings. One grey area would of 
necessity have to be left for case by case determination by the SEC. No complete, self-
executing definition of "process and structure" could be drafted as a practica l matter. 
While a concrete list of subject matter can be culled from the existing institutional agenda 
and the state codes, novel proposals would occur over time, necess itating reliance on 
agency administration. 
257. See WILLIAM K. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION 
BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 37 (1982). 
258. See Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Uncovered Sets and Sophis ricared 
Vo ring Ozacomes with Implications for Agenda lnsrirurions, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 48, 64-67 
(1985). 
259. As the foregoing discussion of barriers to shareholder voting coalitions implies, 
managem ent 's practical control is vulnerabl e only to a challenger willing to invest in a 
takeover or full-blown proxy contest. 
260. For a survey, see infra notes 281-83 and accompanying text. 
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before the shareholders until the board first approves a resolution.201 
Ti'1e condition of board approval amounts to a management veto- to 
control the agenda one must control the board. T'ne shareholders 
have a veto in turn, but no access to the agenda. T.<1is absolute 
control262 over the corporation's contractual agenda is subje:::t to two 
exceptions. One is the sect ion 14(a) precatory shareholder proposai, 
pursuant to which a shareholder who rneets suitabi lity requ ire ments 
~an se t <i n agenda item. but only for a nonbinding vo ~e. ~63 The 
oth er is a state lav1 shareholder access privilege respect:ng by-law 
amendments?>-~ the utility of which is limited. By-laws may contain 
any provision relating to the business or its conduct, not inconsistent 
with the rest of state law or the charter.265 This means that 
coverage of subject matter in the charter preempts contrary treatment 
in the by-laws, opening possibilities for strategic tiering of provisions. 
Management-protective exploitation of this possibility is a basic 
corporate lawyering skill, extensively put to use in the drafting of the 
antitakeover charter provisions of the 1980s. Some of the items from 
the checklist of shark repellent provisions, such as poison pills200 and 
provisions barring shareholder action without a meeting,267 had to 
be placed in the charter as a matter of statutory mandate. Others, 
such as staggered boards268 and supermajority voting re-
quirements,269 might be in the charter or by-laws at the firm's 
option. Management chose the charter, blocking amendment or 
repeal at the instance of a shareholder challenger not ye t in control 
of the board but holding a majority of the stock or a majority of the 
26i. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, §§ 242(b)(1) (charter amendme nts). 25 1 (b)-(c) 
(m ergers), 27.1 (a) (sales of substan tially all assets), 275(a) (dissolution) (1991 ). 
262. Man agement"s process advantage in the event of a challenge, whether by proxy 
fight or sha re holde r proposa l, al so remains substantial. It has wide d isc retion to invest 
corporate funds on the defens ive side, and with the help of proxy solicitors, m a intains a 
substan tial informational advantage. See Black, Agenrs, supra note 30, at 825-26: Black, 
Shareholder Passiviry, supra note 155, at 593-94. Despite amendments to the rules under 
§ 14 , management still has some room to manipulate shareholder preferences by bundling 
proposals. See supra note 180. 
263 . See supra note 162. There is an exception to the rul e of no nbindingness for 
proposals for new by-laws . See infra note 274. 
264. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (1991). 
265. See id. § 109(b). 
266. See id. § 151(a) (providing that preferred stock contract terms go into the charter; 
charte r can provide in advance for " blank check" delegation to manage me nt of power to 
authorize preferred stock and fill in terms). 
267. See id. § 228(a). 
268. See id. § 141 (d), (k) (charter, initi a l by-law, or shareholder by-law; stagge red board 
has effect of barring action for removal of directors witho ut cause). 
269. See id. § 216. 
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proxies. 270 Meanwhile, shareholder preferences respecting such 
provisiOns underwent a change between the early and late 
1980s-defensive charter amendments were routinely ratified during 
the early period and resisted later on. 271 H owever, the resistance 
carne too late . Defensive charter provisions were widespread by the 
end of the decade. Tne new shareholder activists can beg for th ei r 
removal under R ule 14a-8, but, given the board veto on access to the 
cha rter , c:::nnot cornpe! it. 
Th e charte r preem pts th e by-laws only to the extent that it 
actually covers the subject matter in question. Technical possibilities 
for shareholder-initiated contracting arise as a result. The charters of 
public corporations, contrary to the vision of the contractual theorists, 
did not con tain many contract terms before the proli ferat ion of 
antitakeover provisions. The historic public corporation charter was 
kept spare to provide management with maximum freedom of action 
in formulating process rules. 272 The charter contained the minimum 
terms mandated by the code and terms covering any senior equity 
securities issued by the firm; by-laws contained standardized process 
provisions; managers relied on state codes to fill in the rest. Firm 
contracting evolved during the 1980s mostly to load charters with 
defensive provisions. The shareholder agenda of the 1990s includes 
new areas of concern, such as compensation schemes, confidential 
voting, and board and committee structure. As to these, the charter 
may provide nothing, leaving open a field for shareholder-initia ted by-
law amendments. R ead literally, the suitability rules under Rule 14a-
8 permi t by-law proposals, making an initiative cos t-effective.m 
Some by-l aw initiatives have gone forward under Rule 14a-8, but , 
unfortunately, this federal route to contractual access has not proved 
useful to proponents. Technical questions of federal -state 
synchronization have arisen as the SEC has dealt with management 
---------------------- --·----··-
270. At som e point , proced ural maneuvering by management to frustrate exerc ise of 
the shareholder franchise violates a nom1 of Delaware law. That point is ex treme. 
Compare Stahl v. Apple Bancorp , Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1121-22 (Del. Ch. 1 990) (holding 
that board action frustrating exercise of shareholder franchise requ ires a compell ing 
justification) H'ith Blasius Indus. , Inc. v A tl as Corp ., 564 A.2d 651 , 662-63 (De l. Ch. 1988) 
(retreating from requi rement of a compelling justification for such board ac tion). 
271. See supra note 17 1 and accompanying tex t. 
272. This is because charter am endments must by ratified by the shareholders , wh il e 
by-laws may be promulga ted by the board . In an environment in which shareholder 
initi atives respecting contract terms were rare events, it made cost sense to leave the 
contracting to the boa rd. 
273. See Rule 14a-S(c)(1), which excludes matters that are not a proper subject for 
share holde r act ion unde r state law. 
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objections to by-law proposals. State law provides little guidance on 
these questions, and, at least up to now, management effectively has 
blown doctrinal dust into the eyes of the SEC.274 
2. Explanation of the System 
The rule of absolute delegation came into corporate lcl\v ">Vith the 
turn-of-the-century shift toward an entity conception of the cor-
poration-a shift that had the incidental effect of affording freedom 
of action to the managers of new, mass-producing firms. 275 
Previously, an agency theory of board authority had prevailed and 
274. Th e sui tability rul es are built on three principles. First, the subjec t matter must 
be proper under state law under Rule 14a-8(c)(l) . Second, the subject matte r must not 
trave rse a long list of specific excl us ions devised by the SEC over the years. See Rule 14a-
8(c)(2)-(13). Third, following Auer v. Dresse l. 118 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1954), a proposal on 
a subject m atter reserved to the discretion of the board under the state law delegation of 
authority is nevertheless proper if phrased as a request. The three principles do not 
synchronize well. There are two problems. First, a by-law proper under state law might 
nevertheless traverse the SEC list of unsuitable topics. Second, state lawmakers have 
never had occasion to draw a clea r line between board management authority and 
shareholder by-law promulgation authority. As a result, the extent to which a by-law may 
constrain the board management authority is not clear. Nor is it clear whether the board 
of directors, which also has power to promulgate by-laws, can subsequently repeal a by-law 
approved by the shareholders. The no-action letters play out these problems with 
conflicting results. Compare Exxon Corp., 1992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 281, at *1 (Feb. 28 , 
1992) (allowing the shareholder proposal to establish a committee to oversee the board 
of directors to be exclud ed) with Pennzoil Company, 1993 WL 52187 (S.E.C.) at *82-84 
(Feb. 24, 1993) (original proposal) and Pennzoil Company, 1993 WL87871 (S.E.C.) at *40-
42 (Mar. 22, 1993) (revised proposal) (suggesting that the shareholder proposal that by-
laws were to be amended only by shareholders was not proper under sta te law). For a 
summary of the Pennzoil correspondence , see Charles F. Richards & . Anne C. Fos te r, 
Exxon Revisited: The SEC Allows Penn zoil to Exclude Both Mandatory and Precawry 
Proposals Seeking £O Create a Shareholder Advisory Commillee, 48 Bus. LAw. 1509, l 513-
18 (1993). In the former case. the SEC took a no-action position respecting a proposal for 
a by-law mandating a permanent shareholder advisory committee, even though the 
proposa l required funding for th e committee, arguably traversing the state law delegation 
of authority to management. The SEC retreated from the position in the latter case, which 
also concerned a by-law proposing a shareholder advisory committee. Upon res ubmission 
of the proposa l on a precatory basis, th e SEC still sanctioned the proposal's omission 
because it contained a block against repea l by a subsequent board by-law. This, said the 
agency, created a question as to state law validity. 
The SEC's trea tment of the Pennzoil no-action lette r is somewhat counterintuitive as 
a state law proposition. The state codes , read literally, imply that charter terms trump by-
laws , and that shareholder by-laws trump board by-laws, but the point is not clear. The 
SEC's no-act ion lette rs thus have a perverse effect. They invite state courts to detennine 
the issue in management 's favor should it come up at the state level. Given the charter 
competition system, the states have every incentive to decide against the shareholders. For 
further discuss ion, see Coffee, Half- Time Report, supra note 32, at 883-89. 
275. See William W. Bratton, The New Economic Theory of th e Firm: Critical 
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1489 (1989). 
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access had been the rule. 276 New Jersey, the early leader in the 
chartering of large firms,277 conditioned amendment on board 
approval before 1895.278 Delaware foll owed in its corporations code 
of 1899,279 a piece of legisla tion that manifested its determination to 
enter into charter competition with neighboring New Jersey. 280 
Access limitation provisions diffused into the codes of o ther st ates 
during the subsequen t decJ.des. By 1960. twenty-five state codes 
condit ioned charter amendment on board approva l:2s 1 by 1970, 
twenty-eight state codes did so;2s2 by 1993. forty state codes did 
so. 283 Today, on ly ten state codes leave a door open to shareholder 
access. 
This historical sequence can be read as further confirmation of 
the capture of state codes by the management interest: It is no 
accident that this component of management agenda control dates to 
the first ins tances of the purchase and sale of corporate codes. 
Another plausible story has been offer ed, however. Jeffrey Gordon 
has set out a functional explanation for absolute delegation, tied to his 
observations that an open agenda could lead to costly shareholder 
voting cycles and self-dealing by proponents of initiatives directed to 
the firm 's business?84 The tie led him to a three-part argument that 
276. See Gordon , Shareholder fnir/(1[/ve, supra note 29, at 349 n.7 (citing JOSEPH K. 
A NG EL L & SAM UEL AMES. A TR EATISE 0 1'-l TH E L '\ \V Of' PRI VATE CO RPORATIONS, 
AGGR EG ATE ** 297-99 (9th ed. 1871 ); 1 VICTOR MORA WETZ, TREATISE ON TH E LA \V OF 
PRIVATE CORPO RATIONS §§ 243-44 (2d ed. 1886)). 
277. New Jersey began to liberali ze its code aft er 1890, with considera ble fina ncial 
success . See C HRISTOPHER GRAN DY, NEW J ERSEY AN D TH E f iSCAL O RI GINS OF 
MOD ER N AMERICAN CORPORATION LAW 43-45 ( 1993). 
278. JAMES B. D ILL, THE STATUTORY AN D CASE LAW APPLICABLE TO PRIVATE 
COMPANIES UNDER TH E G EN ERA L CORPORATIO N ACT OF NEW JERSE Y AND COR-
PORATION PR ECED ENTS 42-43 (1899) (reproducing Ne w Je rsey General Corporation Act 
§ 27). 
279. See Act of 1899, 21 De l. Laws ch. 273, § 135. 
280. See RUSS ELL CARPENTER LARCOM, TilE DELAWARE COR PO RATI ON 11-1 3 (1937). 
281. See 2 MODEL BUSI NESS CORP. ACT. ANN . 230-31 ( 1960). 
282. See 2 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT. A NN. (SECOND) 260-61 (1971 ). 
283. See 2 MOD EL BUSINESS CORP. ACT. ANN. (THI RD) 1172-73 (Supp. 1993). The 
MBCA count is 38. We di sagree as to two omissions: N.Y. Bus. CORP. L. §§ 803, 804 
(McKinney 1986), and UTAH CODE ANN.~ 16-lOa-1003 (Cumulative Supp. 1994). Of the 
10 states th at omit the board veto , four a ll ow a stated pe rcentage of shareholders to 
propose amendments (Idaho, Minnesota , No rth Dakota , and Pennsylvania); five have no 
process provisions respecting amendment proposals (Louisiana, Massachuse tts, Michigan, 
O hio and Wisconsin) ; California, somewhat ambiguously, requires a board reso lution 
before or after the share holder vote. CA L. CORP. CODE §§ 902, 904 (Wes t 1990). 
284. See Gordon, Shareholder Iniriarive, supra note 29 , at 357-61. For our di scussion 
of th e cycling problem, see infra notes 313-27 and accompanying tex t. 
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ex plained the statutory pattern as a result of evolutionary efficien-
cy.285 First, if the absolute delegation rule had a signifi cantly 
negative effect on value, some states would offer an al ternative. 
Second, al though many states do permit corporations to contract 
around the delegation of business decisionmaking power to the 
board, ~~h public corporations have not offered charter terrns that 
rake up this option. 1l1ird, unl ike antitak eover resolutions. wh ich 
have a nega tive impact on share prices, the absolute deleg;:Hion rule 
has a long historical standing that share prices already re t1 ect. Citing 
Jensen and Meckling's famous article on agency costs, 2~7 Gordon 
concluded that if the rule injures shareholders, managers bear the 
agency costs when they initially sell stock to the public. 
In response to the first argument , we note that a number of 
alternative codes do exist, but we think that inattention by local bar 
associations and other management representatives is the best 
explanation for the isolated persistence of shareholder access 
provisions. Given management agenda control over reincorporation 
decisions,2~8 no actively competing jurisdiction would include 
shareholder access in its product package, even if access were thought 
to have a positive impact on shareholder value. 
\Ve also question the probative value of the second argument's 
point that public corporations have not exploited opportunities to opt 
out of the absolute delegation of ordinary business decisionmaking 
authority to the board. Agenda control follows from process 
provisions that appear to be mandatory and is analytically distinct 
from the statutory delegation of business decisionmaking 
a uthority. ~~<~ O pting out of the board authority delega tion came into 
the codes to facilitate shareholder-level contracting as a means to 
police opportunism in closely held firms. The charter amendment 
that makes use of this permission removes decisionmaking authority 
from the board to the shareholder level. Such a broad-brush removal 
is nei ther feas ible nor desirable in a publicly held firm. A pubiic 
285. See Gordon, Shareholder Initiative, supra note 29, at 357-59. 
286. See, e.g .. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 14l(a) (1991 ). 
287. See Gordon, Shareholder Initiative, supra note 29, at 358 (c iting Michae l C. Jensen 
& William H . Meck ling, Theory of rhe Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and 
Ownersh ip Struclllre , 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976)). 
288. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying tex t. 
289. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (1991) (c harter am endments to be 
approved by the board). This doctrinal distinction is long stand ing. See HENRY 
W INTH ROP B ALLANTINE, B ALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 97, at 320 (1927) 
(d istingui shin g between director and stockh older powers) . 
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corporation conceivably could exploit the permission by expanding the 
set of transactions that must be submitted for shareholder approval. 
H owever, doing so would not open the agenda to shareholder charter 
amendments; instead, the charter would set the agenda, and 
managemen t would retain a degree of control over the initiation and 
timing of the transaction eventually submitted to the shareholders.2Y0 
Fin ally. we ques tion the applicability of Jensen and ~ .. 1eckling 's 
h is torica l e.r onrc pricing model to this case. Th at mode l presupposes 
a complete contract as to which all risk is priced out when the firm 
initial ly goes public. \Ve think an incomplete contract model inclusive 
of ex p osr renegotiation of terms is more appropri a te here. In 
practice, firms go public at an early, entrepreneurial stage of their life 
cycles. At that point, uncontrolled management influence over 
decisions creates value, and no one worries about independent 
directors and other process protections.291 The shareholder par-
ticipation movement deals with firms at a later stage of the life 
cycle-mature, solvent companies able to pursue failed strategies 
because of weak capital market constraints. 292 To have present 
contracting processes determined by a risk allocation implied from a 
public offering of a quarter or half century earlier seems 
counterproductive. 
In sum, state law's evolution to block shareholder access to the 
corporate contract may raise a presumption of efficiency, but a review 
of the history rebuts the presumption. At the turn of the century, 
when the agenda control provisions came into the corporate codes, 
corporate law was changing to facilitate investments of unprecedented 
scope by entrepreneurial managers. Today, the picture is more 
290. W e note the poss ibility that a charter could be amend ed to remove to the 
share ho lde r le ve l th e dete rmination of the charter amendment agenda. Ce rtainl y this is 
the in evitable res ult in closely held firms that move all business decisionm a king to the 
sha reholde r leve l, as the statute permits. However, again, any blanke t remova l makes little 
sense for publicly he ld firms. In the alternative, the charte r could provide that 
m anagement's agend a power over charter amendments is subject to pro ramo limitation 
in any case in which a shareholder proposes an amendment at a m eeting. On the theory 
that th e grea ter includes the lesser, this provision would be va lid. On the other hand , if 
th e agenda control provision were read as strictly procedural and not one of the "business" 
m a tt e rs und er the basic statutory delegation , it would resist opting out and amount to a 
manda te. That reading follows from the structure of the state code. Since shareholder 
approval is mandato ry for charter amendments, they are by hypo th es is no t within the 
" business'" in the exclusive delegation to management. 
291. Ind eed, a charter loaded with such terms might se nd a negative signal in an initi a l 
public offe ring. 
292. See Black, Agenrs, supra note 30, at 832; Lipton & Lorsch, Sllpra note 208 , at 74-
76. 
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complicated. Some firms fit the paradigm of the productive 
management firm, but many do not. Until the recent occurrence of 
successful shareholder initiatives, the shareholder collective action 
problem made it pointless to question access barriers. The question 
finally comes up today in an economic environment in which we look 
to the legal framework to facilitate disinvestment as well as in-
vestment.293 Tne implication for the state code 's access barriers is 
not efficiency, but obsolescence.294 
B. Shareholder Access to the Charter for Process Amendments 
1. Benefits 
a. Shareholder Participation 
We direct our access proposal to the pattern of discrete 
shareholder participation led by agents of public pension funds. We 
project beneficial consequences on the following model of 
engagement, abstracted from the practice pattern?95 
Let us start with a proponent who publicly selects a corporate 
target and either launches a negative voting campaign or makes a 
precatory proposal. Public targeting indicates the proponent's 
judgment that the influence costs at the firm are unnecessarily high. 
If the proponent's determination has credibility, the targeting injures 
the reputations of the firm's managers and makes it more likely that 
the shareholders will obstruct future management proposals. The 
managers have three choices as to their response. First, they can take 
action amounting to a counter-signal showing that the proponent has 
selected incorrectly and thereby rehabilitate their reputations.296 
293. See generally Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolwion, Exit, and the 
Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 847 (1993) (arguing that firms able to 
achi eve disinvestment will be successful competitors in the coming era). 
294. Gordon, Cumulative Voting, supra note i48, at 175-79, indirectly confirms thi s 
point. Gordon sensibly suggests that cumulative voting could facilitate implementation of 
institutional board membership. His proposal runs up against the access problem at the 
implementation stage: Since cumulative voting must be in the charter, and the proponent's 
only vehicle is the precatory proposal, chances for success are speculative at best. 
295. See supra notes 181-208 and accompanying text. 
296. Recent events at Philip Morris show that this is possible. A board coalition (l ed 
by the previous C.E.O., a tobacco division veteran) form ed to fight a proposal of the 
incumbent C.E.O. (a food division veteran backed by the institutions) to split the firm into 
its food and tobacco segments. This led to the incumbent's resignation and the selection 
of a new C.E.O. from the tobacco division. The new control group took its strategy to the 
marketplace, promising a more favorable dividend payout , and met a favorable response 
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Second, if no such response is available and they are sufficiently risk 
averse with respect to reputation and shareholder relations, they can 
indicate responsiveness by starting a dialogue with the proponen t. 
Third, they can do nothing and let the campaign take its course. 
Access to the charter gives the proponent more room to 
maneuver in the second and third cases. In the second case, the 
proponent gets a significant payoff only if the campaign 's reputationa l 
effect s are severe enough to cause realignment of the firm's internal 
coalitions and termination of the chief executive. Otherwise, dialogue 
leads to a payoff in the form of contract concessions. At the 
negotiations, the proponent has cost and reputational incentives to 
make a quick deal and take home some sort of contract modification. 
Management presumably will want to give up as little as possible in 
the way of concrete terms, consistent with an appearance of respon-
siveness. Management, in addition, at all times retains the option of 
noncooperation. The proponent, armed only with a precatory 
proposal and reputational threats, is not in a particularly strong 
position to extract meaningful concessions.297 If management has a 
pending proposal of its own, a credible negative voting campaign 
could mean a stronger bargaining position. Charter access lets the 
proponent go past the negative, which depends on management's 
agenda, and take its own mandatory agenda to the table. A rmed with 
a mandate, the proponent with credible vote-getting ability can close 
off management's option of noncooperation. Furthermore, the 
mandatory stick can be wielded directly against the managers' 
influence within the firm as well as against their reputations: The 
proponent , for example, could go to the table with a new incentive 
in the stock price-a two percent increase aga inst a market decline on the announcement 
day. See Eben Schap iro, Philip Morris CEO Resigns Under Pressure, WALL ST. J., June 
20, 1994, at A3 ; Eben Schapiro , Philip Morris Will Consider Stepping Up Buybacks or 
More Aggressive Dividend, WALL ST. J., June 22, 1994, at A3. 
Thereafter, the institutions continued to pressure the firm , with mixed results . P hilip 
Morri s withdrew its poison pill in March 1995, responding to a 40 % affim1ative vote on 
a 1994 share ho lder proposal. At the April 1995 annual meeting, 25% of the share holders 
voted in fav or of a proposal recommending limitations on benefits to outside directors. 
A Just Vote No Cam paign initiated by CalPERS did less well , however-management's 
board sla te was elected with a 96% vote. The C.E.O., meanwhile , continued to play the 
dividend card , promising a lower level of ea rnings retention. See Suein Hwang, Ar Philip 
Morris, 25 % of Holders Vote to Slice Benefits of Outside Directors, WALL ST. J. , April 28, 
1995, at B4. 
297. G rund fes t, sup ra note 32, a t 932 n.354, noted that the impo rtance of concessions 
extracted to date can be easily exaggerated. Confidential voting, as conceded by 
manage rs, tends not to app ly in contested e lections; decisions to redeem poison pills do 
not bar the boa rd from adopting a new pill if the occasion arises. 
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compensation scheme that reduces the manager's rents.298 In the 
trade-off surrounding the proposal's withdrawal, the proponent can 
select from the whole agenda of process reforms. 299 
Charter access also could be useful in the case of a completely 
unresponsive firm. Precatory proposals have no governance conse-
quences for managers willing to suffer the reputational consequences 
of noncooperation and risk the long-term consequences of poor 
shareholder relations hips. Such a refusal to cooperate puts the 
proponent in a repeat play situation . Charter access lets the 
proponent raise the stakes in a second round , proposing an incentive 
compensation scheme, or an amendment that redeems a poison pill 
and calls for a shareholder vote as a condition of replacement. Such 
a punishment campaign would , we suspect, have to be carefully 
targeted/ 00 with the proponents concentrating resources on a 
selected firm for a demonstration of enforcement power. A successful 
demonstration would reinforce the importance of shareholder 
relations and enhance cooperative incentives among the group of 
targets as a whole.301 Charter access also holds out the possibility 
of short-term financial gain in some circumstances: Poison pill 
298. A negati ve voting campaign a lso could have thi s effect if a compensation package 
were up for a vote. 
We note that th e proposal in the example in the text is unlike ly to be m ade in 
practice. Information costs would dete r inves tment in a full-blown compensa tion proposa l. 
Even if such an investment we re mad e (o r a simpler pe rcentage cut in base salary were 
proposed), probabilities for passage would a ppear to be low even with respect to a 
manifestl y und erperfo rmi ng company. Shareholde r imposi ti on of compensation terms that 
materia lly red uce management rents is tantamount to a no confidence vote, and 
presumably would be me t in kind with red uced manageme nt efforts to reve rse the fortun es 
of the firm. The proponent's purposes wo uld be bette r se rved in the ordinary case with 
a proposal for a compensa tion committee, tha t is, a proposal packaged in pure process 
terms. On the other hand , a shareholde r privilege to make compensat io n proposals, even 
uninvoked, re ta ins a dete rrent value. In ad dition, a substanti ·•e compensation proposal 
conceivably could be useful to a propone nt in a case in which management has been 
recalcitrant, the outside directors have been passive, the shareholders have become 
noticeably dissatisfied , and no potential challenger for board control has appeared . In such 
a situation, a proposal might either promote management responsiveness, prompt a 
shakeup, or induce a control challenge. 
299. See supra note 208. 
300. A problem of info rmation flow should be noted. A negative voting campaign 
involves minimal inform ati onal cost. M andatory proposa ls lifted directly from the existing 
institutional agenda and fitting standing voting policies ra ise no signifi can t informationa l 
problems for the proponent. A more complex proposa l, such as a compensa tion scheme 
ta ilored to a particular company, would crea te more of a problem. Presumably, such a 
target would have to be se lec ted with care , and the campaign well- pub licized. 
301. Cf AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 13, at 45 (suggesting that occasional fi ring 
of big enforce ment gun by a regulator might be more effec tive than frequent firin g). 
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redemption can make the stock price go up if a takeover is a 
likelihood. The chance of gain might favorably alter the economics 
of subgroup formation, inducing private institutional players into the 
game on occasion.302 
The utility of a bigger stick that holds out an intermittent 
financi al incentive could increase over time. The current oattern of . 
discrete intervention turns on reputat ionai incentives on both sides. 
Reput ational incentives can change with circumstances from period to 
period. Pension fund entrepreneursh ip could diminish in intensity if, 
as the roster of players changes, the replacements discover that most 
of the available reputational gain has attached to the departed players 
of the first generation. Management reputational concerns also could 
change over time. The activists already have targeted the largest, 
worst-managed firms. New targets will represent less obvious cases 
of high influence costs, making noncooperative responses a more 
likely possibility. Old targets, meanwhile, become repeat play 
situations over time; as dialogue with institutions becomes an ongoing 
fact of life for these firms, reputational threats may loom less large 
and management's long-term concern about shareholder relations 
matter more. A power to expand the mandatory agenda allows the 
proponent to be more proactive. 
b. State Law 
Federally mandated charter access would ride atop the state 
system, giving the shareholders access to the corporate contract but 
not otherwise interfering with the production of state law. Taken 
alone, it would not impair the responsive benefits of the state system. 
Nor, taken alone, would it ameliorate the sys tem's management bias. 
Accordingly, our definition of appropriate shareholder "process" 
amendments would include reincorporation proposals. We would set 
up the following two-step process for shareholder-initiated reincor-
poration. First, the proponent 's resolution would mandate the 
convening of a committee of independent directors that would, after 
consultation with an outside consultant,303 recommend a best 
alternative domicile. Second, the following year, the shareholders 
would vote on a resolution to approve or reject a move to the new 
jurisdiction. We employ the independent director intermediary to 
solve the problem of selection. Two proponents could suggest 
302. See supra notes 198-99 and ::;ccompanying text. 
303. Here we note possible income for legal academ ics. 
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different states; a given proponent's choice could be uninformed or, 
conceivably, could result from a side-deal with actors in the jurisdic-
tion chosen. In any event, public pension fund agents, being state 
employees, do not seem well-suited to this part icular gatekeeper 
function. Of course, there remain possibilities for management 
inf1uence over the independent directors. H owever, since we make 
this proposal more with a view to deterrent effects in states sensitive 
to incorporation business than with exv;cutions of frequent 
utiiization, we think the compromise workable. 
The point of the shareholder reincorporation in itiative, as stated 
above,304 is to provide state lawmakers with a long-term incentive 
to respond to shareholder interests. We doubt that it would result in 
any short-term disruption of today's charter market.305 No state 
presently stands out as a candidate for the role of shareholder-
sensitive charter monger. Indeed, Delaware's laggard role as an 
antitakeover jurisdiction during the 1980s makes it a possible 
shareholder-directed destination for firms located elsewhere. As a 
practical matter, then, the deterrent of shareholder-directed reincor-
poration would complement the federal threat,300 reinforcing 
Delaware's moderate legislative pattern and encouraging its judges in 
their attempts to mediate between the conflicting interes ts. 
The burden to make use of initiative to invigorate the charter 
market would be on the shareholder proponents. To make active 
competitiOn work here, they would have to expand their 
entrepreneurship to locate a jurisdiction, persuade it to go into 
competition and invest in an informed judiciary, draft an attractive 
code for it, and bring it some business. If all of that happened, 
Delaware would face a dual demand that could produce difficult 
choices. Moves in the direction of the shareholder interest to counter 
the threat of exit by established firms could cause the state to lose 
304. See supra text accompanying notes 141-47. 
305. Had a fed eral re incorporation mandate been on the books in 1980 along with a 
pattern of active shareholder participation, anti takeover legis lation might not have become 
so widespread. A few well-timed reincorporations might have deterred management 
representatives from lobbying state legislatures because th e shareholder interest would 
have garnered a more prominent profile in lawmaking processes. 
306. We would not expect this form of federal intervention to defuse the ongoing 
threat. Any congress ional move against the state system, howe ve r minimal, would break 
a conceptual federalism barrier and imply the possibility of furth e r intervention in the 
event of significant state developments attributable to management influence. The short-
term effect, then. probably would be one of re inforcement. 
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new business from entrepreneurial firms on the move to maturi ty, but 
such confl icts are the ordinary incidents of active competition. 
2. Unintended Consequences 
We have designed our proposal to avoid two possible unintended 
effects of shareh older initiative- rent seeking and vote cycl ing. 
Jeff;-ey Gordon. warn ing of both, has concluded that in itiati ve is not 
cos t bcne ncia l. We argu e that these conce rns can be met through a 
subject ma tter limita tion and a few ancillary process ru les. 
a . Rent Seeking 
O n self-dealing, Gordon showed that, given concentrated 
shareholding and unlimited access to the charter, there would arise a 
risk of logrolling effected through shareholder side agreements that 
direct the firm to suboptimal projects benefitting the shareholders ' 
businesses. Given dispersed shareholdings, Gordon projected that the 
problem might arise whenever a substantial proportion of the group 
of holde rs represents a distinct unity of interest-as when union and 
public pension funds, or members of some political or economic 
interest group, hold a large proportion of the stock.307 This latte r 
scenario would be unlikely to arise in the present context, given 
prevailing institutional diversification practices and ra ti onal apathy 
among small holders. However, Gordon also noted that the advent 
of a regime of unlimited access could cause holding pa tterns to 
change. A t present, American firms having large block holders tend 
to have only one such holder. That holder gains influence over 
management and deters others from accumulating large blocks. 30s 
U n limi ted access opens up possibilities for hostile coali tion-building 
by latecomer block holders, inviting a change in the shareholding 
pattern . 
We agree that the risks G ordon described are cognizable and 
have little confi dence that present fiduciary law could effectively limit 
them. Accordingly, we leave matters of investment and disinvestment 
out of our access proposal to delimit its utility to actors engaging in 
governance activity in pursuit of short-term financial gain. The 
practical cost to the shareholder participation movement, as presently 
directed, is the foreclosure of direct action respecting disinvestment 
307. See Gordon, Sh areholder lnilialive, supra no te 29. a t 376-79. 
308. See id. at 374 (ci ting Harold D emsetz & Ke nneth M. Lehn, The Srrucrure of 
Corporare Ownership: Causes and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECO N. 1155 ( 1985)). 
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and corporate unbundling. H ere, again with Gordon, we think that 
dialogue and process reform work better. 309 
It must be no ted that the process and structure limitation 
diminishes incentives for side deals without ensuring their absence. 
Return to the above example of a proponent who threatens 
m anagement with a ne·w, rent-reducing, incentive compensation 
scheme. Alth ough define d as process and structure, the proposal 
remains susceptible to withdrawal in exchange for a si de-paymen t. 31 0 
The guarantee against such a transaction lies not in the subj ect matte r 
limitation but in the proponent's projected incentive profil e. So long 
as the proponent comes to the role seeking reputational rather than 
financial capital , trade-offs will be structured with a view to 
reputational gain. 1lms, a pension fund entrepreneur concerned with 
vote-getting credibility can be expected to structure trades that entail 
a concrete sha reholder-beneficial component.311 Any additional 
consideration sought by this actor will more likely take the form of 
influence within the firm than the form of rent. Influence within the 
firm, unlike money, gives this actor opportunities for further 
reputational enhancement and at least holds out a prospect of 
shareholder benefit. At the same time, even an undisclosed rent deal 
creates a risk of reputational injury for the proponent.312 
309. Interplay between un bund ling and process refo rm can be hypothesized. The: 
proponent wants the fi rm to divide itself in two or spin off a substan tia l subs idiary. T he 
proponent is motivated by curren t conventional wisdom and is ill-informed. Ma nagement 
resists. The proponen t threatens management with poison pill redemption or incentive 
compensat ion. If management concedes , the firm is unbundl ed . If management resists, 
the proposal goes to a shareholder vo te. 
We do not vi ew thi s possi bility as problematic. In the latter case, the proponent still 
has the substantial ta sk or persuading the shareholde rs of the merits of the process 
proposal. The proponent 's inadequate informat ion about unbundling does no t bear 
directly on that mat ter. In th e former case, managemen t will have had an opportunity to 
inform the financia l community of its case. ff the case resonates, management has no 
reason to concede. 
310. We thank Jeffrey Gordon for noting this point. 
311 . Certainl y, a secret fin anc ial c.~:n ponent could be a part of such a trade. But the 
inclusion of such a component would not necessarily mean that the overall trading process 
was detrim ental to shareholder interests. 
312. And for the ta rge t making the offe r: Third parties report that managers at Phil ip 
Morris, a leading institutional target, recently offe red a job to Richard Koppes, the Deputy 
Executive Director of CaiPERS . Koppes turned down the offer. See Glenn Collins, Philip 
Morris Meeling Subdues Toba cco Prolesl, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 1995, at D3. 
This calculus mi ght change during an end period , but the rep utational deterrent 
should still exercise infl uence . An actor might leave state service for the priva te money 
management sector, or leave one sta te office to ass ume or run for another. In either case, 
later exposure of a quest ionable trade could prove injuri ous. On the other hand, a pension 
fu nd agent looki ng to a ca reer in state poli tics might have a reputational incentive to trade 
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b. Cycling 
On the problem of voting cycles,313 Gordon hypothesized 
corporate versions of a standard Arrovian voting cycl e3 1 ~ under 
unlimited shareholder access. In his base case, we have three 
shareholders, each of whom owns t\venty-six percent. Tne issue is 
unbundling. O ne wants to se ll a divisio n: the second wants the status 
quo; and the third wants a spin off. ~01e preferences are ordered , and 
a maj ority voting cycle results. The sa me, of course, could follow with 
d ispersed shareholdings. 
for a geographically specific benefit , such as the loca tion of a plant in his home state. But 
the conflict of interest still bespeaks a need for secrecy, limiting the potential for political 
reputational enhancement a t home. Only an actor bui lding a personal account for a 
projected retirement seems to present a strong risk. 
It also must be noted that a process and st ructure access privilege could provide th e 
medium for a threat by a financia lly-moti va ted ac tor. For exa mple, a hostil e large 
block holder could use a management compensation proposal (whatever the identity of the 
proponent) as the occasion for negotiations keyed to rent extraction. But this possible 
abuse, like that of rent extraction by a political entrepreneur, exists in the present legal 
structure. Indeed, the blockholder's opportunities to ex tract rents follow from the very 
existence of the shareholder vote. An access proposal limited to process and structure 
does create additional occasions for rent demands, but we doubt that it would so alt er the 
underlying economics as to induce bloc kholding in the first instance or provide a 
block holder with a rent extraction opportunity tha t could not ari se otherwise. Thus, at the 
bottom line, our proposal's incremen tal aspec t comes into the appraisal of the se lf-dealing 
risk tha t attends it. Limited shareholder access se rves mainly to strengthen the bargaining 
posi ti on of one party in an established barga ini ng situation. The side dea l possibility ex ists 
already and is, indeed, intrinsic to any sh areholder em powerment strategy. 
313. Social choice theory , which began with KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOlCE AND 
INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963), asse rts that majority rule can lead to any economically 
and technically feasible outcome. Even if voters are other-regarding, so long as the ir 
preferences differ, voting results will be unstabl e. Furthermore, there will be no basis for 
assumi ng that voting res ults are connected with the prefe rences of the electorate. !d. at 
22-33, 74-120; see also Richard D . McKelvey, lruransmivilics in Mullidimensional Voting 
/'yfodels and Some Implications for Agenda Conrro /, 12 J. ECON. THEO RY 472, 480 (l976) 
(discuss ing global cycling theorem which shows that when majority rule breaks down, any 
two points in space will belong in a cycle). 
314. Gi ven majority rule , it is poss ible to cycle through different preferences. Assume 
that there are three players, A, B, and C, and three alternat ive outcomes, a, b, and c, and 
the following preference rankings: 
A: abc 
B: bca 
C: cba 
The result is a classic voting paradox, that is, a lack of transitive social ordering. 
Cycling occurs by virtue of the actors' preferences remaining fixed over tin-; e. With 
multi ple issues to be resolved simultaneously by a large number of decisionm akers, social 
choice models show that cyclical major ities will occur in two-thirds of the decision contexts, 
so long as logically ordered preferences are likely to emerge. 
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However, voting cycles can be contained by process institutions. 
Critics of social choice theory point out that its models suffer from 
significant limitations; cycling becomes a problem only in the simplest 
of majority ruie institutions-without agenda con trols, without 
strategic voting, and with an agenda constructed on an ongoing basis; 
in p;-actice, agenda-se tting institutions and agent sophistication 
constrain majority outcomes.m So long as <KWrs in voting 
institutions take fuJi advantage of strategic opportun ities :J.vaiiable to 
them under those institutional rules, majori ty-rule voting cycles 2re 
unlikely.31 6 Gordon, heeding this literature, acknowledged that the 
cycling problem attending charter access could be ameliorated with a 
process device that orders the agenda. He considered the possibility 
of a rule that lets management set th e agenda, as between the three 
shareholder proposals. He rejected that device on the ground that 
management ends up controlling the result, effect ively returning us to 
absolute delegation.317 We note in response that the device of the 
independent director committee could be drawn on instead. The 
procedure would be the same one we propose for reincorporation. 
The shareholder proposes the formation of a committee to consider 
the best means of unbundling the firm; the committee reports back 
with its best proposal; the shareholders vote yes or no, with no being 
a vote for the status quo. Since a choice must be presented, 
management's agenda control is broken. The special committee 
31.5. See Shepsle & Weingas t, supra note 258. at 69; see also Kenneth A. Shepsle, 
Sw dying !nsrirwions, Some Lessons from rh e Rational Choice Approach, 1 J. T HEO RETICAL 
POL. 131, 135 ( 1989) (arguing that cycling majorities a re not a major problem). 
For a survey of the anticycling literature containing a useful raxonomy of exp lanations 
for stab ility or induced equilibrium , see DONA LD P. GREEN & IAN SHAP IRO, 
PATHOLOGI ES OF RATIONAL CHOICE TH EORY: A CRITI QUE OF A PPLI CATIONS IN 
PO LITICA L SCIE NCE 11 4-20 (1994). Green and Shapiro divide the ex isting accounts into 
three groups. Th e first contends that equilibrium results i'rom in fo rm ation costs and 
legisla tive specializa tion caused by the existence of a system of permanent comm ittees. 
The second school of though t holds that induced stability res ult s fr om a range of speci al 
preference fom1a ti ons-for example, a quasi-concave preference distr ib ution in connection 
with a supermajority voting requirem ent. The third group , which includes Shepsle and 
Weingast, asse rts that stability stems from institution al arrangements. Green and Shapiro 
add a few additiona l factors to the ca talog drawn from outside th e confines of rational 
choice theory-comp utational difficulty, political infeas ibility. and a regime of 
metapreferences that works to avoid confli ct. 
316. O le-J orgen Skog, 'Volante Generate' and th e Inswbilitv of Spmia/ Voring Games , 
6 RATI ONA LITY & Soc. 271, 282-84 (1 994), argue that McKelvey's theory of global cycling 
depends on the assumption that individuals are ab le to di scr iminate be tween alternatives 
that are very close. In Skog's view, this ass umption is unrea li st ic; if it is re laxed the 
general instability of two-dimensi onal spatial voting games disap pears . 
317. See Gordon, Shareholder lniria1ive, supra note 29, at 363-64. 
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serves the same cycle-breaking function here as does the legislative 
committee. Of course, it would not guarantee the result of effective 
shareholder choice. The committee could resort to subterfuge to get 
the result management wants, reporting a manifestly unpalatable 
alternative to the status quo. However, the initiative is destabilizing 
nonethe less. The initial shareholder vote to convene the committee 
signa ls that divisions of the firm may be up fo r sale. If the sign al 
-,vere to a ttract a third-party offer, suppression by the sp,:;ci<l ! 
committee would be substantially constrained.m 
Given the availability of a process rule that restricts shareholder 
choice, we are not at all sure that cycling need be a problem with 
respect to initiatives on investment and disinvestment. As Gordon 
also noted,3 19 however, consistency over time might be such a 
problem: Shareholders could decide to invest in one period and 
disinvest in the next period, with costly results. Given the problem of 
asymmetric information, and the possibility of rent-seeking on the 
side, we conclude that the risks attending initiative on matters of 
inves tment and disinvestment are prohibitive. 
Cycling could in theory occur with process and structure matters, 
even though the immediate financial incentives that motivate the 
shareholders in Gordon 's examples would be absent. Conceivably, 
one proponent could propose a compensation committee, a second 
could propose a specific, self-executing investment compensation 
scheme requiring no committee, and a third could propose a compen-
sation scheme resembling the sratus quo. H owever, no cycling would 
occur here under our proposal, even though it would open the door 
to any proponent or group of proponents meeting a threshold 
percentage ownership requirement. We have included a process rule 
that prevents cycling:320 Proposals only may be considered at the 
annual meeting, and under the proxy voting system, proposals are 
submitted for a one-round majority vote. The problem stemming 
from unlimited access would not be cycling but inconsistency of 
result-for example, both the status quo based and the new compen-
sation scheme could be approved. A breaker rule could be included 
to deal with this problem. If management deems two proposals to be 
inconsistent, it refers the matter to a third-party adjudica tor. If the 
proposals are then found to be inconsistent, the first in time reaches 
31 8. See cases cited supra note 117. 
31 9. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative , supra note 29 , at 364-65. 
320. STEV EN J. BRAMS, THEORY OF MOVES 187-93 (1994) (showing that there a re very 
simple ways to employ process rul es to break voting cycles). 
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the agenda.321 Two candidates are available for this adjudica tory 
role-the SEC staff and the independent directors ' committee. We 
prefer the latter in theory, but since any disputed matter would find 
its way to the SEC staff in any event , the former amounts to the 
practical choice. In either case, a result is reached and there is no 
cycling. O ne problem remains : the possibility of inconsistency over 
time322 and attend an t costs.323 
We thi nk th e consistency problem is minima! , eve n absent a 
breaker rule. \Ve envis ion a percentage ownership requ irement keyed 
to institutional ho lding patterns and set high enough so that two or 
three institutions must coordinate their efforts in support of the 
proposal. The idea is to rely on the practice pattern to ensure process 
coherence. The leading players in the shareholder participation 
movement have been motivated by reputational gain.324 Process 
and structure initiatives that lead to conflicts with other institu tional 
players hold out little prospect of reputational enhancement.325 
321. Here , a possi bi lity fo r management manipula tion opens up. If management hea rs 
of a proposa l, it arranges with a friendly shareholder to propose an inconsistent proposa l 
first. Assume that manageme nt wants to block a proposa l fo r a compensa ti o n committee. 
The manageme nt nominee would propose that th e charter, which says nothing about 
compe nsa tion committees, be amended to say the corporation shall not have a 
compensa tion committee . The result is the status quo on e ither a yes or a no vote. To 
avoid thi s prob lem, proposa ls that have a status quo effec t would have to be excepted from 
the first-in -t ime rul e . 
322. This prob lem easily could be treated with a provision that bars, for a period of 
years, any subseq uent shareholder initia ti ve on the subjec t matter cove red by a successfu l 
initiat ive. 
323. An extension of o ur proposal toward the terr itory of investmen t and dis investment 
should now be suggested. Access could be granted to ame nd the charte r to broaden the 
statut ory li st or transactions th a t must be submitted for sha reholder app rova l. Under such 
an access perm ission , share holders could require vot ing for acquisi tions effected under 
triangula r me rgers, large asse t purchases, and othe r signi ficant transactions that prese ntl y 
can be d fect eci in the boa rd room in many states. Such an expanded voting regime is 
extensive ly discussed as a mandatory propos ition in Lyn n L. D all as, The Comrol and 
Conflict of !meres/ Vo1ing Systems, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1, 47-71 (1992); see also Rock, Dark 
Side, supra note 161, at 1023 (noting share holder approva l of specia l issue of preferred 
stock). 
Unde r a mo re aggressive form of this ex tension , the shareholde rs would have a 
privilege to legislate not on ly a veto but a right of initiative. For example, a cha rt e r 
provision might permit initiation of a me rger or asset sa le . At this point the line between 
process and structure and substance is breached ve ry clea rly. 
324. See supra text accompanying notes 200-08. 
325. Cf BRAMS, supra note 320, a t 118-19. Brams notes that reputation and moving 
power are best understood in the sam e light : Where a player establishes a reputation and 
the reputation is ackn owledged by an opponent, "it may n o longer be necessa ry for players 
physica ll y to cycle to ·prove ' themselves . Mental moves will then suffice. and a player wi th 
recognized mov ing powe r may then get its way without sufferin g th e costs of ac tll a ll y 
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Furthermore, in a case in which a proposal responds to a bargaining 
impasse with a long-term target or comple te noncooperation from a 
new target, one would anticipate coordination and information sharing 
among the institutions involved in the campaign.326 Finally, since 
reputational gain here ultimately depends on vote-getting ability, we 
would expect proponents to select thei r proposals and targets wit,l1 
care.327 
CONCLUS ION 
This A rticle began by comparing the regulatory strategy of 
enforced self-regulation with the historic alternatives of market and 
fiduciary deterrence, commending self-regulation as a means to 
cooperative solutions to corporate agency problems. H aving surveyed 
the emerging self-regulatory field , and after making a proposal for its 
expansion, we close by noting the modesty of the benefits we project. 
An experiment with process and structure access very well might 
result in no significant changes, either due to sporadic utilization of 
the access privilege, or a cooperatively based response by the larger 
group of shareholders against the forcing of governance terms on 
managers, except in extreme, end-period situations. In the alter-
native, extensive and underinformed utilization could conceivably 
cause incentive or other contractual problems in given firms. 
However, we think management has sufficient resources and enough 
of an informational advantage to protec t firms from this problem. On 
cycli ng." !d. 
326. Here we draw by analogy on S hepsle & We ingast, supra no te 258, a t 64-69. 
She psle and Weingast a rgued that legisla tive ou tcomes a re no t in flux, but disp lay 
system at ic regularities, due in part to the disproporti on a te influence on outcomes o f 
m embers of powerful committees. Ce rtain members. by virtue of th e control over process 
derived from their committee pos itions , are able to transl a te their preferences into 
legisla tive ac ti on . Shepsle and Weingast call this "structure -induced equilibrium," which 
means that an institution can be mod e ll ed as an ex tensive form game due to th e 
combination of process sequ ence and the identity o f th e individual players . A t th e bottom 
lin e, the structure-induced eq uili b rium is an al ternati ve th a t is invulnera ble. The earli er 
social choice models, in contrast, relied on an atom isti c s tructure lacking th e features 
essential to un derstanding th e nature and di stribution of the ac tors' pre ferences. 
327. We m ake this proposal for limited federal int e rven tion without an expectation of 
a favorable political clim a te . In fac t, the proposa l con ta ins a takeover-friend ly aspect that 
wo uld make it politically controversial. Shareholders co uld use it to force poison pill 
redemption or to o pt o ut of state ant itakeove r statues co nta ining open-e nded opt-out 
provisions. See D EL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(b) (3) (1991). 
Since access would fa cilitate shareholder defection in the eve nt of a takeo ve r, it also 
wou ld do nothing to ame liora te th e problem that takeovers present for re lationa l 
share ho lde r part ici pa ti on strategies. 
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our most sanguine projection, charter access, used responsibly and 
occasionally, would bring process rules that lower management-
influence costs to a small group of mature firms. Our hope is that 
competitive evolution would then take its course, so that other firms 
voluntarily adopt the rules that work best. From there, we would 
hope that responsible and occasional use of charter :J.ccess encourages 
ongoing contractual innovation, with all players contributing: 
institutional agents, managers, and lawyers. 
Some years ago, a corporate law debate over the des irability of 
mandatory and enabling rules came down to sim ple difference of 
opinion. The enabling side emphasized the importance of innovation 
and flexibility; the defenders of mandates emphasized process 
infirmities. The discussion here goes back to that point of difference. 
State law has done an excellent job of assuring that firms can draft 
contracts that accord managers freedom of action to invest and 
disinvest, but it has not evolved to open up all possibilities for 
productive firm contracting. State law remains the best vehicle for 
realizing those possibilities, but a demand-side barrier prevents state 
law experimentation. An incidental federal intervention taken to 
facilitate the experiment will not hurt the state system, and it might 
do the system some good. 
